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Essays on the Political Economy of Corruption and Rent-Seeking
Abstract
The dissertation is made up of three papers on the political economy of corruption and
rent-seeking. Two of the papers make use of the historical experience of Britain to illustrate
the theoretical points being made. The ﬁrst paper shows that eighteenth-century Britain
displayed patterns of corruption similar to those of developing countries today. To explain
anti-corruption reforms, the paper develops a model in which the political elite is split
between government oﬃcials and asset-owners. Government oﬃcials can act in one of two
regimes: a corrupt one in which they are free to maximize their income from the provision of
government goods, and one in which a regulated system leaves no room for individual proﬁt
maximization. Faced with a change in the level of demand for government goods, oﬃcials
become able to extract rents at a level that leads to other members of the elite voting to
enact reforms. The logic of the model is tested using a new dataset of members of the House
of Commons and its main implications are validated.
The second paper develops a model of how the British political class came to give up its
power to extract rents from the economy between the 1810s and the 1850s. The key of the
explanation lies in understanding the bargaining process between economic agents who seek
permission to engage in economic activity and a legislature that can grant such permissions.
The third paper analyzes the distributive eﬀects of corrupt interactions between govern-
ment oﬃcials and citizens. Corruption is modeled as a solution to an allocation problem
for a generic government good G. Beyond a transfer from citizens to the government, cor-
ruption redistributes welfare towards “insiders” who share some natural connection to the
government and to other insiders. Corruption also redistributes welfare towards those who
are skilled in imposing negative externalities, and encourages the imposition of such negative
externalities.
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ivChapter 1
Elites and Corruption: A Model of Endogenous Reform
and a Test Using British Data
Eighteenth-century Britain displayed patterns of corruption similar to those of developing
countries today. Reforms enacted in the late 18th and early 19th centuries eliminated most
of these patterns. This paper develops a model in which the political elite is split between
government oﬃcials and asset-owners. Government oﬃcials can act in one of two regimes: a
corrupt one in which they are free to maximize their income from the provision of government
goods, and one in which a regulated system leaves no room for individual proﬁt maximization,
but monitoring eﬀort is required. Faced with a change in the level of demand for government
goods, oﬃcials become able to extract rents at a level that leads to other members of the elite
voting to enact reforms. The logic of the model is tested using a new dataset of members of
the House of Commons and its main implications are validated.
Introduction
In a society pursuing the maximization of aggregate welfare, government workers provide
governance goods and earn an income in exchange for doing so that is enough to keep them
from switching to other jobs, that is, they earn competitive returns. While the government
is eﬀectively a monopoly, supplying a service that cannot be supplied by private enterprise,
in the ideal case government oﬃcials are prevented from taking advantage of this monopoly
and maximizing their income: Laws establish the conditions under which government goods
must be provided, and mandate returns on government activities that are enough for this
to happen. For the purposes of this paper, corruption is deﬁned as a a situation in which
1government oﬃcials, using their monopoly power, do manage to maximize their utility from
the provision of government goods. A similar deﬁnition of corruption has been adopted by
Shleifer and Vishny (1993)—”the sale of government goods for private gain”, and is implicit
in the widely used deﬁnition provided by the World Bank (1997)—”the abuse of public power
for private gain”.
As the presence of corruption has been argued to have negative eﬀects with respect to
eﬃciency and distribution, a literature seeking to explain its determinants has developed.
Empirical research eﬀorts that use corruption as the dependent variable have mostly gone
in two directions. One is that of cross-country studies, as there is signiﬁcant variation in the
levels of corruption encountered throughout the world (Treisman, 2007). Another direction
has been to look at small scale variation in corruption in a certain organization, in the context
of a natural or ﬁeld experiment (Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2003, Olken, 2007). This paper
takes a third approach, by looking at large-scale changes in the level of corruption in a single
country. This kind of variation is most relevant for the larger policy question at hand: what
are the conditions under which a given corrupt country can enter a radical transformation
that pushes its political, administrative, and economic system towards a state which is
closer to the ideal case? The answer would be more interesting if it did not rely on electoral
constraints to induce the change, as often the puzzle is precisely explaining why a given
country has high corruption in spite of democratic political institutions, that is by keeping
the electoral constraint constant. The answer would also arguably be more interesting if it
did not rely on violent revolution by the citizens, as this does not seem like an attractive way
of reducing corruption. What is needed therefore are examples where there was variation in
the level of systemic corruption that was not given by variation in electoral mechanisms and
outcomes or by popular revolutionary pressure.
These kinds of endogenous transformations are rare in the data. The case of Britain in the
late 18th and early 19th century however, is an obvious candidate. An extensive literature
in political economy has looked at, or has drawn inspiration from, the historical experience
2of Britain when discussing institutional evolution, perhaps because the gradual and peaceful
changes that England/Britain engaged in after the Glorious Revolution of 1688 are seen as
especially successful. North and Weingast (1989) and Stasavage (2002, 2003) concentrate on
the emergence of parliamentary control over aspects of public policy, Acemoglu and Robinson
(2006) as well as Lizzeri and Persico (2004) analyze franchise extension through the Reform
Bills of 1832 and 1867, and Cox (1987) looks at the emergence of modern party organizations
that led to the preeminence of the executive over the legislative. This paper argues that in
addition to these three institutional transformations, the elimination of corruption from
public administration is another crucial change in the British institutional structure, and
it too oﬀers lessons that go beyond the case of Britain. So far there has not been a lot of
attention paid by political scientists on this topic, and the body of work that does exist, by
historians, tends to be descriptive rather than analytic.1
The starting point of the argument is showing that Britain in the 18th century had, using
any reasonable deﬁnition, a lot of corruption. The patterns to be described in the following
were given the name “old corruption” by radical contemporaries such as William Cobbett
and John Wade, and the debates around them will seem familiar to any student of the
developing world of today. Starting with around 1780, much of this system was reformed in
a gradual fashion. The British political world of the middle and late 19th century might have
still been iniquitous, un-democratic, and ineﬃcient, and the economic world highly unequal
in its distribution of resources, but the explicitly corrupt features of the 18th century were
clearly gone. The most direct evidence for that comes from the work of W.D. Rubinstein
(1983): While at the beginning of the 19th century, many individuals who had been nothing
but public servants their entire careers left immense fortunes at the time of death, by the
1The most useful works by historians that address this topic directly are: First, W.D. Rubinstein’s (1983)
article “The End of “Old Corruption” in Britain 1780-1860” in which he uses probate records to look at
the wealth of government oﬃcials; then Philip Harling’s (1996b) book “The Waning of “Old Corruption”:
the Politics of Economical Reform in Britain, 1779-1846”, in which he argues that the reforms were enacted
by the elite to legitimize its dominance in an age of political upheaval on the continent; and Norman
Chester’s (1981) “The English Administrative System 1780-1870”, a very detailed description of the changes
in administration in that period.
3middle of the 19th century this phenomenon was gone. Other pieces of evidence to be
described lead to the same conclusion.
Britain’s case is interesting because the changes came in a period in which electoral
constraints were kept constant: the United Kingdom of 1830 was just as undemocratic as
the Britain of 1780. Also, while some radicals in this period hoped to generate the same sort
of popular uprising that had been experienced by France in Britain, it will be argued that
this kind of revolutionary pressure was also unimportant. The end of old corruption was
an entirely intra-elite process, which came about because of parliamentary and executive
decisions which transformed the administrative system and the nature of public oﬃce. This
paper shows, using a formal model, that the conditions inside the British elite of the late
18th and early 19th century were such that an exogenous shock given by the increased
government activity during by the wars against the thirteen colonies and against France led
to the replacement of the old corrupt system with one which sat closer to the ideal model.
The formal model shows that corruption can be understood as a way to achieve the
production of government goods without paying the costs of setting up a professionalized
bureaucracy. Under corruption, oﬃcials produce government goods in order to extract rents
from this activity. When government activity is small as a share of the economy, the losses
in citizen welfare from this system might be small in absolute value, and might not justify
setting up the non-corrupt system. When the amount of government activity increases, the
losses from corruption increase as well. The key factors determining whether this causes an
endogenous reform of the corrupt system are the composition of the elite and the institutional
structure under which interactions inside the elite take place. These two factors determine
how many members of the elite are beneﬁting, either directly or indirectly, from corruption.
The institutional structure and elite composition in 18th-19th centuries Britain was such that
a majority of the elite did not beneﬁt from corruption, and they therefore imposed reforms.
Arguably, this would not be the case in contemporary settings, which might explain why
similar transformations are hard to achieve in the contemporary world.
4The empirical test of the theory relies on a newly-collected dataset of members of the
House of Commons, together with their individual characteristics and voting record. Data
on some 1700 Members of Parliament (MPs) comes from two main sources: voting data
from Donald Ginter’s (1995) collection of roll call votes in the pre-1820 House, as well as
biographical data extracted from the History of Parliament collection of volumes using an
automated procedure. This data is used to validate the the predictions of the formal model.
Alternative theories that could be hypothesized to explain voting patterns are shown to fail
to do so.
This paper contributes to the literature on institutional change by analyzing the disap-
pearance of an institutional outcome which has proven to be highly resilient in other settings.
In the model, change occurs as a result of an elite’s response to changing external conditions,
rather than as a result of popular pressure. The model therefore is a complement to Ace-
moglu and Robinson’s (2006) classic model of franchise extension as a result of revolutionary
pressure. The model also complements the work of Lizzeri and Persico (2004): in their pa-
per, ineﬃciencies in government activity are caused by the electoral incentives of politicians,
and therefore an increase in the ineﬃciency leads to the reform of the electoral incentives.
In this model, ineﬃciencies arise from the technology of production of government goods,
and therefore increases in the ineﬃciency lead to reforming this technology. As in Tilly’s
(1992) classic theory, war is the exogenous factor that changes the relative costs of diﬀerent
institutional setups. The external shock translates in institutional change that is Pareto-
suboptimal for the elite because of the diﬃculty of enforcing Pareto-improving agreements
between parties in a setting with no outside enforcement, as in Acemoglu (2003).
5Old corruption: Britain in the 18th and early 19th cen-
turies
Samuel Huntington (1968) was among the ﬁrst to point out that the developed and relatively
un-corrupt countries of today had been corrupt in the past. The argument that corruption
was a central part of the British political system of the 18th century will be developed in the
following. Simply put, before the 19th century, public oﬃce in Britain was for many oﬃcials
a source of private proﬁt ﬁrst and foremost, even if the letter of the law indicated otherwise
and in spite of the fact that this was often condemned.
The details of the British political system of this period have been extensively discussed
elsewhere (Namier, 1929; Briggs, 1959; Woodward, 1962; Turner, 1999, are classic historical
references). Great Britain (before 1801), and the United Kingdom (after the 1801 inclusion
of Ireland), was an oligarchy with relatively strong control of the executive by Parliament,
very limited franchise, and rather un-competitive elections. Sitting in Parliament was not
remunerated and there were strict property qualiﬁcations for doing so. The king (or queen)
was the head of the executive, but his or her role was constrained by a history of Parlia-
ment removing the monarch when he or she stepped outside of boundaries Parliament was
comfortable with (in the Glorious Revolution of 1688), and by the personal characteristics
of King George III (ruled 1760 - 1820), who was often incapacitated by illness. The monarch
selected a prime minister and other members of the cabinet, and while a consistent practice
of the cabinet resigning when it lost important votes in the House of Commons had not
yet emerged, the make-up of the cabinet did reﬂect the balance of power in the House. As
running in elections was a personal enterprise by the candidate himself, there were no parties
in the modern sense that could constrain MPs’ behavior (Cox, 1987; Briggs, 1959). MPs
were often categorized in shifting and possibly overlapping groups such as the “Rockingham
Whigs”, “Pittites”, “Foxites”, etc. The names of these groups usually reﬂected the political
leader which MPs were most loyal to, even if that political leader did not have ways of con-
6straining or even rewarding their behavior. Most MPs took pride in professing independence
of opinion rather than the following of a party line.
Elections were based on a limited franchise with very heterogeneous rules from one district
to another. There were some eight types of franchise: County franchise, some six types
of borough franchise, and the special seats for the two ancient universities. Voting was
public, and local elites, most often the great landowners, did not hesitate in indicating
what the appropriate choice was to the limited number of electors. The subservient relation
between electors and patrons has been subject to much debate (Namier (1929) argues that
the system was profoundly non-competitive, while O’Gorman (1989) argues in favor of a
higher level of competitiveness than what is usually believed), but it is generally agreed that
voters accepted the legitimacy of a system in which patrons and candidates oﬀered positive
incentives (gifts, money, liquor) as well as more subtle negative incentives in exchange for
voters’ support. Many districts however had no semblance of electoral competition, as one
individual possessed all of the voting rights for the district, through owning all the land that
gave rise to those voting rights—the notorious “rotten boroughs” such as Old Sarum. As
the “inﬂuence” of the patrons was generally known and accepted, most elections were not
contested: throughout the period, at every election, only about 20 to 30 percent of districts
were contested.
The administrations of the period were generally conservative, or “Tory”, using a later
term, in that they did not follow the program of democratization or extension of civil rights
to Catholics which was favored by the more progressive elites. Administrations generally, but
not always, maintained comfortable majorities of MPs who approved of their actions in the
House. Key events and personalities of the period are as follows: After 1773 the government
of Lord North was rocked by the move towards independence by the thirteen American
colonies and began an overseas war to prevent this in 1775. As was always the case in the
18th century, the way this massive war commitment was ﬁnanced was through borrowing
(Brewer, 1990). Perceived mismanagement of the war eﬀort led to the loss of support in the
7House for North in 1782, and he was the ﬁrst prime minister to resign after losing a motion
of no conﬁdence. After a brief period in which more reformist “Whig” politicians formed
the cabinet, in 1783 the twenty-four year old William Pitt became prime minister. Pitt was
prime minister until 1801, and then again from 1804 to 1806, when he died. In the interlude,
a Pitt protege, Henry Addington was prime minister. Pitt’s administration is often called
Tory, using the later sense of the word, as it favored cautious reforms, respect for the king’s
role in government and conservative economic policies. During his time, Britain entered its
prolonged conﬂict with revolutionary France, which lasted from 1793, with interruptions,
until 1815. This war eﬀort was enormous when compared to the limited commitments of the
18th century, and was ﬁnanced through a large increase in the public debt as well as through
increased taxation. After a brief coalition “ministry of all the talents” in 1806, the sequence of
Pittite/Tory cabinets was re-established and continued until 1830 when Wellington became
the ﬁrst sitting prime minister to lose an election to the Whigs of Earl Grey.
There are many aspects of the British political and administrative systems of the time
which could be given as examples of their corrupt nature. Here they are grouped in four
categories:
A. Sinecures. The principle of patronage in public appointments was universal, and
it would not be replaced with competitive appointments until the second half of the 19th
century (Chester, 1981). Some public oﬃce appointments, however, were more criticized
than others: so-called sinecures, that is jobs without any real responsibilities, were routinely
awarded by governments to friends, family, and those who could provide political support
in Parliament. Some of the most obvious sinecures were the ancient positions at the royal
court: chamberlains, Grooms of the Royal Bedchamber, the Master of the Buckhounds, etc.
Those appointed to these positions did not perform such menial jobs, but merely collected
substantial sums from the government purse. Such an appointee could expect from about
£500 a year to £2,000 a year, using ﬁgures from the History of Parliament (1988). These
8were very considerable sums by any measure.2 Less obvious were positions which were
associated with real government activities, but were clearly not meant to be performed by
the title-holder: “comptrollers”, and “auditors” of various government functions were typical
examples of such positions. There also existed positions that did carry responsibilities, were
generously reimbursed, but for which it was agreed that the title-holder would delegate the
exercise of the job to a low-paid subordinate. The fact that this was tolerated is connected
with the general view of what public oﬃce was, which is presented in point 2 below. There
is a natural controversy over what constituted a sinecure, so it would be hard to establish
the number of sinecures and their monetary value. A rough estimate of the number of major
sinecures in the administration would be that there were one to two thousand, going by the
fact that various estimates of how many had been eliminated sum up to more than 1,200,
and a parliamentary committee from 1812 counted 342 still left (Foord, 1947). It is likely
that the total sums wasted in this manner were not large as a share of total spending, but
their symbolic nature made them a prime target for reformers. Access to sinecures, while not
very publicly discussed, was seen by many as a normal perk of political power: governments
were expected to reward their supporters in Parliament with such positions (Namier, 1929,
is a classic account of how the patronage system worked).
B. The public employee as an unregulated income maximizer. More fundamental
than the outrageous but limited case of sinecures was the general perception of public oﬃce
as private property to be used for enrichment by government oﬃcials, often in spite of laws
saying otherwise. Using evidence from Chester (1981) the main features of the 18th century
administrative system can be distilled as:
a. Public oﬃce as a form of property. A position in administration, once awarded, was
de facto the property of the holder for life. This is even though nominally, by 1780, most
oﬃces were awarded at pleasure by the executive.
2Using 1780 as a reference year, £1,000 would be worth about £100,000 in 2010 using the retail price
index as a measure of inﬂation, but about £1,200,000 using increases in average earnings (using the price
indices by Oﬃcer, 2011).
9b. Public oﬃces were bought and sold. Oﬃcials could sell the oﬃce they had under control
to an interested party, or could sell the “reversion” of the oﬃce, that is, they could set up
a contract that transferred the oﬃce to the new holder right as the old holder died. This
meant oﬃces were often not only given away for life but in perpetuity. This happened even
though there were statutes clearly prohibiting such practices. In 1725 the Lord Chancellor
was impeached for selling an oﬃce, and was ﬁned £30,000, but this did not prevent the
practice from continuing.
c. Remuneration by fees in addition to salary. Most government oﬃcials, with the
exception of cabinet members and the pure sinecurists who did not perform any activity,
earned the vast majority of their income not from the salary paid from the government
budget, which was often low, but from the fees collected from citizens whenever the oﬃcial
or his subordinates interacted with the public. If demand for a given activity increased, it
was usual for the oﬃce-holder to hire more subordinates on his own, in order to respond to
such increased market demand. In the military, oﬃcers received a sum from the government,
and then had to pay for soldiers and provisions from that sum, taking the rest as their proﬁt.
The oﬃce holder was in practice an entrepreneur who was optimizing the provision of the
government good in order to maximize income. The incentives for performing the job well,
if any, came mainly from the need to have customers returning, not so much from the
possibility of being replaced for poor performance on the job. The corrupt character of the
fees system is that their level was not generally established by law, but rather was based on
usage. In addition to the oﬃcial fee, Chester notes that a need to pay “gratuities” also arose
sometimes. The gratuity could be paid for “civility, favour, or extra service, but it could
also purchase undue preference.”
The fact that very senior government oﬃcials were subjected to parliamentary inquiries
and impeachment votes for bribery and peculation suggests that bribery and embezzlement
were present at the highest levels. The case of the War Secretary, Lord Melville (Henry
Dundas), is the most famous. One of the most important members of Pitt’s cabinet, he was
10impeached for embezzlement of public funds, because of some £90,000 which had passed
through his hands as government minister, received from unknown sources, but were not
accounted for (Hansarda). He was acquitted in the impeachment trial in the House of Lords,
after being censured in the House. The commander-in-chief of the Army, the Duke of York,
was accused of traﬃcking army commissions with the help of his mistress. The future foreign
secretary, Viscount Castlereagh, was accused of oﬀering some positions in India as electoral
bribery, and a group of oﬃcials appointed to administer ships captured from the Dutch in
1795 were accused of embezzlement of funds. The corruption that reformers were ﬁghting
against was clearly not only in the form of excessive pay, but also took the form of bribes,
extortion, and embezzlement. The bribes and the fee system were natural complements: the
existence of the fee system allowed oﬃcials to easily take money from private individuals,
the path of which was easily then lost.
d. Exercise through deputy. Connected with the view of the public oﬃcial as an owner
and entrepreneur, it was often legally acceptable for a position to be exercised through
“suﬃcient deputy”. This also helped oﬃcials who held numerous oﬃces at the same time, a
situation which was tolerated.
e. The banking function associated with oﬃces. One of the consequences of the self-
contained, business-like nature of public oﬃce was that all money collected from citizens
belonged to the oﬃcer until it was time to pay some of them to the Exchequer or to other
departments. In the meanwhile, the oﬃcer could collect interest on the balance.
These features of public oﬃce are clearly indicative of a model where the government
oﬃcial acts like a utility maximizer who engages in interactions with citizens in which she
can use her eﬀective monopoly on the provision of the government good to extract rents.
Most of these features had evolved as the de facto equilibrium outcome rather than being
prescribed by laws. Legal provisions, generally accepted practices, as well as illegal but
tolerated practices blended together to make public oﬃce a source of proﬁt for its holder,
much like it is the case in contemporary corrupt countries.
11C. Government contracting not meant to maximize social welfare. When in-
teracting with private entrepreneurs, both on the borrowing and the spending sides, the
government did not transact in competitive markets, and therefore rents were available for
those who participated in these transactions. Government contracts for buying various goods
were not awarded through public tender until 1793, with political connections playing the
key role before that (Foord, 1947; Brewer, 1990; Briggs, 1959). Access to government debt
was also done in a non-competitive fashion. Until William Pitt became prime minister,
access to this debt was not done through market mechanisms but rather through a direct
award from the ministry: ”The general practice was for the minister to settle, with a few
select friends in the city, the terms on which they [the loans] should be made” (from Foord,
1947; also see Briggs, 1959).
D. “Inﬂuence”: bribes for the press and for voters. The fact that elections in
this period virtually always involved bribery of the voters or patrons, except for the case
in which the candidate had his own “pocket borough”, is well known (Namier, 1929). A
transaction in which a private political entrepreneur pays for some citizens’ votes from his
or her pocket does not ﬁt this paper’s deﬁnition of corruption, so it will not be analyzed
here. However, when the buyer of votes is the government and the funds being used are
from the public purse, this clearly does fall under the deﬁnition. The Treasury was the most
signiﬁcant provider of such bribes, with the districts thus controlled being called “Treasury
boroughs”. The use of public funds to buy favorable press is also widely acknowledged.
While some radical writers doubted as late as the 1830s that the system of old corrup-
tion had been aﬀected (John Wade’s series of “Black Books” are the best example of this
literature), a less charged analysis indicates that the system was largely gone by the 1820s.
Notwithstanding all the injustices of British politics and society in the middle of the 19th
century, all of the features of the corrupt system described above had been eliminated or
greatly reduced. There are two types of evidence for that: On the one hand there exists
evidence that the end results of a corrupt system ceased to be encountered after this pe-
12riod. W.D. Rubinstein’s (1983) work shows that the phenomenon of government oﬃcials
leaving impressive fortunes at the time of death was gone by the middle of the 19th century.
In addition to this, it is well established that by the 1820s the executive no longer had at
its disposal the extensive system of patronage that allowed it to buy oﬀ majorities in the
House of Commons, and that by 1830 the government could no longer buy oﬀ elections, as
Wellington lost the election of 1830 as a sitting prime minister. In 1819 Prime Minister
Lord Liverpool was complaining that he could no longer eﬀectively use patronage to reward
friends, and when Wellington became prime minister in 1828 he was “forcibly struck by the
lack of patronage at his disposal” (Foord, 1947).
On a more immediate level, there is the undeniable evidence of the legislation from 1779-
1820 which changed the nature of public oﬃce and severely limited the practices described
in the sections above. The beginning of the reform period can be placed in 1779, with
the emergence of a reformist movement in the House of Commons, which was closely as-
sociated with the political group of the Rockingham Whigs (followers of the Marquess of
Rockingham). Leaders of this movement, among which Edmund Burke was a notable ﬁgure,
attacked sinecures, the use of Civil List money to advance the interests of the Crown and
government, and the presence of government contractors in the House. Bills to prevent gov-
ernment contractors from sitting in the House, and to regulate some sinecures were passed.
The movement for economical reform was from now on permanently active in the House.
In 1780 the House established that it lies within its competency to “examine and correct
abuses” in the use of Civil List money (Foord, 1947). Between 1780-1787, a commission for
analyzing the public accounts appointed by the House published ﬁfteen reports on needed
reforms in the administrative system. These recommendations can be summed up as arguing
in favor of a modern “Weberian” bureaucratic system (Torrance, 1978). In 1782 Lord North
resigned upon the House registering its disapproval of the government, a ﬁrst, and the reform
eﬀorts continued during three short-lived Whig or coalition administrations. William Pitt,
who became prime minister in 1784, adhered to a reformist stance with respect to the public
13service, sinecures, and government contracting. While parliamentary activity on this front
was more reduced in the turbulent 1790s, when the events in France led Pitt to adopt a more
authoritarian regime and the progressive groups in opposition to have their legitimacy and
loyalty questioned, after 1800 the movement for administrative reform again became very
active in the House. In 1805, Lord Melville, the War Secretary was impeached for embezzle-
ment of funds, and after that more inquiries into the behavior of senior government oﬃcials
followed. The period 1805-1815 saw a very active eﬀort to enact changes in the nature of
public oﬃce. Looking speciﬁcally at the characteristics of the corrupt system outlined above,
the following paragraphs summarize the changes based largely on Chester (1981) and Foord
(1947).
The elimination of sinecures was one of the prime targets of reformers. As early as 1780,
the House passed bills aiming to eliminate some sinecures, and successive prime ministers
after that acted to reduce their numbers. Burke’s Act of 1782 further eliminated some
one hundred oﬃces. The nature of the elimination however, was not straightforward: as
the property rights of the oﬃcial over his oﬃce were considered beyond doubt, elimination
meant either not appointing a new oﬃcer when the old one died, or establishing that when
the current holder will die the post will be eliminated, or compensating the holder of an
oﬃce which was immediately eliminated with an appropriate sum of money. In this lies the
explanation for the fact that as late as 1830 radical writers such as John Wade presented
accurate lists of sinecurists in the administration: some positions which had been slated
for elimination as early as the 1780s were still there in the 1830s, as their holders had not
yet passed away. The Commissioners for the Public Accounts in the 1780s recommended
the elimination of sinecure oﬃces, but at the same time noted the necessity to respect the
property rights of the holders, and thus recommended monetary compensation as a solution
to the problem. Abolition when the oﬃce became vacant was achieved through acts of
Parliament in 1783 and 1798, and also through administrative decisions by prime ministers
to no longer ﬁll places which became vacant upon the death of the holder. Prime Minister
14William Pitt eliminated in this fashion hundreds of sinecures. When abolition was enacted
immediately, adequate compensation had to be provided by the Treasury, either as a lump
sum or as an annuity equal in value to the remuneration of the oﬃce. Parliamentary pressure
towards inquiring into and eliminating sinecures intensiﬁed after 1805 and the House passed
a bill in 1813 to regulate all sinecures. Even if many of the bills proposed in the House to
inquire into and regulate sinecures were defeated, it became impossible for any administration
in this period to have a policy other than the gradual elimination of all sinecures, which had
not been the case before. Parliamentary committees on sinecure oﬃces in the second decade
of the 19th century found that the few hundred still left were slated to be abolished upon the
death of the holder. Bills to establish a pension system for civil servants also helped remove
the justiﬁcation for sinecures as a form of pension. In 1809-1810 pensions for all civil service
staﬀ were established, and in 1817 the pension system was extended to political appointees.
Connected with the sinecures issue, an act was passed in 1809 preventing the awarding of
oﬃces as a bribe.
Successive acts of Parliament and the executive also changed the de jure and de facto
nature of public oﬃce: The ability of the oﬃce holder to buy and then dispose of his oﬃce as
he saw ﬁt was removed. An act in 1809 made selling oﬃces illegal, with the notable exception
of the Army (but not the Navy), where buying commissions was the accepted norm as late
as the 1850s. The switch from remuneration by fees to salaries was achieved mostly through
administrative action in individual departments: in 1782 the Treasury replaced the fee system
with salaries, the secretary of state’s oﬃce made the same change in 1795, the Navy Board
in 1796, the War Oﬃce in 1797, and the Admiralty in 1800. The right to exercise by deputy
was removed for individual oﬃces by various acts of Parliament (details in Chester, 1981).
The removal of the banking functions was achieved by joining the numerous accounts of the
public administration into a single one at the Bank of England, the so-called consolidated
fund established by Pitt in 1787.
The ability of the executive to provide rents through non-competitive contracting also
15disappeared: After becoming prime minister, William Pitt began selling treasury bonds on
the open market and began introducing competitive bidding for government contracts. After
the beginning of the war with France in 1793 the purchase of army and navy provisions was
transferred to an independent commission.
While private individuals paying bribes to voters continued to be the norm until much
later, the government’s ability to do this was severely curtailed. Foord (1947) details how
this became impossible between 1780 and 1820. Burke’s Act of 1783 required that money
from the Civil List (the sovereign’s funds) be divided into eight designated categories. Out
of these, only one, the privy purse, was the king’s private money to be spent as he wished.
“Secret service” money, which were funds that the king could hand out to individuals of his
choosing for services performed, was limited to a very modest £10,000. Curwen’s Bribery act
of 1809 made it impossible for the Crown to engage in transactions with borough patrons.
The control that the executive exercised over some electoral districts came from it employing
many individuals in those districts (e.g. in the Navy shipyards), rather than from its ability
to secretly pay borough patrons.
There are many other examples of small and incremental reforms of the administration,
some of which are technical in nature and better left to the historian of public administration.
This paper concentrates on the political conﬂict over these changes. As would be expected,
there was a lot of resistance in the House of Commons to such changes. Indeed, the existence
of support for reforms is the mystery, and the existence of such support can only be explained
in a very limited manner by electoral constraints, which were weak and did not become more
binding in this period. The analysis of the political conﬂict in the House of Commons over
these reforms, must make use of what limited evidence is left: as will be explained in the
statistical section, votes in the House in this period were not public, and there was not even
an oﬃcial record for posterity of how MPs voted. Data on some thirty “divisions” (roll-call
votes) in matters which are relevant for the subject at hand, is however available, and this
data will serve as a test of the proposed theoretical model. These votes are not by any means
16the full story of how corruption came to be eliminated in Britain (in fact they do not include
some of the most important bills of the reform process), but they do serve as useful tests of
hypotheses that emerge from the theoretical model.
Theory
In building a model of the reform in Britain, the following facts need to be taken in consid-
eration:
The make-up of the political elite. Britain was an oligarchy in which a small number of
men exercised eﬀective inﬂuence in public aﬀairs. The House of Commons was the arena
in which conﬂicting views among these individuals were resolved, with the House of Lords
serving as a veto point for the nobility. The large increase in the number of peerages awarded
during George III’s reign, and especially by William Pitt, meant that the House of Lords
came to also reﬂect the existing power structure in society.3 Virtually everyone in the House
of Commons was either such an inﬂuential individual or his immediate representative. Some
members of the House had a direct connection with the executive branch, by holding various
public positions which were remunerated. A large part of this group is made up of military
oﬃcers. Other members of the House relied on income from other sources, mainly the
ownership of assets, whether land or capital. Relatively few individuals in the House earned
a living by earning a wage on the private labor market. As being a member in the House was
not remunerated, there existed a large contingent of individuals who had eﬀective political
power but did not earn an income directly from that.
Business-government connections. In most modern-day economies, politicians, whether
in the executive or legislative, can aﬀect the distribution of welfare in society through reg-
ulation of various activities. An obvious example of such an intervention is the creation of
rents in the economy through restrictions in various markets (Krueger, 1974). The welfare
3Between 1776 and 1830, 209 new peerages were created, and the size of the House of Lords increased
from 199 to 358 (McCahill, 1981).
17of economic elites can obviously be aﬀected by these interventions. This gives rise to the
possibility of a deal in which economic elites tolerate behavior by politicians which is prima
facie hurtful to their welfare, in exchange for positive treatment from the latter group.
The business-government connection in Britain in the 18th and early 19th centuries. The
economic elite in Britain, made up of asset-owners and professionals, arguably had less need
for professional politicians and government employees in advancing its interests than it is
the case in the modern system presented in the previous paragraph. This is largely due to
two factors: One is that the economic elite had direct access to political power through the
legislature. An individual seeking a voice in politics could run (or pay) for oﬃce on his own
without the need to be part of a political party, and perhaps more importantly, without
the need to have any special political skills. The other, complementary, reason is that the
primary locus of rent seeking was the legislature rather than the executive. Brewer (1990)
presents the highly developed system of lobbies put in place by asset-holders to inﬂuence
policy in their favor in the eighteenth century. The key aspect of this system of lobbying
is that it primarily sought access to Parliament rather than to the executive or to public
administration. Similarly, Root (1994) is a detailed account of how rent seeking functioned
in Britain at the time: In contrasting it with France, Root argues that the crucial aspect
of the British system of rent seeking was the preeminence of Parliament as a venue for
advancing such objectives for interested parties, as opposed to the executive: “Parliament
was a market for rights to control the economy [...]”. It was the House of Commons that
could impose tariﬀs and other taxes, and therefore generate rents for the successful lobbies,
and it was the House that had to approve of any monopoly rights for entrepreneurs. Cox
(1987) also emphasizes that before the middle of the 19th century, Parliament was the main
source of legislation, and every MP could put forward any bill of his choosing. The case
of the landowners’ rent-seeking behavior and achievements is instructive: After 1793, trade
limitations with the continent due to the war increased agricultural prices. Fearing a fall in
prices, in 1804 and again in 1815 so-called Corn Laws imposed tariﬀs on the importation of
18agricultural products that aimed to maintain these higher returns on land (Briggs, 1959).
These laws came about through Parliamentary action, not because of the executive or public
administration oﬃcials, and Parliament was made up largely of the asset-owners themselves
rather than of professional politicians.
There were groups in the economic elite whose relation to the executive was much more
like that between modern-day business-people and politicians. While imperfect, a distinction
between economic elites that could advance their interests mainly though the House and those
that also needed the executive can be made in the data: Three groups among the “bourgeois”
MPs can be argued to be more likely to enjoy a special relation with the executive: those
forming the India bourgeoisie, who were associated with the East India Company, those
forming the West Indies interest, and those associated with the Bank of England. All three
groups represented private companies with deep connections to the executive and public
administration. (However, the distinction is imperfect in the data, because it is hard to
know how much of one individual’s assets were concentrated in these activities, as opposed to
land-ownership or other kinds of trade.) Root argues that while in internal economic aﬀairs,
Parliament had preeminence, “the colonies were, of course, quite another matter. They were
managed much the way the French ministries regulated the French domestic economy”. The
Board of Trade, made up of government ministers, and the various ministers that organized
colonial policy (the Secretary for the Colonies, then the Home Secretary, then the War
Secretary) handled legislation in the colonies in a manner quite diﬀerent from constitutional
practices in Britain. Consider ﬁrst the example of the “India interest”: the East India
Company was a private enterprise which had been given a monopoly on Indian trade and
also exercised governmental power in that territory. After 1773, a council appointed by
the Crown regulated the exercise of this power, and after 1784 six members of the cabinet
formed a commission that controlled the “political” actions of the company in the colony. The
running of the business of the company eﬀectively depended on the decisions of the British
executive. The case of the West Indies interest is similar: Traders and estate-owners in this
19group depended on governmental approval for the continuation of their quasi-governmental
role in the Caribbean. The Bank of England was a quasi-governmental private institution
which held a monopoly on the government’s banking operations since 1694. The Bank of
England and the East India Company, with their privileged role in the economic sphere,
are at the center of John Wade’s critique of old corruption in his “Black Books”. North,
Wallis, and Weingast (2009) also emphasize the dependence of these kinds of asset-owners
to the government: “Because each of the three monied companies depended on their close
connections with government for their privileges—and because other organizations could
not easily become corporations—the companies, their stockholders, and their representatives
were drawn by their interests to support the government”.
The distinctive feature that separates modern-day political elites from that of 19th cen-
tury Britain is therefore the existence of a group of independent asset owners and profession-
als that controlled the legislature. The fact that independent asset owners and professionals
formed a majority in the House throughout the period under analysis is shown by Judd
(1972). Figure 1 plots the share of total seats belonging to eight economic groups. As will
be explained in the empirical section, landowners, physicians, manufacturers, merchants,
lawyers and bankers were independent asset-owners or professionals, with the remaining cat-
egories of military oﬃcers and colonial businesspeople being made up of individuals who
were directly or indirectly dependent on government oﬃcials. (A more appropriate name for
landowners would be landowners-only, as every member of the House had to hold signiﬁcant
landed property to be allowed to be allowed to take oﬃce (Thorne, 1986). The other cate-
gories should all be understood as being in addition to the default landowner qualiﬁcation.)
Figure 1 shows that the independent part of the House, deﬁned conservatively as explained
above, formed a large majority of 65%-70% throughout the period under analysis. Judd does
not include MPs who were government oﬃcials or employees as a separate category. The
History of Parliament (Thorne, 1986) however, calculates the share of the House which could
be considered as being made up of government oﬃcials (including ministers), sinecurists, and
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Figure 1: Share of eight professional categories in the House. Source: Judd (1972). The
share of government workers computed form ﬁgures provided in Thorne (1986).
court employees at various points: in 1790 this was 22%, in 1806 and 1807, it was 17%, in
1812 it was 15%, and in 1818 it was 12%. Even allowing that a disproportionately large
share of these oﬃcials came from the six “independent” categories above, this still leaves a
majority of the House belonging to the independent group. These conservative calculations,
however, probably greatly underestimate the true nature of the dominance of independent
asset owners: Judd shows that when taking into account the considerable landed interests
of Members who are also listed in a other categories, “[...], it appears reasonable to assume
that about three-quarters of the 5,034 M.P.’s 1734-1832 [sic] were mainly concerned with
land rather than with other forms of wealth.”
Government outlays during the war. The American and French wars were signiﬁcant
shocks to the ﬁscal-military British state. The increase in government activity, as reﬂected
in increased expenditures, taxation, and ballooning public debt was unprecedented. Figures
2 and 3 illustrate this by plotting government income, expenditure, and debt in this period.4
4The data is taken from Mitchell (1988). Nominal sums are deﬂated by using the retail price index
computed from Oﬃcer (2011) to get sums in constant 1750 pounds. Much of the irregular aspect of the
graphs can be explained by the fact that prices oscillated from one year to the other far more than they do
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Figure 2: Left: Income and expenditure of the central government, constant 1750 pounds.
Data from Mitchell (1988). Right: Public debt, constant 1750 pounds. Data from Mitchell
(1988).
The large increase in expenditure after the 1775 beginning of the war in America pales in
comparison to the larger shock given by the beginning of the wars with France in 1793.
This will correspond in the theoretical model to an increase in the demand for a generic
governance good. Acting as unregulated utility maximizers, government employees were free
to take advantage of the increased demand for government products. Large increases in the
fees collected by oﬃce holders during the wars, and their role in encouraging demands for
administrative reforms have been noted by Foord, Chester, Harling, Brewer, and others.
The logic of reform presented in this paper can therefore be summarized by saying that
the increase in government spending caused by the two wars led to a change in the behavior
of the asset owners who controlled the levers of power. The system of uncoordinated rent
extraction in exchange for the provision of government goods that prevailed in the 18th
century might have been ineﬃcient, but it was self-sustaining: the need to attract future tax
or fee payments from citizens induced government oﬃcials to provide enough government
goods, to dissuade those holding ultimate political power from reforming. As the losses from
this system in a society with minimal government activity were small, there was no reason to
in modern economies. A graph for income and expenditure using nominal sums is far more smooth, and can
be found in Appendix C.
220
1
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
T
h
o
u
s
a
n
d
s
 
o
f
 
C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
 
1
7
5
0
 
P
o
u
n
d
s
1740 1760 1780 1800 1820 1840
Year
Debt service Civil government
Military
Customs
Excise
Stamps
Land
Post
Income
0
5
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
5
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
T
h
o
u
s
a
n
d
s
 
o
f
 
C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
 
1
7
5
0
 
P
o
u
n
d
s
1740 1760 1780 1800 1820 1840
Year
Customs Excise
Stamps Post
Land Income
Figure 3: Left: Types of expenditures in constant 1750 pounds. Data from Mitchell (1988).
Right: Sources of income in constant 1750 pounds. Customs taxes were taxes on foreign
trade. Excise taxes were levied on a number of goods, such as soap or beer. The income tax
was introduced in 1800, with marginal rates between 1% and 10%, and eliminated in 1816.
Data from Mitchell (1988).
incur the substantial costs entailed by the establishment of a modern administrative system.5
The increase in the amount of money that was up for grabs for the oﬃcials that came with
the wars, in conjunction with the collective action problem faced by the government workers
in the provision of a public good, meant that their ability to refrain from extracting an
excessive amount of rents broke down, which made other elites reform the system.
This informal logic can be analyzed through a model of repeated interaction between
players making up an elite: The members of the elite are either government oﬃcials, labeled
group O, of size nO, or economic elites labeled group E, of some large size nE. (Individual
players will be indexed by the corresponding lowercase letters o and e.) The two groups
are represented in a legislature by subsets of their members. The government oﬃcials in the
legislature are labeled group A, of size nA. Economic elites in the legislature are subdivided in
two groups, depending on their relation to the government oﬃcials: “Dependent” E players
5An illustration of the diﬀerence in costs between a reformed and a non-reformed department is the
diﬀerence between the most professionalized government department at the time, the Excise, and other
departments. While for example, in 1797 the War Oﬃce, was a simple operation with 58 employees, and
the Admiralty had 45 employees, the Excise was a complex organization, in which a lot of eﬀort went into
policing the more than 6,500 non-corrupt oﬃcials. Brewer (1990) describes the functioning of the Excise in
more detail.
23whose incomes depend on the actions of government players are labeled group B, of size
nB, and E players whose incomes do not depend on the actions of government oﬃcials are
labeled group C, of size nC. Note that the same players would be referred to as being part
of groups A,B, or C when discussing their voting behavior in the legislature, and as part of
groups E and O when discussing their other actions. The situation which is most relevant
for the case at hand is one in which members of group C form a majority in the legislature.
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Figure 4: Illustration of the stages of the repeated game
The interaction between the players takes the form of an inﬁnitely repeated game, in
which each period they make decisions regarding the allocation of endowments, the pro-
duction of government goods, and the status of corruption versus reform. This modeling
approach is most closely connected with that in Acemoglu (2003). As in that paper, inter-
actions between citizens and government agents are subject to a commitment problem, with
cooperation arising as a result of repeated interaction. The game is illustrated in Figure
4. One period of the repeated game is made up of one interaction between the agents: In
the ﬁrst stage of the period, legislators decide between interacting in a corrupt or reformed
system for that period, by taking a majority vote on a binary agenda containing the two
24options. The standard assumption that the players do no use weakly dominated strategies
in the voting equilibrium is made here. In case corruption is the outcome of this vote, in
the next stages resources are committed for the production of the government good and
its production takes place. In the second stage of the period, under corruption, economic
elites make an allocative decision: they each have an endowment which they can use for
private consumption or production of government goods. The government goods have to be
produced by government oﬃcials in group O. Government goods can be produced from the
tax income that economic elites hand out to government oﬃcials.6 The total tax payment
made by economic elites, T T, is equally shared among them, so T = TT
nE is the per-capita
tax payment, and then is distributed to the government oﬃcials as the vector [To1,...,Tono],
where
Po=nO
o=1 To = T T.
In stage three, each government oﬃcial receives the share of the tax payment To, and
decides how much of it to use for the production of Go and how much to keep as their
own rents Ro. The cost of producing one unit of G is 1 in terms of the numeraire. Each
government oﬃcial will produce a certain level Go of government goods, and will keep the
rest of the tax payment as a rent: Ro = To−Go. The total amount of public goods produced
is therefore
Po=nO
o=1 Go = G.
After this, players receive their payoﬀs. All players have generic quasilinear utilities for
private and public consumption. The utility function of E players is:
Ue = Pe + αu(G) (1)
The parameter α here serves to indicate changes in the utility of the public good, which
are of interest for the theory—an increase in α means that the public good is more valuable
relative to the private good. The u(G) function has standard properties: u0(G) > 0 (the
6The assumption that economic elites act cooperatively in paying the tax, and therefore that each E
player is bound to pay the tax that emerges from the group’s optimality conditions is made here. This would
correspond to a situation in which economic elites get to vote on the optimal contribution that each has
to make, rather than making that contribution voluntarily, arguably a good description of the situation in
Britain.
25public good is desirable), u00(G) < 0 (decreasing marginal utility), u(0) = 0, and u twice
continuously diﬀerentiable. Since the cost of production of one unit of G is 1, the optimal
level of provision of the public good for the E players, G∗∗, is given by the Lindahl-Samuelson
condition which sets marginal social utility equal to marginal social cost:
nE
∂
∂(G)
u(G
∗∗) = 1 (2)
The private-goods utility Pe is equal to the income we for each E player minus any
expenditures that must be made for the production of G: Pe = we − T where T is any
kind of expenditure that the E player makes for G to be produced. The income of some
E players can however be aﬀected by O players: Government oﬃcials control a number of
slots that generate income for those economic agents who are given the slots. An E player
who is a legislator and can receive such a slot is labeled as being part of group B and has
income either wb = w−S + wS in case the slot is awarded to b or wb = w−S in case it is not
awarded. Therefore wS is the income that is accrued as a result of the slot being awarded to
that economic agent, and w−S is the rest of the player’s income. Players in C (along with all
other non-B members of E) simply have private incomes wc = w which are not aﬀected by
the actions of the government. The rest of the paper assumes all incomes are large enough
so that the equilibrium tax payments can be made without resorting to credit, and also that
w, w−S, and wS are constants, for simplicity.
The utility of government oﬃcials is similarly a quasilinear sum of utilities for private
and government goods:
Uo = Po + αu(G) (3)
Government oﬃcials value government goods to the same degree as everyone else. Their
private utility is given by the “rent” that is left for each government oﬃcial after the tax
T has been paid by economic agents and the amount Go of government goods has been
26produced by each government oﬃcial. Therefore
Uo = Ro + αu(G) (4)
Ro = To − Go (5)
The notable fact about the strategic situation facing any individual government oﬃcial
is that while she faces the full cost of providing the G that is in her responsibility, she only
beneﬁts from that G in a very small proportion: for a given player o, and assuming all
other O players produce the total amount of government goods G, the cost of producing Go
government goods for o is Go, but the beneﬁt is only αu(G + Go)−α(G). Similarly, looking
at continuous variation the marginal cost of producing more G is 1 but the marginal beneﬁt is
only ∂
∂Gαu(G), which is nE times smaller than the cost. This is therefore a classic case of the
collective action problem facing any uncoordinated system of production of a public good.
When setting up the utility maximization problem for government workers, these terms will
be very small for large nE, so the following assumption will provide a simpliﬁcation of the
exposition:
Assumption 1: nE is large enough such that, in the oﬃcials’ optimization problems, ∂
∂Gαu(G) ≈
0 and αu(G + Go) − αu(G) ≈ 0.
In case reform is the outcome of the vote, then government oﬃcials are no longer free to
optimize how they provide the government good. In the reformed system, they get a ﬁxed
salary which reﬂects the opportunity cost of their labor and have to provide a ﬁxed quantity
of the good G. The salary earned by government oﬃcials is normalized to zero for simplicity,
and they therefore have to use all of the tax payment for the provision of G. Also T is set
at the level T ∗∗ that maximizes individual utility for the tax payers, indicated in (2). (The
total amount of government goods G∗∗ in (2) is nET ∗∗). In order to maintain this system,
economic elites have to pay the administrative cost c each period when the reformed system
is in place. In the reformed system, therefore, the per-period private utilities of members of
27the elite will be:
Pe,Reform = we − c − T
∗∗ (6)
Po,Reform = 0 (7)
The government-goods component of the utility function remains unchanged.
The process by which the dependent economic agents in B interact with the government
is modeled as a simple legislative bargaining process between each one of them individually
and a representative of the O group who is interested in maximizing the utility of all O players
(or of herself individually, the requirement would be the same in this case). Whenever a vote
on corruption or reform is taken, government oﬃcials can condition the awarding of the nB
rents, worth wS each, for that period, on the expressed votes of economic elites. The strategy
used by O in any equilibrium is one that maximizes the likelihood of generating votes in
favor of corruption (which will be shown to be optimal for government workers in case they
themselves favor corruption over reform): for the nB members of B, make a proposal for an
extended policy vector to replace the simple binary agenda B1 = (corruption, reform) with
the following composite binary agenda, where one component of the agenda is made up of
a vector of size two: B2 =

(corruption,wS),(reform,0)

. In this case, B players are voting
on the agenda B2, not on the agenda B1, which is the one being voted on by the C players.
Therefore, B players know that a vote for reform also means a vote to replace the rent wS
with 0, and adapt their best responses to the other players’ actions accordingly.
The equilibrium of the one-period game, without repeated play, and in case C forms a
majority in the legislature, is obvious once the incentives facing the individual government
oﬃcial are considered. The government oﬃcials cannot commit to not extracting the entire
tax payment as rents, because each one of them individually loses only a small amount of
public good utility by not providing any G, but would lose a large amount of private utility
by using the tax payment to produce G. The subgame perfect equilibrium of the period
28game can be computed through backward induction: In the third stage, without reform,
each government oﬃcial solves
argmax
Go
To − Go + αu(G) s.t. Go ∈ [0,To] (8)
The ﬁrst order condition U0
o = 0 leads to −1 = 0, because the eﬀect of the production of
G by one government oﬃcial on his or her own utility from overall G can be approximated by
zero by Assumption 1 (derivation in Appendix D). This suggests the solution Go ≈ 0, which
is the natural outcome of the strategic situation facing the individual government oﬃcial.
Knowing this, in the second stage, the economic elites solve:
argmax
T w − T + 0 s.t. T ∈ [0,w]
=⇒ T = 0 (9)
Knowing that their entire tax payment would be captured by government oﬃcials, eco-
nomic agents would not pay any taxes. This leaves them with the utility level Ue,Corruption =
we. When voting in the ﬁrst stage, players in C compare this to the payoﬀ from reform,
which is:
Uc,Reform = w − T
∗∗ − c + αu(G
∗∗)
The condition for reform is Uc,Corruption ≤ Uc,Reform ⇐⇒ w ≤ w−T ∗∗−c+αu(G∗∗),
which leads to the ﬁrst result:
Proposition 1: Without repeated play, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of
the game is determined by the condition c ≤ αu(G∗∗) − T ∗∗. If this condition holds,
all C players vote for reform in the ﬁrst stage and reform is enacted. If the condition
does not hold, corruption is the outcome of the game, the equilibrium tax payment is
T ∗ = 0 and the equilibrium amount of government goods produced is G∗ = 0.
29The condition that the administrative cost of reform is (much) smaller than the net utility
that public goods provision can bring to the economy is natural for the case at hand: a
lack of provision of G would correspond to an “anarchical” outcome in which no government
services are provided, and the assumption that reform is to be preferred to anarchy is made
for the rest of the paper:
Assumption 2: For the analysis in the rest of the paper, c ≤ αu(G∗∗) − T ∗∗.
Under these conditions, reform would always be enacted in the one-period game. Repeated
play, however, allows all players to reach better outcomes, and the fact that most corrupt so-
cieties have positive tax payments and positive production of the government good indicates
that such a Pareto-improving equilibrium is the one on which players will focus. Repeated
play allows the government to commit to extracting only a part of the tax payment as rents,
which allows the C players to continue tolerating the corrupt system, because in this man-
ner they can avoid paying the administrative cost of reform, and also get some government
goods. Similarly, government oﬃcials have an incentive to seek to commit to not extracting
the entire tax payment, as this allows them to gain some rents from corruption. In such
a game, players can build a cooperative (corrupt) equilibrium, sustained by punishment
strategies directed against individual government workers. The analysis of these cooperative
equilibria follows here.
The information structure of the inﬁnitely repeated game is one of perfect and complete
information, and it is common knowledge to all players. The equilibrium concept is subgame
perfect equilibrium. To maximize the likelihood of a cooperative equilibrium being sustained,
players use “trigger” strategies that postulate the most severe punishment in case of a devia-
tion from the prescribed cooperative behavior. The pure strategies used by all players in the
cooperative/corrupt equilibrium therefore are: For C players: vote for corruption in the ﬁrst
stage of each period, then, along with all other E players, pay a bribe T ∗
o to each o player in
the second stage as long that o player provides at least G∗
o government goods and extracts
at most R∗
o in rents; and switch to setting To = 0 forever for any oﬃcial that deviates from
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then extract R∗
o and provide G∗
o in every third stage of every period, as long as at least
the bribe T ∗
o is received, and switch to setting Go = 0 forever as soon as these conditions
have been violated. In addition, O players condition the private utility of the B players on
B players’ votes, as described above. B players use strategies where they always vote for
corruption, and pay the tax T ∗ every period in which corruption is present and T ∗∗ in every
period in which reform is enacted. In such an equilibrium, E players punish deviations from
cooperative behavior by individual O players by removing their tax payments rather than
by reforming the entire economy. The fact that these punishment strategies are most likely
to generate cooperative equilibria is explained in Appendix D.
The value functions of O players in this corrupt equilibrium and in the best one shot devi-
ation are given by the following two recursive equations (the asterisk denotes the equilibrium
path):
V
∗
o =
1
1 − δO
(R
∗
o + αu(G
∗)) (10)
V
OSD
o = T
∗
o + αu(G
∗) + δO
 
0 + αu(G∗)
1 − δO
!
(11)
Here OSD stands for the best one-shot deviation for one player, and δO ∈ (0,1) is the
discount rate of players in group O. For group O therefore, the value of staying in the
cooperative equilibrium is that of receiving the rents Ro as well as the government goods
for the foreseeable future. The value of the best one-stage deviation is that of capturing the
entire tax payment once, and then receiving no further payments forever. Note that this
requires that E players use strategies where faced with an individual deviation by one O
player, they punish just that one O player, by switching to the one-period equilibrium in the
interaction with him or her, rather than switching to the one-period (reform) equilibrium
in all interactions. Because the actions of any individual government player do not aﬀect
players’ total utility from government goods, by Assumption 1, when deviating from the
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face a (meaningful) change in the total utility provided by the public good, as indicated
in (11). For the postulated strategies to form an equilibrium, a necessary condition is that
V ∗
o ≥ V OSD
o .
The value functions on the equilibrium path and for the reform at the voting stage for
the C players are:
V
∗
c =
1
1 − δE
(w − T
∗ + αu(G
∗)) (12)
V
REF
c =
1
1 − δE
(w − c − T
∗∗ + αu(G
∗∗)) (13)
To these value functions needs to be added the value function for the punishment of one
individual o player who deviated, in order to show that punishing that o player individually
is credible. This individual-punishment value function is:
V
∗1
e =
1
1 − δE

w − T
∗1 + αu

G
∗1

(14)
Here T ∗1 is the optimal tax payments vector in which the constraint that the one o
player who has deviated always receives 0 in payments. For these strategies to form a
corrupt equilibrium it has to be that V ∗
c ≥ V REF
c , and that individual punishments of o
players, that lead to the value function V ∗1
e if applied, are credible. Moreover, it has to be
certain that if an equilibrium cannot be generated by the use of the individual punishment
strategy, than it cannot be generated by other strategies, notably strategies that postulate
switching to reform after individual deviations are observed. Appendix D shows that indeed
the punishment is credible and a more eﬀective punishment is not available to E players.
In the corrupt equilibrium, elites have to pay the equilibrium tax rate, which is used
for rents for the government oﬃcials and for the production of G∗ government goods. If C
players institute reforms, these persist into the future under the given equilibrium strategies.
Under the reformed system, they pay the administrative cost c as well as the tax T ∗∗, which
32is used entirely for the production of the optimal quantity of government goods G∗∗. At the
other point when C (and all other E) players need to select an action, stage two of every
period, it is easy to show that there are no proﬁtable one-shot deviations for E players from
the equilibrium strategy of paying T ∗: any positive non-zero tax payment T < T ∗ leads
to its conﬁscation by the government oﬃcials, and the beginning of the reform phase in
the next period. As having the payment be conﬁscated cannot be better than having some
positive-utility government goods be provided, such a deviation would never be proﬁtable.
Any proﬁtable deviation in which a total tax payment of zero is desirable for the E players
can only arise oﬀ the equilibrium path, as Assumption 2 ensures that C players would always
prefer enacting reforms in stage one rather than making a zero tax payment later on.
Any allocation of T, R and G that makes the two participation constraints, for O and
C players hold can generate a cooperative/corrupt equilibrium. The following analysis es-
tablishes necessary conditions for at least one such equilibrium to exist, and shows that a
suﬃcient increase in the demand for public goods, as indicated by α, will always lead to the
breakdown of any such corrupt equilibria.
The individual oﬃcial’s participation constraint is a simple trade-oﬀ between receiving a
rent forever and stealing the entire tax payment now, so to see if cooperative equilibria exist
as α increases, the oﬃcial’s constraint can be kept holding with equality. Doing this leads
to the following equilibrium condition (derivations of the following three results are found in
Appendix D):
R
∗
o = (1 − δO)T
∗
o (15)
The rest of the tax payment T ∗ will be returned as government goods, therefore
G
∗
o = δOT
∗
o (16)
G
∗ = nEδoT
∗ (17)
This shows that eﬀective marginal cost of one unit of G for the E group under corruption
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δO, higher than the cost of 1 under reform (because from a 1
δO payment, only 1 will be
used for public good production). From this it follows that the equilibrium tax payment T ∗
is deﬁned implicitly by the modiﬁed Lindahl-Samuelson condition that sets marginal total
utility equal to marginal total cost under corruption:
nEα
∂
∂(G)
u(G
∗) =
1
δO
(18)
This condition implicitly deﬁnes T ∗, by implicitly deﬁning G∗. Therefore, under cor-
ruption the tax payment is higher and/or the quantity of public goods is lower than under
reform, but under corruption the administrative cost c is not paid. The cooperation condition
given by V ∗
c ≥ V REF
c is therefore (derivation in Appendix D):
(αu(G
∗) − T
∗) − (αu(G
∗∗) − T
∗∗) + c ≥ 0 (19)
Appendix D shows that this condition is equivalent to requiring that the consumer surplus
under corruption plus the cost of reform are higher than the consumer surplus under reform.
It is clear that for low values of α this condition will always hold for positive c. For example,
as α → 0, both equation (18), which deﬁnes T ∗, and equation (2), which deﬁnes T ∗∗, indicate
∂
∂(nET)(nET ∗) → ∞ which leads to G∗ → 0,T ∗ → 0 and G∗∗ → 0,T ∗∗ → 0. This would make
the condition for corruption be c ≥ 0, which is always true. However, as the demand for
public goods increases, as indicated by an increase in α, the condition will be violated. The
proof of this proposition is provided in Appendix D. The intuition is simple: as public goods
become more important, economic elites would like to invest “a lot” in public goods. A cut
of this investment needs to be given to the government oﬃcials to keep them cooperating,
and as the required investment becomes higher, this cut will also become higher, hence the
losses generated by tolerating corruption will themselves become higher.
Proposition 2: There always exists an αRC beyond which reform is preferred by C players
to corruption. If α > αRC, then all C players vote for reform, while if α ≤ αRC,
34corrupt equilibria can be sustained.
If the reform condition holds for group C, then group B would not vote for reforms, as they
would get the same result (reform), but lose the extra proﬁts (this is under the assumption
that O players have a reason to condition the behavior of B players). The fact that all players
belonging to a group vote the same, even if any one player switching their vote would not
aﬀect their utility unless they happened to be pivotal, is given by the assumption that the
players do not use weakly dominated strategies in the voting equilibrium. An interesting
question is whether it is possible for the O players themselves to prefer reforms to corruption.
While under corruption they gain rents, it may be that the underprovision of the public good
makes them also prefer reforms instead of corruption, for severe levels of underprovision. The
condition for an O players to prefer reform to corruption is
V
REF
o ≥ V
∗
o (20)
1
1 − δO
(αu(G
∗∗)) ≥
1
1 − δO
(R
∗
o + αu(G
∗)) (21)
R
∗
o ≤ αu(G
∗∗) − αu(G
∗) (22)
However, the following result shows that as α increases, A players become less likely to
prefer reforms, so if they are non-reformist at low levels of α, they are sure to stay that way.
(The proof is presented in Appendix D).
Proposition 3: As α increases it will be the case that R∗
o > αu(G∗∗) − αu(G∗) and hence
A players become sure to prefer corruption.
As long as A players do not prefer reform, it is an equilibrium behavior for them to condition
the behavior of B players in order to induce them to not vote for reforms either.
It is instructive to consider what would happen in case a B player was pivotal, instead
of a C player, in the realistic case in which O players do not want reform. Now all non-
B players use the same strategies as above, with B players being the ones who must be
35dissuaded from voting for reforms. In this case, a vote for reform means losing a share of
the his or her income for the B player expressing it, so the condition for maintenance of the
corrupt equilibrium that applies to a pivotal B player, instead of (19), becomes (derivation
in Appendix D):
V
∗
b ≥ V
REF
b (23)
(αu(G
∗) − T
∗) − (αu(G
∗∗) − T
∗∗) + c + w
S ≥ 0 (24)
The choice of corruption or reform in case a B player is pivotal is given by the following
proposition (proof in Appendix D):
Proposition 4: If a B player is pivotal, there always exists an αRB beyond which the pivotal
B player prefers reform. However, it is always the case that αRB > αRC.
For reasonable values of the parameters, it will be the case that αRB  αRC. This is because
the term wS is the income of the B player that is dependent on the government, and it is
likely to be much larger in absolute value than the other terms in the inequality. This
suggests why in many corrupt societies economic elites that have political power tolerate the
corruption of government oﬃcials, even though they lose some utility by doing so.
The main empirical predictions of the model are that an increase in the demand for
government goods will make the pivotal C group of players switch their behavior from
tolerating corruption to voting against it. Government workers, if against reform at low
levels of the demand for public good, are sure to remain against as the demand increases.
If favorable to reform at low levels of the demand, government workers are sure to become
against reform as the demand increases. Rigorously, B players are predicted to vote against
reforms in case O players do not want reforms and therefore have a reason to condition B
players’ behavior. However it should be noted that once it is known that C players will
institute reforms, the only reason A players have to constrain the behavior of B players
through the extension of their agenda from B1 to B2 is if the assumption of not using
36weakly dominated strategies is also made for them with respect to this. Otherwise, since the
outcome of the vote is known, then A deviating from a strategy of conditioning the awarding
of rents on votes is also an equilibrium strategy, which would mean that B players are not
constrained to vote for corruption.
Empirical analysis
Data
Roll-call data from the period under analysis is extremely limited, as meetings of the House
were not public, and an oﬃcial list of the votes did not begin to be recorded until 1836.
Whenever the House “divided” (voted yes or no on a motion), one or more MPs, called
tellers, would make a list of the MPs who voted for, and one or more MPs would make a list
of the votes against. These lists were not then kept in the archives, only the aggregate results
of the vote. However, some of these lists did survive and made it to the public. Donald Ginter
(1995) has assembled all the remaining division lists between 1760-1820 in a series volumes,
and this will constitute the source for roll-call data. Because these are unoﬃcial lists, they
have some limitations: First, only a limited number of divisions have survived, so data on
some of the most interesting votes of the period is lost for posterity. Second, because the yes
and no lists were recorded separately, for some divisions only one of the two has survived in
its entirety, with the other list only partially available. Third, sometimes the exact numbers
of for and against votes from these lists diﬀers by a few from the oﬃcial records, probably a
result of their un-oﬃcial nature. In spite of all their limitations, Ginter’s division lists oﬀer
an unique insight into the activity of the House of Commons in this period.
A model seeking to explain these voting patterns needs independent variables relating to
the characteristics of the MPs expressing the votes. Extensive information on the members
of the House in this period can be found in the History of Parliament (HP) (1998) series
of volumes. The parts of the HP which are relevant for the analysis here are those on the
37years 1754-1790 (3 vols., ed. by Namier and Brooke, 1964), and on 1790-1820 (5 vols., ed.
by Thorne, 1986). The HP presents biographies of each MP in these periods. A sample
entry is presented in Appendix B. These biographies are the main source for coding the
independent variables, which deal with the individual characteristics of each MP and their
electoral district. As there are over 1700 MPs which enter the dataset, and the relevant texts
sum to over 6000 pages, manual extraction of the needed information would be prohibitively
diﬃcult. An automated procedure was employed instead to extract the needed information
from the text of the HP. This procedure has the advantage of transparency and replicability
when compared to human coding: the criteria by which the various variables have been coded
are transparent and are consistently applied to each entry. A discussion of the algorithms
used to extract the data is available in Appendix B. The dataset also contains some variables
assembled by Judd (1972), who provides lists of merchants, bankers, directors of the Bank
of England, “nabobs” and other MPs with colonial ties, and manufacturers. These lists are
useful for coding the key occupation variable.
For the occupation variable that captures belonging to groups A, B, and C from the
theory, MPs have been categorized into occupational groups following the categories used by
the HP, Namier, and Judd. All three sources follow some categorization that revolves around
the groups government oﬃcials, military, business/bourgeoisie, and landowners. There can
be a lot of overlap between these categories, as there was no prohibition on someone, for
example, being a government oﬃcial and having substantial business interests and a high
military rank at the same time. MPs have been categorized in eleven occupations, which will
correspond to eleven dummy variables in the empirical models. The possibility of overlap
between groups is maintained, as described below.
Group A
Military: A large number of members of the elite held some military rank, but for many,
these ranks were gained in their youth, and they did not progress to a career in the military.
38Therefore only MPs who gained the rank of at least Colonel in the Army and that of at least
Rear-Admiral in the Navy are classiﬁed as being part of the military. These individuals can
reliably be characterized as career military oﬃcers, who depended on the government for
their well-being, at least in their role as oﬃcers.
Government oﬃcials: Unlike the other occupation variables, this one can vary over time:
for each MP, he is coded as a public oﬃcial only in the years in which he is indicated to
hold a public position in the the HP. While public servants and sinecure-holders tended
to keep their public jobs until their death, those holding political oﬃces could have been
holding them for only a short period. The HP lists, for each MP, all public oﬃces he has
held, together with the years of service. All employment related to the central government is
included, but mostly symbolic positions such as that of sheriﬀ, which belonged to the local
administration and were a natural result of the inﬂuence an individual might have held in
his home region are excluded. The full description of the algorithm used can be found in
Appendix B.
Group B
It is harder to precisely delimit the members of group B. Judd presents a list of MPs that had
investments in the colonial companies, and who were associated with the Bank of England,
but these individuals also had other business interests, which might have mattered more
to their calculations than the investments in assets whose returns were directly dependent
on the government. However, ﬁnding support for the fact that these individuals were on
average more likely to vote against reforms than those who were clearly members of group
C would be supportive for the logic of the theory. The three groups listed under B for the
purposes of the empirical model are as follows. India bourgeoisie: The members of this group
were generally very rich and were often called nabobs. This variable is coded using the lists
provided by Judd. West Indies bourgeoisie: This is a group made up of individuals who had
substantial business interests in the Caribbean. Bank of England: Judd presents a list of
39bankers in the House and distinguishes between those associated with the Bank of England,
a private but quasi-governmental institution, and other bankers.
Group C
For group C, bankers (not with the Bank of England), merchants, manufacturers and physi-
cians are each coded using a list from Judd. Variables that warrant some discussion are:
Lawyers: Many MPs had some legal qualiﬁcation, but it is harder to know how many
relied on this as a substantial source of income, as getting a legal education and being called
to the bar were often natural steps towards other professional careers. Judd does not list
lawyer MPs, so this information was extracted from the text of the HP as described in
Appendix B. The algorithm does not rely on legal education, which was held by many MPs,
but instead codes as a lawyer an individual who: 1) had been called to the bar (and therefore
was a barrister), or was among the few who were are listed as solicitors and attorneys, and
2) is not established to be a merchant, military man, manufacturer, or physician by Judd.
Landowners: As explained, a more appropriate name would be “landowners-only”. With-
out doubt, most members of the House held some property in the form of land. Those who
were not listed in any professional category are however considered by Judd and the HP to
be the residual category of pure landowners, not involved in business or government. An in-
dividual is coded a landowner-only if he was not part of the other categories when expressing
his vote. Individuals in this category held property in the form of land and this was their
only role in the economy.
The other individual-level variables have been extracted from the text of the HP. First,
those relating to the personal background of the MP:
Public school education: Namier and Judd emphasize the role of public school education
for forming a common class spirit among the oligarchy. This variable is coded as 1 if the MP
is listed in the HP as having attended one of the seven public schools identiﬁed by Judd.
University education and Grand Tour (a multi-year tour of Europe in youth) also speak to
40the MPs’ exposure to reformist ideas.
First son: Being a ﬁrst or younger son was crucial in the social structure of the times.
Strict primogeniture rights awarded the estate of the father to the ﬁrst son only, with no
possibility of splitting it. Aristocratic titles as well were passed on only to ﬁrst sons. Younger
sons mainly had to provide for themselves. Typical career paths for younger sons of the
oligarchy were the military, government, the colonies, law, or business. Aristocratic title:
MPs could accede to an aristocratic title either by inheriting it from someone or by having
it be granted by the executive to them.
It is also useful to identify MPs that belonged to the Whig group in the House. While
it is the case that MPs were identiﬁed as belonging to a group because of their voting
patterns, rather than having their voting being determined by belonging to a group, the
Whigs and their progressive and anti-court attitudes might be suspected to have aﬀected
the voting patterns of their members through their very distinctive ideological characteristics.
Variables indicating adherence to the Whig ideology are either membership of the Whig Club,
or membership of Brooks’ Club, which was a social club frequented by individuals with Whig
views.
Electoral characteristics of MPs’ constituencies are also important, as they need to be kept
constant when evaluating the eﬀect of occupation on voting patters. These characteristics
are indicated by the following variables: Contested election: Did the MP arrive in the
House through a contested election when expressing any given vote? Constituency-level
data provided by the HP is used to code a dummy variable for this. Size of the constituency:
This is generally considered an indicator of the amount of “inﬂuence” that could be exercised
over the voters. The HP uses a division of constituencies between small (under 500 voters),
medium (500-1000 voters), and large (over 1000 voters) and the dataset uses these categories
as well. Type of franchise: There were eight types of franchise, that is criteria for deciding
who in a given constituency was allowed to vote: county franchise, various types of borough
franchise, and university franchise.
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1779 and 1819 which are relevant for the research question at hand. The dataset therefore
has an MP-vote format. The list of divisions and the justiﬁcations for their inclusion in the
dataset are given in Appendix A. The full list of available divisions can be found in Ginter
(1995). In all cases, a 1 for the vote variable corresponds to a pro-reform vote. In all there are
7141 votes expressed by 1708 MPs. The dataset includes only divisions which were explicitly
about the topics that have been described as being part of the corrupt system: sinecures,
government contracts, remuneration of public oﬃcials, impeachment eﬀorts, and audits of
the executive’s expenditures. The ﬁrst ones are from the 1779-1780 period and relate to
the “economical reform” program whose main promoter in the House was Edmund Burke.
Divisions on bills to prohibit government contracts from being awarded to members of the
House, to remove some positions which were considered sinecures, and to audit the pensions
which were secretly handed out by the executive are included here. Bills on soliciting public
contributions to the executive, and for the reduction of sinecures from 1794 and 1797 are also
included. Another set of divisions is on the corruption scandals involving major government
oﬃcials after 1805: the secretary of the Navy, Lord Melville, commander-in-chief of the
Army, the Duke of York, the future foreign secretary Viscount Castlereagh, and Prime
Minister Spencer Perceval. A large number of divisions after 1813 are on proposals to set up
a committee to audit the expenditures from the Civil List, which reformers argued were often
corrupt in nature. Another set of bills are about the abolition of sinecures explicitly. After
1815, eﬀorts to establish a pension system for oﬃcials were also promoted by reformers, and
this is reﬂected in a few divisions. Three divisions on electoral bribery and the sale of oﬃces
are also encountered towards the end of the period, with the last bill included in the sample
from 1819.
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The ﬁrst type of statistical model used to test the theory is a logit model in which the main
variables of interest are the occupational dummies:
vit = L(β1g1it + ... + β11g11it + γXit) + εit
Here L is the logistic function. This model corresponds to the use of a dataset in which for
each MP i one or more votes of yes or no are recorded, indexed by t. The dependent variable
vit is binary. Variables g1it to g11it are dummies for the eleven occupational groups identiﬁed
above. The vector Xit collects possible control variables, and γ collects the coeﬃcients on
these variables. The error terms are εit and are assumed to be arbitrarily correlated within
one MP’s votes. An intercept is not included, to help with the presentation of the results:
without an intercept, a logistic function of the coeﬃcients β1 to β11 represents the predicted
probability of voting in favor of reforms given that an MP is a part of that group, rather than
the diﬀerence from some baseline group. Also, the logistic transformations of the conﬁdence
intervals bounds represent the bounds of the conﬁdence intervals for the predicted values.7
A Wald test for equality of coeﬃcients can be used to test whether one group’s predicted
probability is diﬀerent from another’s. In case the control variables in Xit are included,
they need to be set at a ﬁxed level to be able to make a prediction for vote share using the
coeﬃcients on the g variables of interest. Since all controls will be dummies, they will always
be set at their modal/median value whenever presenting results of models that use controls.
Since there is reason to believe that one MPs’ votes will be correlated from a division to the
other, arbitrary autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity inside an i group is allowed through
the use standard errors clustered at the MP level in all models.
A second type of model groups individuals in the three A, B, and C groups, according
7The same results can be obtained in a model with an intercept, with predicted vote shares obtained
from summing up the coeﬃcient on the dummy of interest to the coeﬃcient on the intercept, and conﬁdence
intervals for predicted vote shares as conﬁdence intervals for this linear combination of coeﬃcients.
43to the description provided above. Now the model is:
vit = L(βAAit + βBBit + βCCit + γXit) + εit
The logistic transformations of the coeﬃcients on the A,B, and C dummies are also
interpretable as predicted vote shares, and three Wald tests for the equality of the coeﬃcients
between the three groups are always presented. Again, the possible control variables are set
at their modal/median values. All conﬁdence intervals and tests are based on standard
errors clustered at the MP level here as well. To aid in interpretation, results are generally
presented graphically, indicating the p-values for the relevant statistical tests on the graphs.
This model accommodates two concerns that might be raised about the possibility of
using the available data to test the theory: the existence of missing votes, and the fact that
the “inﬂuence” of borough patrons might bias the results.
Missing votes. The nature of the roll-call data from Ginter means that often the full
dataset for a division is not available. There are two diﬀerent types of missingness: First,
missingness which is due to the imperfect recovery of both the majority and the minority
list. As can be seen in Appendix A, for many bills, while both the majority and minority
lists have been recovered, they diﬀer somewhat from the voting totals, indicating that some
votes have been lost. This kind of missingness can safely be assumed as random, and will
not aﬀect the bias or consistency of the estimates, but merely make the sample smaller. The
second kind of missingness is that due to cases in which only one list has been recovered. In
the data, it is the case that reformers’ names became public more often than anti-reformers’
names, so the share of the reform vote will be overestimated in the full sample. In these
cases, the predicted pro-reform vote shares for the various groups will be overestimated,
but the diﬀerences in voting behavior between groups will be maintained. This kind of
missingness does not aﬀect the estimates of marginal eﬀects of the independent variables on
the dependent variable because it is not generated by the independent variables: a reduction
44of the number of “no” votes in the dataset does not change the proportion of the various
occupational groups who voted for or against, but merely reduces the sample size. To show
that the results are not generated by the missingness of some “no” lists, two sets of results
are presented: in the body of the paper, results on the full (unbalanced ) sample, and in
Appendix C, the same models on the restricted, balanced, sample. It will be the case that
the two sets of results are very similar in terms of diﬀerences in voting behavior between the
groups, indicating that the missingness due to non-recovery of some lists does not aﬀect the
validity of the ﬁndings.
Inﬂuence of patrons and “parties”. In most contemporary legislatures, a vote by a legis-
lator might reﬂect his or her preferences on the issues at hand only to a small extent, with
the need to follow the party line as the predominant motive. (Of course, it could also be
the case that legislators join parties that advance their preferences in the ﬁrst place.) In the
period under analysis, this is less of a concern, as parties in the modern sense did not exist.
What did exist was the connection between the MP and the patron of the district that the
MP represented, ranging from situations in which the MP was the “owner” of the district,
and did not need to take into account anyone else’s interests, to situations in which he was
a mere placeholder for the patron.
The interests of the patron could generate omitted variable bias if it were the case that
pro- or anti-reform preferences of patrons caused them to choose to support candidates
from certain occupational groups for their districts. If the interests of the patron are not
correlated with the occupational group of the MP however, then no bias emerges. If the
district patron-MP connection is what generated the connection between occupational group
and voting behavior, then it is expected that when the relation is analyzed in subsamples
where the patrons’ inﬂuence is low or missing, the connection between occupation and voting
behavior should disappear. There are two ways of identifying such subsamples: First, it
is well established that “inﬂuence” depended a lot on constituency size: the smaller the
constituency, the more likely it was that it was under the control of a patron (Briggs, 1959).
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on voting behavior fails to change, which indicates that omitted variable bias due to patrons’
inﬂuence is not a valid concern, except for the case of the B-type MPs, as will be explained.
Similarly, districts in which elections had been contested were less likely to be under the
strong inﬂuence of a patron. Again, results on this subsample will be similar to results on
the full sample, so omitted variable bias will be shown to not be a concern.
Another concern about possible omitted variables is that the political “party” with which
an MP identiﬁed might have constrained his behavior. This is in general hard to argue for,
as the political groups identiﬁed by the various commentators clearly reﬂected MPs voting
patterns, rather than the other way around. Krehbiel (1993) is an exposition of the idea
that observing similar voting patterns among members of a legislature does not mean that
membership of parties is a signiﬁcant determinant of voting patterns. The crucial reason why
parties did not themselves determine MPs’ votes in Britain at the time was that there were
no party organizations that could have helped or hindered the MPs’ re-election. However, in
the case of the group of Whigs, it could be argued that their distinctive ideology acted as a
sort of constraint on MPs’ behavior because of the social network that made up the “Whig
world” (Mitchell, 2005). Controlling for belonging to the Whig group is clearly an example
of post-treatment bias, because a result of the treatment variable is controlled for (an MP
was a Whig mainly because he had certain preferences, not the other way around). Results
where belonging to the Whig group is controlled for are however included, and they again
do not show the relation between occupation and voting behavior breaking down.
Results
Before presenting the tests of the theory, other possible explanations of voting behavior in
the sample are analyzed, to show that they are not good or complete models of the observed
data. To test these hypotheses, Table 1 presents logit regressions (with an intercept) of the
voting dummy on a number of predictors. The ﬁrst set of theories that could be argued
46to explain the reforms have to do with the emergence of the bourgeoisie as an important
political player, and the conﬂict between the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie. By its nature,
corruption has a pre-modern aspect to it, and the relations of patronage and extraction that
it entails are not unlike the feudal relations between the various strata of the aristocracy and
the commoners. A new class of business-people would not be expected, if it itself was not
somehow brought into the system, to be in favor of a system of extraction by politicians, so
a reasonable hypothesis would be that the rise of the bourgeoisie meant the appearance of
a class who was opposed to corruption. As the theoretical model shows, this is not the case
if the business-people can be brought into the system by being oﬀered protection for their
rents by the politicians, in exchange for them tolerating corruption by the politicians.
Indeed, in spite of the intellectual tradition arguing in favor of its importance, the bour-
geoisie versus aristocracy dichotomy fails to generate any traction in explaining the observed
events in the data. In table 1, models 1-2 show that a simple dummy for bourgeoisie, coded
as 1 if the MP belonged to the categories merchant, India/West Indies bourgeois, banker,
lawyer, manufacturer, or physician is not at all signiﬁcant in predicting observed voting pat-
terns. Why this is the case should be obvious from the discussion in this paper: individuals
in these categories varied widely in how much they beneﬁted from the corrupt system, with
the colonial business-people and the bankers in the Bank of England having a special relation
with the executive which made them unlikely to challenge politicians’ privileges. Similarly,
models 3-4 show that a dummy for an aristocrat MP fails to predict voting behavior. Why
this is the case should also be obvious: far from being a unitary group, the aristocrats varied
in their relation with the corrupt system, from those who were professional politicians or
depended on sinecures for their livelihood to the great landowners who fought against politi-
cians’ privileges. The second set of claims that can be tested relates to the MPs’ personal
backgrounds. MPs varied in their exposure to education and the world outside Britain, as
well as in their status in life as ﬁrst or younger sons. In models 5-6, it is shown that these
personal background variables fail to explain voting patterns in any meaningful way (the
47Table 1: Relation between biographical and electoral variables, and pro-reform votes
Pro-reform vote Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Bourgeoisie .060 .103
(.63) (.39)
Aristocrat .024 -.369
(.85) (.76)
University .091 .055
(.47) (.64)
Public school .174 .171
(.16) (.16)
Grand tour .050 .033
(.87) (.91)
First son .108 .119
(.38) (.31)
Contested elect. .226 .260
(.04) (.01)
Large const. 1.376 1.38
(.00) (.00)
Medium const. .725 .823
(.07) (.03)
Small const. .483 .521
(.19) (.15)
Constant -.222 .110 -.211 .157 -.377 -.015 -.269 .067 -.993 -.679
(.00) (.11) (.00) (.02) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.30) (.00) (.05)
Balanced samp. Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
No. of obs. 5776 7141 5776 7141 5640 6977 5776 7141 5776 7141
Pseudo-R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03
Logit regressions with standard errors clustered at the MP level.
ﬁrst son dummy is also not signiﬁcant on its own).
The fact that electoral constraints inﬂuenced MPs’ reform votes is not a surprise. In the
models in which the impact of occupational group on voting is tested, these factors need to be
kept constant, because of the need to explain whatever variation in reform preferences there
is outside that generated by citizens’ natural desire to limit corruption. Models 7-8 show
that indeed MPs that had entered the House through a contested election were more likely to
vote for reforms. In models 9-10, it is also shown that the larger the constituency, the more
likely the MP is to vote for reforms (the baseline category in these models is “unknown”). It
is well established that larger districts were those in which popular opinion mattered more,
so it is to be expected that MPs elected in these districts would be more reformist.
Popular opinion has also been argued to be a cause of the reforms, by taking the form of
revolutionary pressure (Harling, 1996b). The extent of popular revolutionary movements in
Britain during the French Revolution is debated. Hobsbawm (1996) argues in favor of the
48existence of an extensive revolutionary movement in Britain at the time, while Woodward
(1962) argues the danger of revolution was exaggerated by the ruling class. In the “revo-
lutionary pressure” view, the fear of French-style revolution is what led the British elite to
enact reforms. This approach overlooks the extensive intra-elite conﬂict over the reforms, as
well as the fact that the reforms began some 10 years before the French Revolution. This
paper argues that there is no evidence that the safety of the British political or economic
establishment was seriously questioned by contemporaries. This is based on two pieces of
evidence: The ﬁrst is the evolution of interest rates on government debt in this period. If
investors doubt that the political system will survive, they would ask for higher interest rates
to compensate for the increased likelihood of government debt being repudiated. Figure 5-
left plots the nominal rate of interest on long-term government debt in the period under
analysis. There is no obvious spike in the rate to correspond to increased fear of popular
revolution. Indeed, in the years after the Revolution started in France, the interest rate
reached historical lows. The high in interest rates in the late 1790s can be entirely explained
by a bout of inﬂation due to the suspension of convertibility to gold in 1797, which drove
nominal interest rates higher. The pattern of interest rates in this period corresponds to a
situation in which investors came to expect slightly higher average inﬂation than usual, but
are very far from suggesting a realistic concern on the part of contemporaries with serious
political break-down in Britain.8
This view of stability is reinforced by movements in the prices of stocks. Using stock
prices as indicators of concern with political developments has an established tradition (see
Cutler et al., 1998; Fisman, 2001). Figure 5-right plots an index of share prices assembled
from Mitchell (1988). Again, stock prices do not behave diﬀerently from the historical norm,
seeing a rise after the beginning of revolution in France, a fall in the late 1790s as taxation
8In 1799 and 1800, inﬂation spiked to 20% and 30% respectively as the government appeared to use the
inﬂation tax to help ﬁnance the war. Appendix C presents a graph of a roughly-calculated real interest rate,
by subtracting the yearly inﬂation from the yearly nominal interest rate. Since the retail price index used as
a measure of inﬂation swings widely from one year to the other, the real interest rate thus calculated swings
as well, but does not show any increasing or decreasing pattern in this period.
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Figure 5: Left: Interest rates on consols (perpetual bonds) issued by the British government.
Data from Mitchell (1988). Right: Stock prices index of British companies. Data from
Mitchell (1988).
increased and trade with the continent was blocked, and then a recovery to the historical
trend. (The huge increase in 1822 is due to a speculative bubble in mining stocks.) These
movements in prices are not at all compatible with an expectation of revolution in Britain
or of signiﬁcant violent changes in the economy and polity. The fact that the intra-elite
dynamic rather than external pressure is what led to the reforms is also conﬁrmed by the
lack of an increase in electoral competitiveness in this period. Between the 1760s and the
1820s, approximately 25 to 30 percent of districts were contested in every election (Appendix
C), so whatever electoral pressure did exist, it was constant throughout the period.
The stability in economic indicators and political competitiveness should not obstruct
the large shock that did aﬀect Britain in the period under analysis. The wars with the
colonies and especially with France did bring an unprecedented change to British politics
and economics: government activity increased a lot as resources needed to be mobilized to
ﬁght the wars. The theory predicts that MPs should form anti- and pro-reform coalitions
based on their interests with respect to politicians’ corruption when the demand shock occurs.
The implication that reform should be observed whenever the demand for government
activity surpasses a threshold is easily veriﬁed by noting that reform eﬀorts are dated as
beginning in 1779, right as the expenditure levels plotted in Fig. 2 were reaching a new
50Merchant
Physician
Bank of Eng.
Banker
India
West Indies
Manufacturer
Lawyer
Military
Government
Landowner
A
B
C
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Controls: none.
Logit model, standard errors clustered by MP.
X axis indicates probability of pro−reform vote with 95% conf. intervals.
Unalanced sample. N = 7141.
Merchant
Physician
Bank of Eng.
Banker
India
West Indies
Manufacturer
Lawyer
Military
Government
Landowner
A
B
C
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Controls: electoral characteristics. Controls set at modal value.
Logit model, standard errors clustered by MP.
X axis indicates probability of pro−reform vote with 95% conf. intervals.
Unbalanced sample. N = 7141.
Figure 6: Left: Voting behavior by occupational group, no controls. Right: Voting behavior
by occupational group, controls: electoral characteristics.
historical high. Reform eﬀorts became intensiﬁed after the unprecedented increase in gov-
ernment expenditures that started after the 1793 beginning of the conﬂict with France. No
bills relating to the sort of reforms discussed here can be found before that in either Ginter
(1995), or in Hoppit’s (1997) exhaustive list of failed legislation, or in the historical account
of administrative reform by Chester (1981).
The more subtle predictions about how the various groups will vote in these matters
require direct analysis of of roll call data. The logit models that use the occupational cate-
gories variables illustrate how the eleven categories are predicted to vote, and also allow for
tests of hypotheses about the voting patterns of groups A, B and C. Figure 6-left presents
the predicted vote shares and 95% conﬁdence bands when including just the occupational
dummies, without controls. (The corresponding models for the balanced sample are all pre-
sented in Appendix C, and always show similar results.) Government and military MPs are
less inclined towards reforms than the coalition of independent bourgeoisie and landowners,
with the dependent bourgeoisie group in the middle. Figure 6-right presents the same model,
controlling for electoral characteristics of the district the MP came from: whether there was
a contested election, the size of the constituency, and the type of franchise. This model
is instructive because of the need to explain variation in voting patterns that cannot be
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Figure 7: Left: Voting behavior by occupational group, electoral and personal background
controls. Right: Voting behavior by occupational group, electoral and personal background,
and Whig membership controls.
explained by electoral constraints. Again, government and military MPs were less favorable
to reforms than merchants, landowners and other members of group C, with the dependent
businesspeople somewhere in the middle.
Figure 7-left presents a model in which the personal characteristics of the MP are added as
controls: university education, public school education, the “grand tour”, ﬁrst son status and
aristocratic title. These controls fail to aﬀect the general relation between the occupational
groups and voting behavior. Figure 7-right adds the two controls for belonging to the Whig
group: membership in the Whig Club, and membership in Brooks’ Club. While these
controls generate post-treatment bias, adding them does not remove the general trend in the
results.
The theory predicts that there should be a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the voting be-
havior of members of groups A and C, with those in A less likely to support reforms than
those in C. Figures 8-9 again present results without and then with controls, as well as
the p-value for equality of coeﬃcients on the estimates of the three groups’ voting shares.
These results indicate that group C is always expected to vote in a more reformist manner
than group A, with the diﬀerences being in the range of 20-25 percentage points. Given the
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53measurement error assumed to be present in the the data, these diﬀerences are important.9
Group B MPs are in between, and the diﬀerence between them and group C MPs becomes
smaller as controls are introduced. Given that the measure of belonging to the B group can-
not distinguish those MPs who also had other business interests, and therefore would better
be categorized as C, this was to be expected. However, note that there does exist a clear
diﬀerence between the colonial merchants and their counterparts without colonial interests
in the models in ﬁgures 6-7. This shows that individuals who had some business interests
that were dependent on the government for their returns did vote in a less reformist fashion
than their counterparts who did not own such government-dependent assets. For example,
in the model in ﬁgure 7-left, where electoral and personal characteristics are controlled for,
the diﬀerences between India merchants and the regular merchants or between West Indies
merchants and regular merchants are always signiﬁcant at the .00-.02 level. An explanation
for why B players appear to vote in a more reformist fashion than predicted by the strict
interpretation of the model will is oﬀered the following paragraphs by taking into account
the omitted variable of inﬂuence at the district level.
To check whether the preferences of district patrons are an omitted variable driving
these results, the analysis can be restricted to either only large constituencies or to only
constituencies where the election had been contested. Figure 10-left presents the results
for the sample of large constituencies only, in a model in which electoral and individual
characteristics are controlled for (the results without controls are similar). The diﬀerence
between groups A and C is maintained, which shows that it was not generated by the interests
of borough patrons inﬂuencing both the sorts of MPs that got elected in their districts as
well as their voting patterns. Group B is now more similar in behavior to A than to C. This
suggests that, when unconstrained by the interests of the patrons of the boroughs in which
they ran, members of group B are more likely to oppose reforms than the full-sample models
9Measurement error in the independent variables, would bias the coeﬃcients of the logit model towards
zero. A coeﬃcient of zero on an occupational dummy corresponds to a predicted vote share of .5 when
applying the logistic transformation, so the bias towards zero that is usually expected in the presence of
measurement error in the independent variables means bias towards .5 predicted vote share in these models.
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suggest. Therefore, it appears that the reason the B players in the sample vote in a more
reformist fashion than what was expected of them has to do with the need to balance their
interests with those of borough patrons: when unconstrained, they vote against reforms,
but since most borough patrons can be expected to be large landowners, who are argued
to be reformist, then it was to be expected that when having to consider the interests of
borough patrons, B players would vote more in a more reformist fashion than they would
otherwise have done. B-type individuals arguably depended more than other type of MPs
on patrons’ inﬂuence for their election: since they were often individuals who had lived for
a long time abroad, or who lived in London, they did not generally have a natural home
constituency which they could win without the help of a patron. Therefore, the empirical
analysis provides encouraging evidence that the voting behavior of B-type individuals is that
predicted by the model, with this conclusion being muddled in the data by the diﬃculty of
distinguishing between B and C players, and by the “inﬂuence” variable which makes B
players appear more reformist than they really were. However these two considerations do
not aﬀect the key fact that A and C groups diﬀered vastly in their voting behavior, which
is the key of the theoretical model.
55Figure 10-right presents the same model on the sample of only competitive elections,
thus in districts in which “inﬂuence” was less important. Again, the diﬀerence between the
voting patterns of members of group A and group C is clear, and B sits somewhere in the
middle. These results show that even in districts in which there was less need for MPs to
balance their preferences with those of borough patrons, the distinction in voting patterns
predicted by the model is maintained, which shows that omitted variable bias due to the lack
of information on the constraints imposed on the MP by borough patrons does not seriously
aﬀect the results in the full sample.
Discussion of the results
This paper oﬀers an explanation for how Britain came to engage in administrative reforms
to eliminate corruption in the late 18th and early 19th century. Britain had a political and
economic structure that facilitated the switch to a reformed, relatively un-corrupt, system
of public administration. A large part of the political elite was made up of individuals who
derived their income from sources other than government or government-protected activities.
When faced with the exogenous shock of an increase in the demand for government goods,
this part of the elite was pushed into supporting a system where monitoring costs are paid
but extraction is limited. The need for politicians’ favors for the asset-owners was limited by
an institutional structure which allowed asset-owners to advance their own interests through
the House of Commons, so there was little the oﬃcials could oﬀer in exchange for toleration
of their corruption.
The model implies that there should exist a relatively brief period in the political devel-
opment of a country when such endogenous reforms can be enacted through the mechanism
presented in this paper. Some or all of the conditions which are needed for the model
to produce a reformist outcome seem to fail in many contemporary developing countries,
which might explain why they do not switch to the reform equilibrium even when govern-
56ment activity increases. In these countries, if representative institutions exist, professional
politicians often take up all the seats, a natural result of modern party-dominated politics.
Therefore all members of the representative institutions are members of the A group from
the model, and other citizens need to relate to the political system otherwise than through
direct participation. Also, asset owners, whether inside or outside of the legislature, seem to
be easily bought into the system by being oﬀered government contracts and favorable reg-
ulation, which is easier to do in a modern economy with high tax-gathering and regulatory
ability on the part of the executive. In such a setting an increase in government expenditure,
far from encouraging reformist moves inside the elite, would merely lead to more corruption.
57Chapter 2
Legislative Bargaining and Open Access: Economic Re-
form in 19th Century Britain
Recent literature in political economy has put forward a set of developments in law and
policy in 19th century Britain as the crucial institutional changes that allowed it be the ﬁrst
country to engage in modern economic growth. This paper develops a model of how the
British political class came to give up its power to extract rents from the economy between
the 1810s and the 1850s. The key of the explanation lies in understanding the bargaining
process between economic agents who seek permission to engage in economic activity and
a legislature that can grant such permissions. In an uncoordinated bargaining process the
unique equilibrium outcome is that each citizen that seeks a permit will obtain one from
the legislators for a payment of nearly zero. To avoid such an outcome, legislators design
mechanisms that limit their freedom to bargain with the citizen, and help them achieve a
higher payoﬀ. Before the reforms, a patronage system through which the executive controlled
Parliament worked as such a mechanism. The removal of the patronage system, far form
making the legislature more powerful in its relation with outsiders, led to it accepting the
free allocation of permits for economic activity, and hence to liberalization.
Introduction
The case of Britain in the 18th and 19th centuries has played a central role in the literature
on comparative political and economic development: some of the most important contri-
butions are North and Weingast (1989), Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2006), Lizzeri and
Persico (2004), North, Wallis and Weingast (2009), Cox (1987), Stasavage (2003), and Root
(1994). Not only was Britain the ﬁrst nation to engage in modern economic growth, but
58its peaceful and gradual path from authoritarianism and relative poverty to democracy and
wealth recommend it as an important case for research in comparative development. A
large part of the literature is in broad agreement with the idea that an especially favorable
political equilibrium that emerged in Britain after the late 17th century generated an insti-
tutional framework which was favorable for economic development. Broad features of this
institutional framework are secure property rights, free enterprise, and the rule of law.
Only recently however, did the literature progress to a stage where speciﬁc instances of
institutional change are put forward as explanations for Britain’s economic progress. North,
Wallis, and Weingast (2009), and Mokyr (2009) are some of the ﬁrst major works that go
beyond talking about general notions such as secure property rights and free enterprise to
putting forward detailed lists of changes in the legal and political framework in Britain which
can explain its economic development. Both sources emphasize the importance of changes
in economic policy and legal framework starting in about the second decade of the 19th
century for later economic development. North, Wallis, and Weingast concentrate on “open
access”—the emergence of free incorporation of private enterprise, that is the possibility of
establishing a joint-stock, limited liability company, which only happened after key changes of
legislation in 1825, 1844, and ﬁnally in 1855. Mokyr presents a longer list of similar changes,
which include, in addition to free incorporation, the elimination of monopolies by chartered
companies, the relaxation of banking laws to permit the formation of a modern banking
system, the emergence of free trade, the elimination of limitations on the free movement
of labor, and others. All these changes are similar, in that they all mark the shift from a
system where economic activity is tightly controlled by those who hold political power for
their own proﬁt (be they the monarch or Parliament), to one in which access is free. As the
distortionary eﬀects of limitations on economic activity, and the necessity of open access to
such activity are well established (see for example Bates (1981) or Acemoglu (2009)), the shift
can form an explanation for the sustained rise in average income levels in Britain after about
1830 (Maddison, 2008). While the importance of free incorporation for development, as well
59as the necessary conditions that must exist in a society for its emergence are convincingly
presented in North, Wallis, and Weingast, a model of the mechanism by which this happens
is not presented. Mokyr presents an argument for the importance of beliefs and ideas for
these changes, but similarly does not develop a model of how they emerge in equilibrium.
This paper presents such a model and and argues in favor of the idea that its logic ﬁts the
facts of the British historical experience. A list of the changes in law and policy that form
the subject of the analysis is presented in section 2. There is, obviously, a large historical
literature on each one of these developments. Each one had its own peculiarities, its own set
of conﬂicting interests, and its own story of how precisely it came about. (Detailed historical
accounts include Harris (2000) for the emergence of free incorporation, and Irwin (1997)
for the emergence of free trade, among many others.) However, in addition to the detailed
historical aspects, there is arguably something connecting all of these changes, beyond their
positive eﬀect on economic growth. They all happen within a relatively short time period,
mostly between 1820 and 1855. They all mark a similar shift from access to various economic
activities on the basis of “permits” allocated by Parliament to free access to all those who
desire to do so. And they all come about in rather non-dramatic ways as a result of decisions
of Parliament that make oﬃcial a new situation in which this is the only possible equilibrium.
This paper seeks to complement the existing literature by political scientists, historians, and
economic historians on each one of the individual changes, by presenting a uniﬁed framework
to analyze them all.
The core of the theoretical argument is the following: Keeping everything else constant,
rational, utility maximizing politicians will seek to use their ability to regulate the economy
for their own proﬁt (Stigler, 1971). If the state has the ability to limit the freedom of economic
agents to engage in various activities (which any normally-functioning state should have),
then those controlling political power would seek to proﬁt from this ability by exchanging
permissions to engage in economic activity for payments by those desiring such permits.
The literature on rent generation and rent distribution is too large to summarize here,
60but it should be noted that throughout history, in the absence of electoral constraints, or
other factors that work against this tendency, such as the need to stay competitive in war
(Tilly, 1992), such regulation has been the default state of political and economic systems
(Buchannan and Tollison, 1980). Britain in the period under analysis is an example in which
the political class renounces this prerogative and makes the “permits” available for anyone
who desires them. A political class that acts as a unitary rational actor would not do so, so
it is important to analyze how the British political class came to allow these changes in that
period.
Before about 1820, Parliament showed no strong inclination toward such liberalization.
Over-sized and disciplined majorities acted rationally in maintaining a system where those
seeking incorporation, monopoly rights, and other privileges, had to seek a charter from Par-
liament. Those seeking the charters were normally expected to give something in exchange,
whether actual monetary payments such as those made by the East India Company, employ-
ment, shares, political support, and other advantages for legislators and their families. The
discipline of majorities was maintained not through party organizations, which were largely
non-existent (Namier, 1929), but rather through the patronage system: While legislators
were certainly free to vote however they wanted, large numbers of them were also aware that
votes that are not according to the wishes of the administration would lead to the partial or
total elimination of patronage income, which was freely dispensed by the executive. Patron-
age was under the control of the the executive even if there was little doubt that ultimate
political control lay with the Commons, which controlled taxation and the ultimate use of
any funds raised by the state. One beneﬁcial aspect for majorities in the Commons of the
fact that they gave up the control over patronage to an executive, was that the executive
could use this control to maintain discipline in Parliament (Namier and Brooke, 1964).
It will be argued that one role of the distribution of tax income through the circuitous
mechanism of the patronage was that of solving the legislators’ collective action problem:
Consider the problem faced by a legislature which can distribute permits for economic ac-
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to half of the legislators. The legislators can make proposals about the price they would be
willing to exchange their vote for, but ultimately the agent has to agree to a given allocation
by actually paying the bribe. That is, the interaction between them can be modeled as a
legislative bargaining problem, in which legislators are free to make proposals regarding the
distribution of the bribe, but the citizen has veto power on any allocation. It will be shown
that in such a situation, the citizen can get the permit with an essentially zero expenditure:
Any given legislator prefers to be inside a majority that votes for the permit and get some
income, rather than be outside and get nothing. Any legislator that lies outside of the coali-
tion would therefore be willing to replace a member of the coalition for a very small payment,
which is better than the zero he or she is currently getting. Even if there are no legislators
outside the coalition, and everyone gets a bribe, a subcoalition will always be willing to give
the citizen a better deal by charging a lower total price, but distribute that lower total price
among fewer coalition members. The model in section 3 develops these intuitions formally,
by showing that the unique equilibrium outcome of the bargaining process is one in which a
“cheap” majority is formed in which the legislators sell the permit for a bribe that collapses
to zero as the discount rate increases. The problem is closely connected to the non-existence
of the core in generic multidimensional preference aggregation problems.
Such an outcome is disastrous for the legislature, and this is perhaps why few real-life
legislatures work in this manner. Legislators usually ﬁnd it useful to limit their freedom by
forming an organization, such as a party, which prevents them from accepting oﬀers that are
good for them personally in the short run, but lead to a bad outcome for the group as a whole,
and ultimately to a bad outcome for themselves. Before about 1820, the patronage system
formed such a disciplining mechanism. In a version of the model in which legislators give
up their short-term control over tax payments in the economy to the executive, which then
distributes the income back to them, a coalition of legislators can achieve a much better result
for its members than in the case of uncoordinated bargaining: Given an appropriately large
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process, if the executive implements an appropriate mechanism, in which deviations from
an agreed-upon voting behavior attract a loss of patronage. Moreover, legislators would
agree to the continuation of these limitations on their behavior whenever they are given a
chance to do so, so the system is stable. The coalitions formed in this case need to be super-
majorities, as there need to be enough members of the coalition that need to be paid oﬀ by
the agent seeking the permit for such an attempt to be impossible. Indeed, the majorities
formed under the patronage system were apparently ineﬃciently large, a fact which can be
understood through the lens of this model.
In the period leading up to 1820 the patronage system was disbanded in Britain, for
reasons quite exogenous to the argument here (Popa, 2012). On the face of it, Parliament
in the 1820s was much more powerful next to the executive than it had been until then,
because it now had full control of the tax revenue and could not be controlled by the gov-
ernment through patronage. But the ﬂip-side of this apparent freedom was the breakdown
of coordination indicated in the argument above. Permit-seekers in this period started being
able to obtain the permits for free, leading to a situation where access was liberalized. In
societies in which the patronage system exists, or in which authority is centralized in a single
actor, as opposed to a legislature operating by majority rule, such a breakdown due to a
collective action problem would not happen. The case of Britain in the 19th century, namely
the combination of rule by a legislature and the lack of a patronage mechanism or modern
party system, led to this striking development.
Liberalization in 19th century Britain
Access to economic activity in Britain was anything but free well into the Industrial Revo-
lution. The key features of the unreformed economic system were:
1. The lack of full incorporation rights for businesses. Two key features of the modern
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system, and limited liability—the fact that shareholders are responsible for the losses of the
company only up to the value of their shares. The reasons why these features are crucial for
complex economic activity to develop will not be further discussed here (see North, Wallis,
and Weingast (2009) for one argument). An entrepreneur in 18th and early 19th century
Britain could not establish such a company at will. The Bubble Act of 1720 established
that incorporation can take place only with a parliamentary charter and such charters were
not forthcoming: only 61 companies were listed on the Course of Exchange (London Stock
Exchange) in 1811, compared with 258 by 1825 (Harris, 2000). Incorporation was a privilege
that only the best-connected individuals could acquire, with other entrepreneurs having to
settle with less eﬃcient forms of organization, such as the partnership or the trust. While
the oﬃcial fees that were needed for an incorporation charter were relatively low, barriers to
newcomers were formidable: Harris succinctly summarizes the incorporation process before
the reforms by saying that “[i]incorporation was granted or refused on the basis of the level
of opposition of conﬂicting vested interests.”
2. The prevalence of monopoly rights in the most lucrative markets. A summary of the
activities of chartered monopolies is oﬀered in Harris (2000): Trade with India and China
was the exclusive privilege of the East India Company. Banking was highly regulated: the
Bank of England (a private company at the time) had a virtual monopoly on large scale
banking, as other banks were forbidden from becoming incorporated or having more than
six partners. Marine insurance, a crucial activity was also subject to a duopoly granted to the
Royal Exchange Assurance and London Assurance in 1720, in exchange for a cash payment
directly to the Civil List (the money used by the king for patronage) of 300,000 pounds
from both companies. Navigation itself was subject to regulation that required that any
trade with Britain be done only using British ships. In any market in which there was only
one or few incorporated companies, those companies had an advantage next to competitors
equipped with a more rudimentary form of organization, which gave them noncompetitive
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3. Limitations on trade. The most notorious limitation on trade were the so-called
Corn Laws, which were designed to give British landowners protected returns on their land.
Harley (1994) presents some of the other limitations: “The customs protected British textile
manufactureres, from Irish linen and Indian cotton, iron masters from cheap Swedish iron
and much else.” Before the 1840s tariﬀs insulated protected interests (mainly those in the
land-intensive activities) from external competition: the average tarriﬀ level was about 55%
in 1820 (Harley, 1994).
Changes in laws and policies regarding these limitations start appearing into the second
decade of the 19th century, and are accelerated from the 1820s to the 1850s. Taking each of
the three points above, relevant reforms are:
1. The emergence of free incorporation took a circuitous route between 1825 and 1855.
The historical details of this development are presented in Harris (2000): Throughout the
ﬁrst decades of the 19th century, a large number of entrepreneurs began seeking incorpora-
tion rights for their businesses. Harris counts 624 companies being promoted in 1825. Most
of these new companies sought incorporation from Parliament—438 bills for incorporation
were put forward in 1825 and 286 were approved. The involvement of the MPs in these new
enterprises was direct: Harris argues that an unprecedented number of MPs were oﬀered
roles as directors (board members) of these new companies. Numerous accusations towards
MPs who promoted companies in which they had been oﬀered free shares were levelled in
and outside Parliament. The cabinet of Lord Liverpool rejected the procedure of parlia-
mentary incorporation altogether and wanted to return to a royal chartering system which
had declined after the Glorious Revolution. In 1825, the executive, through its Attorney
General, Lord Eldon, proposed a bill that featured a mixed system: a Parliamentary bill
was still needed for full incorporation, which included limited liability, but for the purposes
of establishing a joint-stock company without limited liability, a royal charter (which by
this time meant a decision by the executive) could be requested. This bill was adopted and
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of new incorporations. In 1834 this was further altered through a bill passed with near una-
nimity which stated that the executive could also grant limited liability privileges. Harris
notes that those desiring a charter were encouraged to take the executive route. However,
by 1844, it seems that any interest in limiting the formation of new business enterprises
in this manner was lost: a Parliamentary committee chaired by the future prime-minister
William Gladstone proposed the establishment of a system of free incorporation (without
limited liability), and his bill was adopted without much debate or opposition. In 1855 and
1856 this principle was further extended by Parliament to allow limited liability to these
companies, with the 1856 Joint Stock Companies Act, which formed a uniﬁed framework for
free incorporation in the entire UK, passing the House of Commons easily (Hansard, 1856
[2012]).
The debates around free incorporation suggest a model where, until the 1820s, Parliament
was able to limit access to this privilege to those who had the favor of a majority, and who
had to provide beneﬁts back to the majority. As majorities were tightly controlled by the
executive, the system was eﬃcient for political elites, who could derive signiﬁcant rents
from their ability to block access to economic activity. The ability of a stable majority to
commit itself to not handing out the privilege of incorporation too easily broke down by the
1820s, and ﬂuid majorities started awarding such privileges to an ever-increasing number of
applicants, for an ever-decreasing payoﬀ. The Repeal of the Bubble Act, far from being a
liberalizing measure, instead attempted to take this power from the hands of Parliament,
and did manage to contain the process of easily awarding the permits, which was desired
by virtually all MPs. But the legislators could not directly beneﬁt form the fact that the
executive could now control incorporation, as the ability of the executive to transmit the
proﬁts from such control back to MPs was now gone. The system of executive incorporation
was useless for MPs, and they removed it without much opposition in 1844 and 1855.
2. While many trading monopolies had been eliminated in the wake of the Glorious
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India and China. The EIC was deeply connected to the administration: government oﬃcials
and company representatives acted together to administer aﬀairs in India, and the company
had immense political inﬂuence. In 1793 the company’s monopoly was extended for another
20 years, but by 1813 demand for access to this trade by shipping interests in provincial
towns was strong in Parliament. The provincial businessmen were successful in 1813 in
convincing Parliament to remove the monopoly on the India trade, and again in 1833 in
removing the monopoly on the China trade. The marine insurance monopoly was attacked
beginning in 1810 with attempts by competitors such as the New Marine Insurance Company
to gain access to this market, but a bill to allow this was defeated by one vote. By 1824, a
new entrant, Alliance, was able to secure a charter in the Commons. In banking, so-called
country banks began seeking access to the same kind of privileges as the Bank of England.
By 1826 the Bank of England’s monopoly had been broken up and new banks could gain
access to incorporation, but only if operating outside of London. The Bank Charter Act of
1833 allowed such banks in London as well. Similarly to the case of incorporation in general,
monopolies were broken up by a process in which new entrants seek to obtain privileges
similar to those of existing ﬁrms from Parliament, and manage to do so relatively easily in
the context of the ﬂuid and un-disciplined majorities of the period.
3. The story of the liberalization of foreign trade is complex and has been presented
in many other places (Irwin 1997, Schonhardt-Bailey, 2006). Harley (1994) is a summary
of the developments: In the 1840s limitations on trade were eliminated, with the most
notable change being the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846. Small steps towards liberalization
had been taken in the 1820, through the elimination of some import duties. After the
Conservatives came to power in 1842, they gave in to the pressure of un-protected interests,
represented through organizations such as the Anti-Corn Law League. While the repeal of
the Corn Laws follows a complex story and certainly had a lot to do with the famines that
the system occasionally produced, most other markets were liberalized at the same time for
67reasons having less to do with an interest in general welfare, and more to do with the fact
that industrial interests managed to obtain from Parliament an equal footing to the one
of the landed interests which were generally protected by tariﬀs. (The fact that industrial
interests beneﬁted from liberalization follows from the fact that while Britain had enormous
comparative advantage in industrial products, it had no such advantage in land-intensive
products. The tarriﬀ system made it hard for workers to obtain food, clothing, and other
basic necessities, but did not help industrialists who had no need for such protection.)
These changes all share some similarities, beyond the fact that they all led to a liberaliza-
tion of access to economic activity. All came about as a result of demands from outsiders to
be granted the same privileges as insiders. While such demands were deﬂected for more than
one hundred years by the stable and disciplined majorities of the 18th century, the elite’s
ability to limit access to economic activity seemed to vanish around 1820. The disciplined
majorities which rejected demands for free access before this period are now replaced by a
situation where new entrants become able to gain access to the privileged positions with
minimal sacriﬁces towards the elite. This change in elite behavior leads to the need to study
the breakdown in parliamentary discipline which allowed the elite’s bargaining position to
weaken so much.
This paper argues that the diﬀerence between the pre-reform period and later dates with
respect to elite behavior has to do with the disappearance of a mechanism which induced
majorities in Parliament to behave in ways which were eﬃcient for them. The mechanism
is the patronage system often called “Old Corruption” which characterized the British po-
litical system throughout the 18th century (Popa, 2012; Harling, 1996b; Rubinstein, 1983).
Commentators of the 18th and early 19th centuries, while often decrying the negative eﬀects
of Old Corruption on society, were generally in agreement that the system worked as an
eﬀective mechanism for maintaining disciplined majorities, and through this beneﬁted the
elite not only in a direct fashion, but also through its role in achieving legislative coordi-
nation (Foord, 1947). Old Corruption was a system of sinecures, non-competitive public
68contracting, privileged position for public employees, and electoral manipulation that made
a signiﬁcant part of the members of Parliament be dependend on the executive for their con-
tinued welfare. While Commons controlled taxation and ultimately controlled public policy
in all its aspects, under Old Corruption, the administration of public funds was delegated to
the executive and the monarch, who then returned some of them to MPs or their families in
the form of patronage, or “inﬂuence” in contemporary parlance (Rubinstein, 1983; Harling,
1996b). David Hume summarizes the contemporary view on the utility of the system thus:
“The crown has so many oﬃces at its disposal that, when assisted by the
honest and disinterested part of the House, it will always command the resolutions
of the whole, so far, at least, as to preserve the ancient constitution from danger.
We may therefore give to this inﬂuence what name we please; we may call it by
the invidious appellations of corruption and dependence; but some degree and
some kind of it are inseparable from the very nature of the constitution and
necessary to the preservation of our mixed government.” (Hume, 1748 [1985])
Many contemporaries and later authors are similarly in agreement that patronage served a
useful role for the elite. Foord (1947) is one of the deﬁnitive accounts of the system and he
summarizes it thus:
“Without exception the ministries of the eighteenth century employed court
favours to maintain themselves in oﬃce, and practical politicians saw no way to
’get the King’s business done’ in parliament without the use of inﬂuence.“
But, through a dynamic separate from that discussed in this paper, the system of patronage
had largely disappeared by 1820. The House of the 1820 was less constrained in its actions
by dependence on the government, and this meant that its strategic incentives were also
altered. Prime Minister Lord Liverpool noted in 1819 that he could no longer use patronage
to reward allies, and Prime Minister Lord Wellington was “forcibly struck by the lack of
patronage at his disposal” (Foord, 1947) in 1828. The government could not even ensure
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sitting prime minister to lose an election.
The most notable analysis of party strength throughout the 18th century is Cox (1987).
Cox argues that the ability of party organizations to constrain members’ votes by altering
their electoral prospects became important only after the introduction of secret voting and
elimination of electoral corruption in around 1883-1884. Before that, the individual MP
behaved like an entrepreneur in elections, having to provide his own (sometimes enormous)
sums of money for electoral bribery. “Patrons”, that is local economic elites, sometimes
ﬁnanced the campaigns of candidates, but the central party organization, in as much as it
can be called that, did not have the power to do so. Indirect evidence on the lack of control
by parties of their MPs comes from the low proportion of party-line votes in the House:
Using data from Lowell (1902), Cox shows that only after about 1870 do party-line votes
begin to make up a large (over 70%) proportion of total votes in the House. Cox calls the
twenty year period after the abolition of the Corn Laws (e.g. 1846-1866) the “golden age of
the private MP”, when members of the House proudly professed not being constrained by
parties in their actions.
The formal model captures these intuitions in a rigorous framework, and shows that the
equilibria of legislative bargaining processes between members of a legislature and outsiders
are determined by the two incentive structures.
A model of legislative bargaining and policy reform
Consider a set of nL legislators, where nL is an odd number, indexed by l. The legislators
make decisions through majority voting on binary agendas, so that an agenda is adopted if
strictly more than nL/2 vote for it. Economic agents that want to engage in various activities
need a permit which is allocated by the legislators through a vote. Denote by Pe = 1 the
case in which the permit has been allocated to agent e and by Pe = 0 the case in which
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her income minus any expenditures that are incurred for securing that income. The income
without a permit is normalized to zero and the income with the permit is some P. The costs
for securing the permit are Be for each agent. The economic agent’s utility is therefore:
Ue(Pe,Be) =

   
   
0 − Be if Pe = 0
P − Be if Pe = 1
(25)
The economic agent gets the permit from the legislators. To secure a permit, strictly more
than nL/2 legislators have to agree to this, that is vote aﬃrmative on a binary agenda
between allocating and not allocating the permit. The interaction between the agent and
the legislature is a bargaining process in which a bribe of total value Be can be distributed
among a certain number of members of the legislature. The legislators can accept the oﬀer,
that is take the bribe in exchange for votes, or reject the oﬀer, which means that no deal is
reached and the interaction advances to a new period. The utility of an individual legislator
is the bribe that is paid to that legislator, which is a share of the total bribe Be.
Ul(Pe,Be) = bl
s.t.
nL X
l=1
bl = Be (26)
All agents use a discount rate δ ∈ (0,1), so any payoﬀs that can be achieved in the
next time period have to be discounted accordingly. The legislative bargaining process is
a random-proposer model (McCarty and Meirowitz, 2007): at each new proposal stage,
a legislator is drawn with equal probability to make a proposal for a policy vector that
contains Be and Pe. Each legislator therefore has a probability of 1/nL of making a proposal
in each stage. The economic agent, sitting outside of the legislature cannot make proposals.
However, the nature of the bribe-paying process means the agent has an absolute veto on the
policy being implemented: unless he or she agrees to pay the bribe, it cannot be paid to the
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individual legislators and the citizen need to also be allowed. That is, side-payments from the
citizen to legislators should not be assumed as impossible, given the factual details presented
in section 2. Therefore the following aspect of the model is introduced by assumption:
Assumption 1: Side payments of the form s ∈ [0,∞) from the economic agent e to any
one legislator l are available.
(Of course, for any side payment to happen, paying and accepting it should be equilibrium
behavior.) The model analyses two modes of interaction between the potential buyer and
the legislators who can “sell” the permit through their votes: ﬁrst a situation in which only
the legislators and the buyer are involved in the bargaining, and then a situation where a
“leader” of the legislators, in the form of an executive or a party, can alter their incentives
in the bargaining process. Results with δ → 1 are always given special consideration in
the analysis, to model a situation where the bargaining takes the form of rapid oﬀers and
counter-oﬀers from the players.
Uncoordinated bargaining
In this case, the timing of the game is as follows: at stage t a legislator l begins the bargaining
process by proposing a total bribe Be,t. The bribe payout can be written as a vector:
Be,t = [b1,...,bn_{L}], bl ≥ 0 ∀l (27)
where each legislator gets a speciﬁc payoﬀ bl, which can be zero. It should be obvious that
in any equilibrium the bribe Be has to be lower than the value of the good, so Be ≤ P,
otherwise transactions would not take place. It is useful to think of the legislators who get
positive payoﬀs under the proposal Be,t as the “coalition” which is selected by the l player
for that stage. Once the proposal has been made, each individual legislator votes “yes” or
“no” on the motion of awarding the permit to e. In case strictly more than nL/2 “yes” votes
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is implemented. In case less than nL/2 “yes” votes are expressed, the permit is not allocated,
the payoﬀ vector Be,t = [0,...,0], Pe,t = 0 is implemented for that period, and the game
advances to a new period, which is discounted by all players at rate δ. In the new period,
t + 1, a new proposer is drawn and he or she proposes another payoﬀ vector Be,t+1. A vote
is taken on this new proposal, and if both the citizen and a majority of legislators agree on
the new payoﬀ vector, it is implemented, and so on.
This is therefore a model of legislative bargaining with full veto power by the citizen. Each
legislator has an equal chance of making a proposal in each period, as in the classic model
by Baron and Ferejohn (1989). However, there is one player who, while having no proposal
power, has full veto power on any allocation, similarly to the model in McCarty (2000). A
discussion of the relevant equilibrium concept in this interaction is warranted at this point:
Baron and Ferejohn ﬁrst note that in such legislative bargaining games (without a veto
player in their case), any allocation Be can be sustained in a subgame perfect equilibrium
provided the legislature is large enough and the discount rate is high enough. To avoid
this profusion of equilibria, Baron and Ferejohn and a large proportion of the literature
on legislative bargaining that followed their paper imposes the assumption of stationarity
on the strategies that players are allowed to use in any subgame perfect equilibrium. This
assumption essentially says that players cannot condition on the history of play until time
t, their actions at time t. In particular, this means punishment strategies cannot be used.
This rather strong assumption allows the equilibrium set to be collapsed to a much smaller
one. Assuming away punishment strategies is not very problematic in the Baron-Ferejohn
model and in similar extensions, as there is no particular “better” equilibrium that players
might be interested in generating by the use of punishment strategies than the one that does
emerge.
Assuming away the use of punishment strategies however, would not be appropriate in
this model. This is because there is one particular kind of equilibrium that legislators might
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part) of the surplus in the game is distributed among them rather than being shared with the
citizen. In particular, legislators would naturally be conjectured to ﬁnd it in their advantage
to use punishments against fellow legislators that make or vote for proposals that award
to the citizen any payoﬀ larger than what is absolutely necessary for the citizen to keep
participating in the bargaining (which is an arbitrarily small quantity ε). So the analysis
here will not limit attention to only stationary equilibria.
Allowing any subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) as a solution of the model will again
lead to any allocation Be being sustained in some SPE. There is however something that is
unconvincing about the SPEs that would generate such allocations (as well about the SPEs
in the original Baron-Ferejohn model). These equilibria are predicated on the fact that the
deﬁnition of subgame perfection is such that a SPE should only be immune to one-player
deviations. That is, if in a particular equilibrium Σ∗ the payoﬀ vector for some two players
l1 and l2 is [u1,u2], but a joint, incentive compatible, and mutually agreed upon deviation
by the two players would give them payoﬀ [u1 +a,u2 +a], a > 0, such a joint deviation will
not take place. That is, the SPEs being allowed are not coalition-proof (Bernheim, Peleg,
and Whinston, 1987), in the sense of not being required to be immune to joint, incentive-
compatible, deviations.10 This is an unnatural assumption to make in the context of a
legislature: a basic function of a legislature is to allow players to discuss their strategies and
to coordinate their voting. When there is noting to be gained by anyone by not voting in
a mutually agreed upon way, it is erroneous to simply assume that such mutual agreements
will not take place. That is, it should be the case that the SPEs that are considered in the
analysis of legislative bargaining are coalition-proof subgame perfect equilibria (CPSPEs).
The following is a straightforward extension of Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston’s deﬁnition
of coalition-proofness to extensive-form games (See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) for the
10Coalition-proofness is a weaker version of the requirement for a Nash equilibrium to be strong (Aumann,
1959). Strong Nash equilibria are those which are immune to any joint deviations, even if the joint deviations
themselves are not self-enforceable. A connected concept from social choice theory is the core, which is the
set of undominated outcomes given a preference aggregation rule. (Schoﬁeld, Grofman, and Feld, 1988)
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Deﬁnition: (Coalition-Proof Subgame Perfect Equilibrium). Consider the extensive-form
game Γ. A proper subgame G of Γ is a node nt and its successor nodes nτ such that
if n0
τ ∈ G and n00
τ belongs to the same history as n0
τ, that is n00
τ ∈ h(n0
τ), then n00
τ ∈ G.
A strategy proﬁle σ∗ in the game Γ is a coalition-proof subgame perfect equilibrium if
the restriction of σ∗ to G is a coalition proof Nash equilibrium of G for every proper
subgame G of Γ. A generic strategy proﬁle σ∗ is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium if
the following recursive deﬁnition holds (Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston, 1987): Take
the normal-form game GN = [{ui}n
i=1,{Σi}n
i=1] , where ui is player i’s utility function
and Σi is player i’s strategy set. Denote by J the proper subsets of {1,...,n} and
denote an element of J by j, a “coalition” of players. Denote by Σj the strategy sets
of all players in coalition j. and by Σ the strategy sets of all players 1 through n.
Denote by −j the complement of coalition j. For each σ0
−j ∈ Σ−j denote by GN|s0
−j
the game induced on group j by the given actions s0
−j for members of the group −j.
Denote by ˜ ui : Σj → R the utility given by ˜ ui(σj) ≡ ui(σj,σ0
−j), that is the utility for a
member of coalition j under strategy proﬁle σj given ﬁxed actions σ0
−j by non-members
of the coalition. The coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE) is deﬁned recursively
as follows: (i) If n = 1 , σ∗ is a CPNE iﬀ s∗ maximizes u1(σ). (ii) If n > 1 then (a):
For any game GN, σ∗ ∈ Σ is self enforcing if for all j ∈ J, σ∗
j is a CPNE in the game
G|σ∗
−j, and (b): For any game GN , σ∗ ∈ Σ is a CPNE if it is self enforcing and if
there is no other self enforcing strategy proﬁle σ ∈ Σ such that ui(σ) > ui(σ∗) for all
i = 1,...,n.
This deﬁnition simply requires that the CPSPE strategy proﬁle be a coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium in each proper subgame, that is that there are no proﬁtable “coalitional” de-
viations from the equilibrium strategies. The deﬁnition of coalition-proof subgame perfect
equilibria (CPSPE) implies that coalitional deviations from candidate equilibria are consid-
ered if they are welfare improving for all those who agree upon them, and moreover, no
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deviation principle to coalition-proof equilibria is straightforward: instead of looking for
proﬁtable one-player deviations, the deﬁnition allows to search for proﬁtable, self-enforcing,
coalitional deviations. Also note that since all CPNEs have to be Nash equilibria, all CPSPEs
have to be subgame perfect equilibria.
Generic legislative bargaining games will not usually have any coalition-proof equilibria.
The intuition for this is simple, and is connected to the inexistence of the core in generic
multidimensional preference aggregation problems: ﬁx an allocation Be = [b1,...,bnL] in a
bargaining process in which a majority is needed for a decision and there are no vetoes by
a citizen or any other agent. There will always exist an allocation B+
e = [b1 + a,...,bnm +
a,...,bnm+1 − c,...,bnL − c] , where nm > nL/2 such that all legislators 1 through nm would
jointly deviate from Be to B+
e in a way that is self-enforcing.11 However, it is the case that
in the model discussed in this paper, a CPSPEs exists and is “unique” in a loose sense, thus
being the natural predicted outcome of the bargaining process. The fact that the bribe-
paying citizen has a veto on any allocation of the bribe will lead to the existence of a small
set of CPSPE outcomes, which compacts to a single point when δ → 1. The ﬁrst set of
results therefore are:
Proposition 1: Consider the legislative bargaining game presented above. Only the fol-
lowing allocations can be sustained as a coalition-proof subgame perfect equilibrium
outcome: B∗
e = [b1,...,bnL], P = 1 where
PnL
l=1 bl ≤ (1 − δ)P. This leads immediately
to:
Corollary 1: If δ → 1, the only allocation that can be sustained in a coalition-proof sub-
game perfect equilibrium is B∗
e = [0,...,0], P = 1 (here the payoﬀ 0 can be thought of
as an arbitrarily small ε for at least one half of the legislators).
11The result that, abstaining from any game form, any given allocation in multidimensional choice problems
is dominated by another allocation, has been stated numerous times with some of the most notable analyses
being Plott (1967) and Shepsle and Weingast (1981).
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collapses to zero in the natural case in which δ → 1.
Proof: The strategy for proving Proposition 1 is to show that any allocation B∗
e that
fulﬁlls the given condition can be sustained as a CPSPE and then, more importantly, to
show that no other allocations can be sustained as CPSPEs. First consider any allocation
B∗
e = [b1,...bnL],P = 1 with
PnL
l=1 bl ≤ (1 − δ)P and the strategy proﬁle:
i) Any legislator to be drawn as proposer proposes a B∗
e.
ii) All legislators vote “yes” for any B∗
e in any stage; also the citizen agrees to any B∗
e in
any stage.
iii) In case any other allocation is proposed: (a) The legislators can vote whatever they
want, and (b) The citizen will vote “no”, so the game advances to the next stage.
This simple strategy proﬁle is a CPSPE because there are no proﬁtable joint, self-
enforcing, one-shot deviations for any players at any point on or oﬀ the equilibrium path.
Take ﬁrst the histories that lie oﬀ the equilibrium path (that is when a proposal other than
B∗
e has been made): In such a non-B∗
e proposal, the citizen would get less than δP as a
payoﬀ. Any payoﬀ-modifying deviation from the prescribed equilibrium strategy behavior
has to include a “yes” vote from the citizen. But a “yes” vote from the citizen would lead
to a payoﬀ less than δP , whereas the “no” vote prescribed by the equilibrium strategy
generates more than δP. So a payoﬀ-modifying proﬁtable deviation by a coalition does not
exist. Proﬁtable deviations by individual players do not exist either: Any change of vote by
a legislator does not change the outcome of the process keeping other players’ votes constant,
and an individual deviation by the citizen is not proﬁtable by the argument above. (In this
oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path case legislators can vote anything in the equilibrium strategy proﬁle,
so their deviations do not need to be analyzed.)
Consider now deviations from the equilibrium path: A coalitional deviation that includes
a deviation by the citizen to voting “no” will not happen, as such a deviation is clearly not
proﬁtable, as it would lead to a payoﬀ that is at most δP whereas on the equilibrium path the
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proﬁtable, as it leads to the rejection of the new policy by either the legislators themselves
or the citizen, by the argument above. A payoﬀ-modifying deviation by a coalition at the
voting stage will not be proﬁtable, as it will generate the payoﬀ δBe which is less than Be.
The fact that as δ → 1 the set of equilibria that can be sustained collapses to a single point
follows immediately.
The coalition-proofness requirement becomes more important in showing that no other
equilibrium outcome can be sustained in a CPSPE. Consider an allocation Be = [b1,...,bnL], P =
1 where
PnL
l=1 bl > (1−δ)P. In such an allocation, the legislators must use an incentive struc-
ture such that they force the citizen to accept less than δP from the bargaining process.
Assume an equilibrium path along which such an allocation is proposed and it is accepted,
that is it receives “yes” votes from at least half the legislature and from the citizen. Now
consider a history that lies oﬀ the equilibrium path in which the following alternative pro-
posal which makes both the proposer, a majority of legislators, and the citizen better oﬀ,
has been made:
B
0
e = [b1 + a1,...,bm + am,bm+1 − cm+1,...bnL − cnL], al > 0,∀l,cl ≥ 0,∀l
and
  nL X
l=1
(bl + al) for (bl + al) ∈ B
0
e
!
<
  nL X
l=1
bl for bl ∈ Be
!
(28)
It is easy to see that such a B
0
e always exists, except in the case in which the proposer
allocated herself the entire bribe in the candidate equilibrium, that is when Be = [P,0,...,0].
The alternative proposal is a modiﬁcation of Be where the proposer and at least half of
the legislators receive more than in Be, and the citizen also receives more than in Be. In
the context of a legislature, there is nothing to prevent the players beneﬁting from the new
proposal B0
e , that is both the more than half of legislators who receive more under the new
proposal, and the citizen who also receives more, from agreeing upon a joint deviation in
which they vote “yes” on the new proposal. So consider the one-shot modiﬁcation of the
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e in
equation (4) has been put forward, a majority of legislators and the citizen deviate to voting
“yes” for B0
e. It is clearly the case that the deviation is proﬁtable:
Vl,t(σOSD) > Vl,t(σ) for l in 1,m
Ve,t(σOSD) > Ve,t(σ) (29)
But for σOSD to be a valid deviation, it remains to be proved that it is self-enforcing, that
is that no player or group of players who take part in the deviation would ﬁnd it worthwhile
to “bail out” on the agreement and renounce to deviate. The self-enforcing requirement on
the deviation means that changing their mind and voting “no” when the new proposal has
been made should not be attractive for any player or any coalition. For such a change of
mind to be attractive for the legislators, it would have to be that the equilibrium strategy
proﬁle can enforce from the next stage an outcome that is even better for the players who
defect from voting “yes” on the deviation. That is, for a deviation from the allocation
B0
e = [b1 + a1,...bm + am,bm+1 − cm+1,...bnL − cnL] to be attractive for players 1 through d,
d ≤ m, it would have to be that those who vote “no” on the vector B0
e are guaranteed even
more in the next stage, that is they will receive
B
00
e|d = [(b1 + a1)
1
δ
+ ε,...(bd + ad)
1
δ
+ ε] ,ε > 0 (30)
where B00
e|d is the restriction of a payoﬀ vector to players 1 through d. For this promise to
be credible, it has to be that the payoﬀ vector B00
e can be sustained in a CPSPE. But now
for B00
e to be sustained in an equilibrium a necessary condition is that given some legislator
l, the payoﬀ
B
000
e |l =

((bl(B
00
e) + a
0
1)
1
δ
+ ε

(31)
where B000
e |l is the restriction of the payoﬀ vector to l and bl(B00
e) is the payoﬀ of player l
79under B00
e can be sustained in an equilibrium. This series of necessary conditions progresses
an inﬁnite number of times: for an allocation B(k)
e to be sustained in equilibrium it has to
be that, given a modiﬁed allocation B(k+1)
e in which at least half of legislators get a better
outcome cannot be sustained. But for B(k+1)
e to not be sustained, a necessary condition is
that that an allocation B(k+2)
e in which one player l receives the payoﬀ
bl(B
(k+1)
e ) =

bl(B
(k+1)
e ) + al
 1
δ
+ ε (32)
can be sustained in a CPSPE. Clearly allocations in which

bl(B
(k+1)
e ) + al
 1
δ
+ ε > P (33)
cannot be sustained in equilibrium, so a corresponding allocation B(k+1)
e cannot be sustained,
which leads to the fact that B(k)
e cannot be sustained, and so on. For any allocation to be
sustained in an equilibrium, it has to be that at least one member of the legislature can be
dissuaded from voting for a new proposal that gives her more by the promise of a “prize” in
the future for rejecting the new better oﬀer. But such ever-increasing payoﬀs will eventually
hit the budget constraint that all payoﬀs must sum to P, as long as ε > 0 and δ < 1,
with δ ﬁxed, and hence promises to increase the payoﬀ of legislators who defect from the
coordinated deviation are not credible.
The fact that the economic agent would also not “bail out” on the deviation follows
from a similar reasoning and from Assumption 1. For e to renounce a deviation from Be
to B0
e, where B0
e gives her a better payoﬀ it has to be that an even better payoﬀ, part of
some B00
e can be enforced in an equilibrium. This increasing series leads up to a payoﬀ of
P for the economic agent, which can be enforced in equilibrium, as has been shown above.
So the economic agent would bail out on the proposed initial deviation at time t if she
was guaranteed a payoﬀ of P in the next stage, t + 1, if doing so. Payoﬀ P for e can be
implemented in a CPSPE at time t+1. But the citizens using a “self-punishment” strategy
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PUN which switches to the “bad” equilibrium in which e receives P in case a proposal
that is not Be has been put forward is not subgame perfect at stage t. This is because by
Assumption 1, the citizen could induce a non-Be proposal to be put forward at time t, which
would guarantee her payoﬀ P at time t + 1 under σ∗
PUN. For this to happen, the citizen
can make a side payment st to the proposer at time t worth (slightly more than) what the
proposer is getting under σ∗
PUN. Such a side payment will be made by the economic agent
up to the level max(st) = δP, which is the gain from making the payment and attracting
the “bad” equilibrium (in which the economic agent gets P) in the following stage. So for
σ∗
PUN to form an equilibrium, a necessary condition would be that the proposer at time t
receives more than the maximal side-payment that could be made to him by the citizen:
bl(σ
∗
PUN) ≥ δP for l proposer (34)
However, such an allocation again cannot be sustained in a CPSPE if the citizen can
made side payments, by the follwing argument: clearly for this allocation to be sustained it
has to be that it is not rejected by half of the legislators. For this rejection to not occur, it
has to be that in case a rejection by a coalition of half of the legislators has occurred, play
switches to the punishment equilibrium σ∗
PUN in which the economic agent receives P and
legislators receive zero. In case side payments were not available, the fact that σ∗
PUN states
that play switches to the punishment equilibrium after a rejection of Be would act as an
eﬀective disincentive for legislators to reject Be. It has been established that for Be to be
sustained as an equilibrium with strategy proﬁle σ∗
PUN it has to be that the non-proposing
legislators should receive at most (1−δ)P in total. But the economic agent is willing to pay
side-payments up to the level δP for a rejection to occur. Clearly then the economic agent
would make side-payments to at least half of the legislators in order to trigger a rejection
of the Be proposal and a switch to the punishment equilibrium. This shows that equilibria
in which play switches to an allocation in which the economic agent receives P at time
81t + 1 as a punishment for legislators’ behavior at time t cannot be sustained in a CPSPE,
as long as side-payments can be made. This then shows that the economic agent cannot
be dissuaded from agreeing to deviations from a proposed allocation in which she is not
receiving at least δP by the promise of getting the payoﬀ P in case she does so, which shows
that coalitional deviations from any Be deﬁned in equation (27) to B0
e deﬁned in equation
(28) are self-enforcing. This shows that Be cannot be sustained in a CPSPE.
The remaining possibility is one in which the proposer proposes the allocation Be =
[P,0,...,0], from which there are no proﬁtable changes such as the one presented above. But
in this case the citizen is at least indiﬀerent between accepting this proposal and postponing
for another stage, so the citizen can delay agreement for another stage. Hence there are no
CPSPEs that implement an allocation in which the citizen receives less than δP and the
proof is complete.
Coordinated bargaining
The problem faced by legislators in the game in section 3.1 is essentially a collective action
problem: they would all like to be able to prevent themselves from accepting new oﬀers,
as this leads to the lack of equilibria in which legislators capture more than (1 − δ)P of
the surplus. However, in any individual vote, one-half of legislators will always ﬁnd it
advantageous to deviate from any allocation, which leads to the breakdown of any equilibrium
which is not the one in which they get the minimal payoﬀ. The legislators can overcome this
collective action problem by limiting their freedom through an institution that implements
a mechanism in which the legislators are sanctioned in case their behavior deviates from a
prescribed set of rules. Such an institution should be able to impose a cost on any individual
legislator who behaves in ways which are suboptimal for the group (and ultimately for any
legislator individually). Examples would be an executive or monarch who controls a stream
of payments to the legislators, and who can alter these payments in response to the actions
of the legislators in the bargaining game, or a party organization that can impose costs on
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Consider then the following modiﬁcation of the game in the previous section. There is in
every period a tax income T which is collected from the economy. The legislators control the
use of this tax through majority voting, but can delegate its use to an agent G. The agent
then can return this payment to the legislators in the form of patronage. In between each
period of the bargaining game described above, a (potential) vote on whether the role of
agent G should continue is taken by the legislators. Such a circuitous way to distribute the
tax income seems redundant at ﬁrst sight: if the legislators can control the tax payment T,
why not decide on its use themselves rather than delegating this to an outside agent? In the
context of this model, such a delegation mechanism will help legislators prevent themselves
from being pushed to an equilibrium where the citizen captures (almost) all of the surplus.
In case agent G exists and he or she is free to exercise control over T, the game structure is
as follows:
The bargaining process between the citizen and legislators is identical to the one in the
previous section. Now after each stage in which a vote is taken, the coordinator G distributes
a patronage vector Π = [π1,...,πnL] such that
PnL
l=1 πl ≤ T. The behavior of the coordinator
is only strategic in that she has to follow the rules of a mechanism M. The question is
whether a majority of legislators can design a mechanism M to be implemented by the
coordinator G that would help them achieve a better outcome in the bargaining process. In
case such a rule can be designed, the majority will extend the contract with the coordinator
for future periods.
Consider the following behavior rule M for the coordinator: select a coalition C =
{1,2,...,nC}, nC > nL/2. Members of this coalition receive the patronage vector Π =
[π1,...,πnC] where πl = T/nC for all l ∈ 1,nC. Denote by B∗
e = [ P
nC,..., P
nC,0,...,0] a payoﬀ
vector in which each member of the coalition receives an equal share of the bribe, and the
total bribe is the entire proﬁt P. This is an outcome of the bargaining process in which
legislators capture all of the surplus, in spite of the fact that the citizen has a veto on any
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indiﬀerent between accepting the deal or not.) This allocation will be the unique CPSPE of
the bargaining game in case an appropriate incentive structure is implemented. Moreover,
at any point in time, the members of the coalition C would vote for the maintenance of the
coordinator G in her position, so the mechanism works even if legislators do not give up
their ultimate control on the tax payment.
When awarding the patronage, G should use the following criterion: In case a “yes” vote
has been expressed by a member of C on a proposal other than B∗
e or in case a “no” vote
has been expressed by a member of C on B∗
e , implement a patronage vector in which the
coalition member which expressed the oﬀending vote gets zero in patronage for that period.
(Assume for simplicity that the tax income not spent is destroyed or returned to the tax
base). Legislators that behave according to the rules set by G will receive the appropriate
allocation T
nC for that period. For this mechanism to successfully dissuade coalition members
from engaging in the cycle of defections that reduces their rents to close to zero, the parameter
that needs to be adjusted is the size of the coalition, by the following reasoning:
In a legislature of size nL, with a governing coalition of size nC with .5nL < nC ≤ nL,
any majority that implements a given policy needs to include at least sc = ﬂoor[nC − .5nL]
members of C12. (The sc notation suggests that they are the “supermajority” part of the
coalition.) For these sc members of the coalition to be dissuaded from voting for a proposal
other than B∗
e, they need to be guaranteed a loss of patronage due to doing so that is greater
than the gain in bribe payments that can be made to them. A suﬃcient condition for such
a supermajority to not vote for the alternative proposal is that
P ≤ scΠsc
where Πsc =
sc X
l=1
πl (35)
12The ﬂoor function is ﬂoor(x) = y where y = max(n) such that n ∈ N and n ≤ x
84Here Πsc is the total patronage that is paid to the supermajority members of C. This gives
the coalition size that is needed for defections to be avoided: The optimal size is given by
P = (ﬂoor(nC − .5nL))
 T
nC

(36)
which leads to an optimal coalition size nC of
nC =

   
   
nLT
2(T−P) if
nLT
2(T−P) > .5nL
.5nL if
nLT
2(T−P) ≤ .5nL
(37)
This explains why super-majoritarian coalitions might be needed, even if they lead to an
over-dispersion of the patronage income.
Proposition 2: In a version of the legislative bargaining game in which the mechanism
M is implemented, the only allocation that can be sustained in a CPSPE is B∗
e =
[ P
nC,..., P
nC,0,...,0],P = 1 where the number of P
nC terms is nC = ...
nLT
2(T−P) if
nLT
2(T−P) >
.5nL or nC = .5nL if
nLT
2(T−P) < .5nL.
Proof: Again, ﬁrst show that the given payoﬀ proﬁle can be sustained by a CPSPE and
then show that no other payoﬀ proﬁle can be sustained in a CPSPE. B∗
e is sustained as a
CPSPE by the following strategy proﬁle: Any proposer selected at any stage proposes B∗
e
as the policy vector and every member of the coalition and the citizen vote “yes” on this
motion. In case another proposal has been made, every member of the coalition C votes “no”
on this alternative proposal. (The citizen and non-C legislators can vote anything). There
are no proﬁtable joint or single one-shot deviations from this strategy proﬁle: any single
deviation by a member of the coalition to voting “no” for this proposal is not proﬁtable, as
it either does not change the outcome of the vote but it does remove his or her patronage
income (in case they are pivotal), or if it does change the outcome , the gain is not enough
to overcome the loss in patronage, given condition (35). Any joint deviation by members of
C cannot be proﬁtable: either the group that deviates is too small to change the outcome of
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the gain in bribes cannot be large enough to overcome the loss of patronage: as shown
above, the largest per-capita gain from the bribe is given by distributing all of P to the sc
supermajority members of C (which in this case has to be discounted by δ as the soonest
this payoﬀ can arrive is the next stage), but by construction of the supermajority, this will
not be enough to make a joint deviation proﬁtable for them, as each lose more in patronage
than they gain by this deviation (condition 35). The citizen cannot gain by voting “no” and
advancing to the next stage, as in the next stage the same constraints will be in place for
coalition members, and a postponement until then cannot generate an increase in payoﬀs
for the citizen. (Assuming a small ε is gained by the citizen in the bargaining process - then
he or she is not indiﬀerent between voting “no” and voting “yes” on the proposal B∗
e, and
will vote “yes”). Oﬀ the equilibrium path, again no proposal can be good enough to make
it worthwhile for a large enough part of C to vote for it given the removal of patronage
income this would lead to, as indicated by the suﬃcient condition (35). Deviations from the
prescribed strategies oﬀ the equilibrium path by the citizen or by non-C legislators do not
matter for the outcome of the game.
Now it needs to be shown that no other allocation than B∗
e can be sustained in a CPSPE:
Assume that such an allocation can be sustained in a CPSPE. This would entail having at
least sc members of the C group vote “yes” for such an allocation. But it has been established
that such a vote cannot occur in equilibrium, as the loss in patronage by the sc legislators
cannot be overcome by the gain in bribes if condition (35) holds, therefore no such allocation
that is not B∗
e can be sustained in a CPSPE, which completes the proof.
A simple but important corollary of Propositions 1 and 2 is that given a binary choice
between the coordinated bargaining system in section 3.2 and the uncoordinated bargaining
system in section 3.1 , all members of the coalition C would vote in favor of the coordinated
bargaining process whenever the coordinated system generates a higher payoﬀ for each of
them. This would always be the case for any reasonable parameter values: Taking the simple
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sustained in a CPSPE, shared equally between a minimally winning majority, what is needed
for the C legislators to prefer the coordinated system is that P/nC > (1−δ)P/.5nL. The C
legislators would also always prefer the coordinated system in the case in which δ → 1.
The exposition until now has assumed, for simplicity, that only one permit is awarded,
and only one economic agent bids for it. A situation in which multiple economic agents are
interested in obtaining such permits is more natural. This extension of the model, however,
will not change the conclusions of the analysis: An uncoordinated bargaining process will
again lead to the legislature giving away the permits for free, while a coordination mechanism
will help the members of the legislature avoid this situation. The fact that the number of
permits being awarded can aﬀect the value of each such permit does not aﬀect this conclusion.
The analysis in this section is presented in a more abbreviated form, as it is largely analogous
to the one in the single-bidder section. The situation in which δ → 1 is given priority, as it
is the most natural setup, one in which rapid oﬀers and counteroﬀers are made by all parties
involved in the bargaining process.
To model a situation in which multiple bidders are looking for permits, consider ﬁrst
an extension of the model in which two such bidders are interacting with the legislature.
(The argument immediately generalizes to more bidders). Now the timing of the bargaining
game is similar to the situation before, except the proposals are on a vector of the type B =
h
(b1
1,b2
1),(b1
2,b2
2),....(b1
nL,b2
nL)
i
. The superscripts in each pair indicate the bribe received from
economic agent 1 and 2, with the subscripts again indexing the members of the legislature.
At the voting stage, each legislator is allowed to express a vector of votes, on whether the
permit should be given to either of the two bidders, and both bidders can accept or reject
the proposed allocation. In case one bidder has accepted the allocation and the other has
not, the bargaining process advances to the next stage with only the bidder that is left.
The major diﬀerence between this process and the one with a single bidder is that the
value of each permit might depend on the number of permits being awarded at the same
87time: rationing the permits would create rents, so a higher number would reduce the value
of each one individually. Express the value of a permit now at each moment in time as
a function of the number of permits awarded: P(nP), where nP is the number of permits
awarded with P decreasing in nP.
The basic intuition of why this modiﬁed game leads to the same kinds of conclusions as
the single-bidder game is that, just as before, joint and self-reinforcing deviations from any
proposed allocations in which legislators receive substantial bribes always exist. Similarly,
attractive deviations from an equilibrium where the bidders capture most of the rents do not
exist, as the bidders themselves need to be part of such deviations. To see that joint devi-
ations from allocations with signiﬁcant bribes being paid exist, note that for any allocation
B = [(b1
1,b2
1),...,(b1
nL,b2
nL)] , and for any m ≥ 1
2nLthere exists an alternative proposal:
B0 =
 
b1
1 + a1
1,b2
1 + a2
1

,...,
 
b1
m + a1
m,b2
m + a2
m

,
 
b1
m+1 − c1
m+1,b2
m+1 − c2
m+1

,...,
 
b1
nL − c1
nL,b2
nL − c2
nL

ai
l > 0∀i∀l,ci
l ≥ 0,∀i∀l and
 
nL X
l=1
X
i
bi
l,DEV for bi
l,DEV ∈ B0
!
<
 
nL X
l=1
X
i
bi
l for bi
l ∈ B
!
(38)
where bi
l,DEV are the individual bribes under B0
This alternative proposal can arise oﬀ the equilibrium path for any equilibrium that
generates the allocation B. By an argument identical to the one in the single-bidder game,
this proposal features increased bribes for at least half of the legislators and more rents for
both bidders. Clearly a one-shot deviation by a coalition of players including the bidders
to accepting this alternative proposal is proﬁtable, and by an argument analogous to the
single-bidder case such a deviation is self-reinforcing. Similarly, strategies that postulate a
self-punishment in which legislators give up all rents to one or both of the bidders in case
a deviation from the B allocation has been proposed and one/both bidders have rejected it
are not subgame perfect as long as side payments are allowed, as bidders would then induce
such proposals in order to capture all of the rents, by an argument identical to the one from
the single-bidder case.
The diﬀerence that arises in the proof for the multiple-bidders case is that now there also
may exists a proﬁtable joint deviation from the allocation in which both bidders capture all
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one permit now depends on how many such permits are allocated, there exist deviations in
which the following alternative proposals are utility-improving for both half the legislators
and for one bidder (assume it is bidder 1, and assume legislators 1 through m are the ones
whose utilities are improved):
B
0 =
h
0 + a
1
1,0

,...,

0 + a
1
m,0

,(0,0),...,(0,0)
i
(39)
In B0 legislators 1 through m each receive a higher total bribe payment than under B.
At the same time, the diﬀerence between the rents captured by bidder 1, P(1), and the total
bribe he/she has to pay,
P
b1
l,DEV for b1
l,DEV , is higher than the equivalent diﬀerence in case
the bribe vector B is implemented and both permits are allocated. In case this outcome were
permanent, both half of the legislators and one bidder get a better deal, so they would appear
to be tempted to deviate to the new allocation. However, this is not the case when looking
at the entire time horizon: as the second bidder will reject an allocation in which he/she
does not get the permit (in the sense that he/she will not pay any bribes), the bargaining
process between the legislature and the second bidder advances to a new stage, in which it
becomes identical to the process described in the single bidder case. The outcome of this
bargaining process is characterized in Propositions 1 and 2. This means bidder number 1,
who gains the sole permit in the proposed equilibrium will only reap the beneﬁts of holding
the permit by themselves for one period of the bargaining game: after this the second permit
will be allocated as well and the value of the permit will drop to P(2). As δ → 1, which is
the most relevant case as explained above, this eﬀectively means the additional beneﬁt that
bidder 1 derives form holding the permit by themselves converges to zero. This shows that
the proposed beneﬁcial joint deviations from the allocation in which both bidders get the
permit do not exist, and this shows that indeed the strategic situation in the two-bidder case
is analogous to the one in the one bidder case as δ → 1. The argument extends immediately
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is lower than the total number of bidders will be ephemeral, so the situation in which all
bidders receive permits is the unique equilibrium of that situation as well.
The coordinated bargaining situation with multiple bidders is similar to the one with a
single bidder as well: Under the leadership of a coordinator who controls the stream of tax
payments, the legislators can now generate an equilibrium in which the quantity of permits is
optimized to maximize the total amount of rents in the economy. Denote by nO the optimal
number of permits, which maximizes aggregate rents. A suﬃcient condition for nO permits
to be allocated and for each member of the governing coalition to receive 1
nCP(nO) is that the
coordinator implements the same mechanism from the single-bidder section, where now the
size of the coalition, sC, is given by replacing P with P(nO) in expression (13). Therefore,
the multiple-bidders case will be identical in its conclusions to the single-bidder case, even
if each additional permit being awarded aﬀects the value of other permits.
Empirical evidence
Historical evidence from 18th-19th century Britain is extremely supportive of the logic pre-
sented in this paper for why the British elite came to no longer restrict access to economic
activity after about 1820. This section uses evidence regarding incorporation rights for com-
mercial enterprises to prove this. Using information from Taylor (2006) and Freeman et al.
(2012), this section shows that there is ample historical evidence in favor of the following
points:
1. There is clear evidence that limitations on company incorporation, such as the Bubble
Act, were designed to create rents for insiders and were eﬀective in doing so.
2. Before the era of open access, it was crucial for companies seeking incorporation
from Parliament to secure the suppport of inﬂuential individuals who might have exercised
direct or indirect inﬂuence in Parliament. This was most commonly done by awarding such
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3. After about 1820, the practice of securing support in Parliament by oﬀering shares
or other inducements to members of the House was maintained. However, there is evidence
that the scale of such transfers dropped signiﬁcantly, and being partners in such enterprises
was no longer a very lucrative endeavor for members of the House.
4. Limitations on incorporation were abolished with little resistance or debate when it
was becoming clear that they no longer served the purpose of preventing the access of new
entrants to markets.
These points taken together support the logic of the model in this paper. In the following,
each one is analyzed separately.
1. From its genesis, the Bubble Act, preventing the free formation of incorporated com-
panies without Parliamentary approval, was meant to protect the returns of existing incor-
porated companies: “The legislation was not the result of a moral panic about joint-stock
projects, but of a cabal of South Sea Company directors pushing Parliament—where many
of the company’s directors sat—into protecting the price bubble that they had taken great
pains to inﬂate. The cabal aimed to deter further stock company promotion and maintain
the ﬂow of funds into South Sea shares” (Freeman et al. 2012, p 22; see also Scott, 1912,
v1.). Freeman et al (2012) show that the main eﬀect of the act was not so much to prevent
the formation of speculative enterprises, as to direct entrepreneurs seeking to engage in sig-
niﬁcant economic activity to seek incorporation from Parliament (or to try to organize their
business as an “unchartered shareholder partnership” of dubious legality.) At the beginning
of the 19th century, as the opportunities for new company formation were increasing for
entrepreneurs, together with their desire to do so, the enforcement of the Bubble Act began
to be more strict that it had been in the 18th century, turning into a tool which insiders
were trying to use to stop all new market entrants, not just those seeking the advantage
of incorporation. In 1807 for example, an existing distillery in West Ham ﬁled a complaint
regarding a new entrant in the liquor market which was trying to set up an (unincorporated)
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cessful, the fact that it made it to court, as well as the ambiguous court ruling regarding it,
showed how easy it was for insiders to use such legal mechanisms to deter new entrants even
when they did not formally violate existing legislation. (Freeman et al 2012, p 29).
2. Seeking incorporation from Parliament was no easy task before around 1820: ... In
order to obtain a parliamentary act, “winning at least the support of the local landowners
was essential. [...] Allocations of shares could win over skeptical landowners.” (Freeman et
al 2012, p 49). Freeman et al describe the problems faced by a canal company seeking incor-
poration in 1792: At the beginning of the project, the entrepeneurs “ﬂatter[ed] themselves
that the project will meet with Lord Rawdon’s concurrence and patronage” (Ashby-de-la
Zouch Canal Company Minute Book, 1792, cit in Freeman et al 2012, p 48.) This was not
enough as other inﬂuential landowners from the regions through which the canal was going
to pass through were not yet on board: “As a result of these problems, when the shares
were issued, the committee of management decided to reserve 500 of the company’s 1,500
shares for landowners, and withheld a further 250 to be distributed during the progress of
the company’s bill through Parliament.” (Freeman et al. p 49). Therefore more than half
of the shares (and future proﬁts) of the company were captured by inﬂuential power-brokers
and politicians. Another approach was to appoint inﬂuential individuals as executives in
the companies seeking incorporation. Freeman et al again list the example of another canal
company which had four of its seven directors appointed by local landowners. Critics of
the system were stating the obvious: Joseph Hume, MP, was “strongly impressed with the
impropriety” of the system “of canvass and inﬂuence” of the incorporation process (Hansard
11:910, 1824, cited in Freeman et al.). Similarly, Henry Brougham thought that “the system
also encouraged “jobbing” in votes, that is, MPs selling their votes on the committee to the
highest bidder.” (Hansard 12:635-6, 1825, cited in Freeman et al).
3. The system of remuneration in exchange for votes between entrepreneurs and politi-
cians did not end in the second decade of the 19th century, quite the contrary. The years
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increase in the number of incorporated companies. However, the historical evidence shows
that the nature of these bargains had changed: On the one hand the scale of the induce-
ments that entrepreneurs had to provide politicians with went down a lot. Freeman et al.
note a few examples of such eﬀorts from the 1830s and 40s. In 1844 a railway company had
spent £11,409 on incorporation expenses in Parliament, which was 3% of its capital, and
according to the company’s minutes, double what it would have been had incorporation not
been opposed by local landowners. Similarly, a railway company established in 1826 spent
some £160 (plus £300 on solicitors’ fees) on expenses related to passing its incorporation
bill in the Commons. This is again about two percentage points of its capital. Perhaps
more convincingly, this period sees a huge increase in the percentage of new companies that
make a provision in their “constitution” to seek incorporation. Using a sample of British
companies from that period, Freeman et al show that this percentage goes from 0% before
1800, to 13% in 1810-19, to 53% in 1820-24, and up to 71% in 1830-34. This is all happening
in a period where incorporation still had to be obtained with an act of Parliament. It should
be obvious from these numbers that securing such an act became signiﬁcantly cheaper for
entrepreneurs in the period after 1820, in accordance with the logic of the model.
4. Given the signiﬁcance of barriers to incorporation in the political economy of Britain
in the 18th and early 19th centuries, the abolition of these barriers came with little debate or
conﬂict. In fact, there has never been a ﬂoor vote taken on the two major legislative changes
that eliminated these barriers: the Companies Act of 1844, which established automatic
incorporation in case a few basic qualiﬁcations were met, and the Limited Liability Act of
1855, which granted limited liability on such companies. The act of 1844 had actually been
preceded by laws speciﬁc to certain sectors to allow free registration: Shipping companies,
savings banks, building societies, and joint-stock banks had all received access to registration
in the decades before 1844. The act of 1844 was written by a commission lead by the young
William Gladstone, and passed Commons easily according to Taylor (2006), and Harris
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Commons without much debate. There is no record in the Hansard of roll-call votes on these
acts, and Taylor (2006) states that their passage was seen as a “minor adjustment at the
time”. Taken together, these points show that the logic of the model is in accordance with
the basic historical facts, and thus the model can serve as an explanation for the behavior
of the British elite in this period.
Conclusions
This paper has explained a set favorable institutional changes in the British economy of
the 19th century by emphasizing the unique political framework of this country in that
period: Britain at the time was led by a legislature, but this legislature neither had at its
disposal the traditional patronage system, neither had yet developed a modern party system.
This unique feature led to an equilibrium where the bargaining power of the elites in the
legislature in relation to members of society was unusually weak. The mechanism of reform
presented here can be seen as an answer to the problem presented in Acemoglu (2003): there,
reforms that could improve total productivity in an economy are not adopted if those who
hold political power stand to lose from these refoms, and the fact that promises of future
redistribution towards those who now allow reforms are not credible makes the existence of
a “political Coase theorem” impossible. Under the mechanism presented in this paper, no
political Coase theorem is needed for reform to be achieved: While the political elite would
block reforms if it behaved as a unitary actor, operating under a majority rule the elite faces
a formidable collective action problem which leads it to not being able to block reforms. To
solve this collective action problem the elite designs mechanisms that constrain the behavior
of individual members, such as political parties or a patronage system. However, when such
mechanisms are not available, as was the case in Britain, reforms are an equilibrium outcome
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The Distributive Eﬀects of Corruption
This paper analyzes the distributive eﬀects of corrupt interactions between government
oﬃcials and citizens. Corruption is modeled as a solution to an allocation problem for a
generic government good G. The deﬁning features of this solution are the existence of a
market for G when it is not supposed to exist, and the fact that in that market contracts
cannot be enforced by an outside agent and transactions are usually secret. The interaction
between government oﬃcials and citizens takes place in a large-population game in which
they are randomly matched for one period. Beyond a transfer from citizens to the govern-
ment, corruption redistributes welfare towards “insiders” who share some natural connection
to the government and to other insiders. Corruption also redistributes welfare towards those
who are skilled in imposing negative externalities, and encourages the imposition of such
negative externalities.
Introduction and informal presentation of the model
The formal literature on the social eﬀects of corruption often starts by modeling this phe-
nomenon as an allocation problem for a generic government good G. The nature of the
allocation that emerges in equilibrium is then analyzed for its implications for the corrupt
society. This paper will argue that existing models do not capture some of the most relevant
features of corrupt transactions, and will show that incorporating those features in models
of corruption produces interesting results with respect to the distributive eﬀects of corrup-
tion. The most important argument of the paper can be summarized by saying that the
very special nature of corrupt transactions means they have important distributive eﬀects,
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the government.
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) are a classic starting point for the literature on the formal
analysis of the eﬀects of corruption: they consider the provision of government goods Gj in
market transactions by oﬃcials, when there are complementarities between the various Gj
goods, under diﬀerent coordination structures by the oﬃcials. Banerjee (1997) and Banerjee,
Hanna, and Mullainathan (2012) model corruption as a more general allocation problem for
the government good, and analyze the principal-agent relation between a welfare maximizing
government and a bureaucrat. A survey of the issues relating to the formal modeling of
corruption is Aidt (2003). This paper continues the tradition of modeling corruption as an
allocation problem for a government good, and contributes to the literature by explicitly
considering the special nature of corrupt transactions, as well as by concentrating on their
distributive eﬀects among citizens.
The core of the interaction between citizens and the government oﬃcial in the paper
is the problem of allocating a generic government good G. In a non-corrupt system, the
good G will be allocated based on social utility. In the utilitarian framework adopted here,
social utility will take into account both the private utility of the a citizen receiving the
good G as well as the possible eﬀects on others (externalities) from G being awarded to
that citizen. In the non-corrupt system, the allocation itself could be made through an
administrative decision, through a market (in case the market is better suited for revealing
private preferences), or through some other mechanism. Notwithstanding the mechanism
of allocation, what is important is that allocation in the non-corrupt system is based on
social utility rather than private willingness to pay. In case the social utility of allocating
good G to anyone is computed to be negative, the good would not be allocated at all. In
the corrupt system, G is allocated in such a way as to maximize the government oﬃcial’s
income, rather than social utility. In practice this means the good is allocated through a
market mechanism: this is Shleifer and Vishny’s classic deﬁnition of corruption as the sale
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social utility in the non-corrupt case in many ways, but one immediate implication is that
goods which should not be available at all in the non-corrupt case are available for purchase
in the corrupt case: the obvious example is that of a get-out-of-jail card for a criminal. In
the non-corrupt case the exchange of bribes for letting a criminal go does not happen, as this
does not maximize an appropriately deﬁned social utility. In the corrupt case, such goods
are available, as they maximize the government’s income. A similar example is a “ticket”
to let one agent capture rents from other agents in society: A ticket for participating in
government contracting at super-competitive prices, and hence capturing rents from the rest
of society is a very typical product that is subject to corrupt transactions. The only case
in which a market for G would also exist in the non-corrupt system is one in which this
is the socially optimal way to distribute G: an example is government auctions for various
products such as telecommunications bandwidth. Even in this case, there will be signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between the market for G in the non-corrupt and corrupt systems.
Beyond the fact that it often should not exist, the market for G under the corrupt
regime is very special. Two characteristics separate it from usual competitive or monopolistic
markets, and the diﬀerence might be so great as to even make it inappropriate to call the
corrupt interaction a “market”. The ﬁrst characteristic is the lack of any outside enforcer
of corrupt contracts. Simply put, promises made under corrupt conditions are not at all
credible, as no higher authority would intervene to enforce them, since they are illegal.
This would seem to suggest that corrupt interactions should be limited to spot transactions.
However, there are few if any true spot transactions in the world: what is normally called
a spot transaction is still an exchange of money now for goods that will have to reveal
their true usefulness over time, even if that time is very short and very near. If the goods
are proved ex-post to not have the promised qualities, the seller will be sanctioned by the
government, which would not be the case if that transaction was a corrupt one. This leads
to modeling the corrupt interaction as a dynamic game: ﬁrst the customer pays the bribe,
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cost to delivering the good, the unique equilibrium behavior of the government should be to
not deliver it, and corrupt transactions and their associated bribing would therefore never
happen.
Cooperative equilibria in which the corrupt transactions do happen should therefore
emerge only under some form of repeated interaction. Some corrupt interactions are ap-
propriately modeled as inﬁnitely repeated games between one citizen and one government
oﬃcial, and this case is brieﬂy discussed in the paper. However, many relevant types of
interactions between the oﬃcial and citizens are those in which they interact once (or over
a ﬁnite time horizon, or over a short time horizon). Favorable judicial decisions, business
and building permits, government contracts and their associated rents, are all examples of
“one-shot” interactions, where normally the commitment power of the government next to a
potential customer is non-existent. Therefore, the paper argues that the most relevant model
of interaction between citizens and the government is one in which customers are randomly
drawn from a continuum of citizens, and are matched with the government for such a one-on-
one, one-shot transaction. The government is a long run player, and the customers are short
run players (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991). Cooperative equilibria in such large-population
random matching games have been studied extensively in game theory. The natural way to
obtain a cooperative equilibrium in such cases is to rely on community enforcement: new
players who are drawn to be matched with the government condition their behavior on the
previous behavior of the government and citizens. In case deviations from the cooperative
equilibrium by either citizens or the government happen, play switches to a punishment
equilibrium, in which players revert to the one-shot non-cooperative outcome. These kinds
of “trigger” community-enforcement strategies can generate cooperative equilibria in much
the same way they generate cooperative equilibria in regular repeated games.
The main question in the paper is what are the properties of such cooperative equilibria in
terms of distributive eﬀects in society, when compared to a baseline in which the government
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equilibria, the second feature of corrupt transactions must be taken into account : the fact
that that corrupt transactions are not usually public. Their outcomes will not normally be
observed by all agents, which leads to the need to model carefully the information structure of
games that model such transactions. One major determinant of the nature of the cooperative
equilibria is therefore the information structure of the game: players can punish bad behavior
by previous players only if they observe such bad behavior. But corrupt transactions are
generally meant to be secret, as they are illegal. Having access to knowledge about previous
interactions is in this case a valuable asset, and those citizens who for whatever reason know
about what the government and other fellow citizens have done in the past, or to whom such
information can be revealed without danger, will be the only ones who can participate in a
cooperative equilibrium. A group of “insiders” who has access to information on previous
matches between the government and citizens will therefore be the only one which can
participate in such corrupt transactions. In practice, the insiders would be citizens who are
family, friends, or are otherwise connected to the oﬃcial, which explains why corruption
most often goes hand in hand with cliquish behavior based on “connections” rather than
with the open process by which the highest bidder among all possible customers engages
in the corrupt transaction. One immediate implication of this is that corrupt transactions
will often be very ineﬃcient: the only ones who engage in them are those who are closely
connected to the oﬃcial (and there is no reason to believe they are also the ones with the
highest valuation of the corrupt good) rather than the most eﬃcient agents in the entire
population, even if the most eﬃcient agents would be able to pay much higher bribes.
An extension of the model allows more than one citizen to be matched with the govern-
ment at any given time. In this case, there is more than one cooperative equilibrium, as the
selection of any of the matched citizens as partner for the corrupt transaction is compati-
ble with the criteria for selecting cooperative equilibria presented in the body of the paper.
However, it is argued that an equilibrium in which the government selects the insider citizen
99who has the highest valuation for the good and the highest willingness to pay for it has
special attractive properties, and it forms the basis of the analysis, along with discussion of
other possible equilibria.
For completeness, the analysis of spot transactions and regular repeated interaction is also
presented. Spot transactions lead to the selection of the citizen with the highest willingness to
pay (in case more than one is matched), and the distinction between outsiders and insiders no
longer matters. Repeated interaction with a single player has simple distributive properties:
a corrupt transfer is made to the government, externalities might be imposed on the other
citizens, and the discount rate matters for the existence of this equilibrium. In case many
citizens are matched with the government over long time horizons, there are many possible
equilibria and no strong predictions about which one is selected.
The private usefulness of the G good can itself be seen as endogenous. For example,
the utility of a get-out-of-jail card depends on whether the citizen has committed the crime
with which it is associated. The knowledge that such products are available for purchase
will determine citizens to maximize the usefulness of holding them. A large part of the
utility of holding the G good might come in the form of an externality: the usefulness of the
freedom card is maximized in case the crime associated with it has been committed. The
usefulness of a ticket to participate in government contracting is maximized if the highest
amount of rents can be captured by the holder of the ticket from the other citizens, and so
on. In equilibrium, agents who gain G will always maximize their private utility for the good,
which means maximizing the externality that the good alllows, which means that those who
are able to impose the highest externalities have an advantage to other players in winning
the G good.
The distributive eﬀects of the corrupt system compared to a non-corrupt system follow
from the properties of the described equilibria. The comparison is mainly made in the case
of the random matching interaction described above. In the non-corrupt system, a social
welfare function which maximizes private utility as long as externalities are not imposed is
100assumed to be in place. This social welfare function combines the basic utilitarian principle
with the Pareto optimality principle that the increase in someone’s utility should not come
from capturing utility from someone else. Compared to this baseline, the corrupt system
generally redistributes towards insiders, as they are the only ones who are able to engage in
corrupt transactions. The corrupt system also generally redistributes towards those citizens
who have a high ability to impose externalities on others, e.g. criminals or persons who are
especially skilled in capturing utility from others. This is because the ones with such high
ability to impose externalities will have a higher private utility for the G good, and therefore
will be the ones who acquire it. The corrupt system also obviously redistributes towards the
government oﬃcial, who is free to use his or her ability to provide the G good to extract
bribes. The eﬀect of corruption on total utility in the society is generally negative: even if
externalities and rents are counted as transfers, and therefore have no eﬀect on total utility,
the selection of partners for corrupt transactions only from the insider group will have large
negative eﬀects on total utility for realistic models of private utility for G. As the most
reasonable distribution of the parameter indicating private utility for the government good
in society is skewed towards zero and has a very long tail, limiting the number of draws
from the distribution to the insider group will leave out some very high-utility citizens. The
properties of the social loss from corruption are explored through a simulation exercise, and
it is shown that a small insider group and high variability in the private utility for the G good
increase social losses. The last section of the paper discusses some more subtle implications
of the model and its connections with existing theoretical and empirical puzzles.
A model of corrupt interactions
The basic building block of the model is an allocation problem: There exists a government
good G which needs to be allocated (or not) to citizens who each have a certain level of
utility for the good. Under a corrupt (CORR) system, a citizen j desiring such a product
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There are three connected features of what are normally referred to as corrupt interactions
that separate them from the regular non corrupt activity of the government, and these three
features need to be part of the model:
1. Corrupt transactions often take place in markets that are not supposed to exist. In
the reformed (REF) system the G good would most often be provided through non-
market mechanisms. If market mechanisms were used in the non-corrupt system (e.g.
a public auction), they would have diﬀerent characteristics. Moreover, the corrupt
markets themselves have two very distinctive features:
2. The usual enforcement mechanisms for contracts are not available. In the case in this
paper, the government is both the seller of the good and the enforcer of any rules, so it
cannot commit to acting against its own interests. (An equivalent justiﬁcation would
be that a higher-level government oﬃcial is a welfare-maximizing social planner, and
has no interest in enforcing illegal transactions.)
3. Corrupt transactions are often secret and cannot be made public.13 Only a part of the
population might have access to information about them. The extent of secrecy needs
to be parameterized through features of the information structure of the game.
One citizen per period
The most simple type of interaction between citizens and the government is a two-player
game that takes place at some time t: a citizen j and a government oﬃcial g are matched for
an interaction. The citizen has an endowment w and can spend it on two goods: a private
13This feature is introduced in the model because it characterizes an overwhelming majority or real-life
corrupt interactions. Reasons why corrupt transactions are kept secret can include: i) Fear that a higher-level
oﬃcial would punish corruption (either because he or she is a social utility maximizer, or because they face
constraints that induce them to so so). ii) Fear that political or personal enemies would use this information
against the oﬃcial. iii) Electoral constraints. iv) Fear from the citizens who participate in these transactions
about points i)-iii), etc.
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unit, and a government good G. In the follwing, only one market for G goods is considered
at a time, so the subscript g on each G good is omitted.
The utility function of the citizen for the private and government good is linear and
additive: endowment is transformed into utility at rate 1 for the private good, so w enters
into the utility function without a coeﬃcient before it. The government good enters the
utility function at rate αj, and it is constrained by assumption to be binary: Gj ∈ {0,1}.
For the problem to be at all interesting, αj has to be greater than 1, so that the government
good is desirable for the citizen. Any Rj “rent” (bribe, tax) payments to the government
are subtracted from the utility function, as they reduce the private good consumption of the
citizen. The utility function is therefore:
Uj = w + αjGj − Rj (40)
The government oﬃcial’s utility is also linear in money (which in the corrupt system
comes in the form of a “rent” or bribe, hence the R notation):
Ug = Rg (41)
One-shot interaction
The “match” of the two players takes the form of a two-stage game: in the ﬁrst stage, the
citizen hands out a payment to the oﬃcial, of size Rj. Assume no credit constraints for the
citizen, so Rj can be as great as needed to secure G. In the second stage, the oﬃcial keeps
this payment and can choose to provide the good G back to the citizen. Denote this event,
the provision of the good to player j, by Gj = 1, and the non-provision by Gj = 0. (The
assumption that the provision is a binary event is made here). Providing the good carries
a cost c∈ (0,∞), so denote by cg = c the event “oﬃcial g incurs the cost c”. This cost
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producing g, the risk involved by the provision of an illegal good, or simply the opportunity
cost of giving up a good which is generally desirable (this would happen in case the G good
was rival). It does not contain the costs of producing the good that are borne by the public
budget, as these should not aﬀect the oﬃcial’s utility in any way. Therefore, the cost c might
well be very small.
The unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the one-shot game is easy to see: in
the second stage, the government oﬃcial solves:
argmax
Gj
Rj − cg
s. t. Gj ∈ {0,G}; cg = c if Gj = G; cg = 0 if Gj = 0
⇒ G
∗
j = 0 (42)
It should be intuitive that as long as providing G has the slightest cost, the oﬃcial is
better oﬀ keeping the bribe payment but not providing G. Backing oﬀ one stage, in the ﬁrst
stage, the citizen solves:
argmax
Rj
w + αjGj − Rj
s.t. Gj = G
∗
j
⇒ R
∗
j = 0,P
∗
j = w,Uj = w (43)
So without a more complex form of interaction, a transaction in which the good g is
delivered in exchange for a bribe will not happen as long as providing that good has the
slightest cost for the government oﬃcial. Such a commitment problem would not be im-
portant in case of a spot transaction, where the payment and the delivery of the good are
absolutely simultaneous. This case will be discussed in Section 2.3.1.
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The commitment problem looks diﬀerent however, in case multiple, repeated, interactions
are considered. Repeated games will have multiple equilibria, as suggested by the various
folk theorem results (e.g. Friedman 1971). The folk theorem for repeated games in which the
stage game is a dynamic game is given in Wen (2002). The result in Wen (2002) is similar
to the one in the folk theorems for repeated simultaneous games, with the exception of the
replacement of the minmax value for repeated simultaneous games with a more general notion
of “eﬀective minmax”. The eﬀective minmax is roughly speaking the lowest utility that can
be imposed on a player in one period without other players also minmaxing themselves. In
the present case, this value is easy to determine as zero for the government and w for citizens:
For each citizen, he or she can choose to not make any rent payments and thus consume only
private goods, thus receiving a utility of w. For the government, it can choose to not provide
any G and therefore not incur any costs, and get utility zero. The feasibility condition in
the folk theorem is that the sum of payoﬀs cannot be greater than the maximum amount of
utility available in the game each period, which in this case is w + αMAX
t,j − c. Here αMAX
t,j
is the highest value of α at time t. Therefore the folk theorem of Wen (2002) states that
any payoﬀ vector that generates utilities per period higher than 0 for the government, and
higher than w for the citizens, but that sums up to less than w + αMAX
j − c in each period
can be sustained in a subgame perfect equilibrium for a high enough discount rate.
Among these multiple equilibria, this analysis concentrates on those which, loosely speak-
ing, are cooperative, in the sense of having some notion of Pareto optimality associated to
them. More formally, the analysis will assume that players only consider equilibria Γ∗ which
have the following properties:
i) Γ∗ is Pareto eﬃcient in expectation. This means that Γ∗ is not weakly Pareto dominated
in expectation. Denote by EV k
EQ the expected payoﬀ of player k in equilibrium EQ. An
equilibrium Γ∗0 will not be considered if there exists another Γ∗ such that EV k
Γ∗0 ≤ EV k
Γ∗ ∀k ∈
{N,g}, with strict inequality at least once, where N is a continuum from which the citizens
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citizens and the government than an equilibrium Γ∗0, and not a worse outcome for anyone,
then eliminate equilibrium Γ∗0 from the analysis, as it is assumed that players do not consider
it.
A separate requirement from the cooperative one would be that the community enforce-
ment process only selects equilibria in which the citizens are not over-paying for the good,
that is the rent level is not higher than what is absolutely necessary for the government to
provide the good to whatever citizen it provides to in equilibrium. This requirement helps
remove multiple equilibria in which all that is diﬀerent is the size of the rent (which is just
a transfer from citizens to the government), and thus allows the analysis to concentrate on
other dimensions of redistribution. Formally:
ii) Γ∗ is such that V
g
t,Γ∗ = V
g
t,OSD,∀t. This requires that the government’s participation
(incentive compatibility) condition in the equilibrium always holds with equality: the utility
of the government under the equilibrium has to be equal to the utility of the government
under the best one-stage deviation from the given equilibrium at every moment.
The form of interaction considered in section 2.4 will generate many equilibria which fail
both of these criteria, so in that case the predictions of the model will be weaker.
Multiple interactions, diﬀerent citizens: equilibrium derivation
Consider a game in which the basic two-stage game presented above is repeated numerous
times between the oﬃcial and a diﬀerent potential customer each period. In such an inﬁnitely
repeated game, all players discount the future with rate δ ∈ (0,1). In this section consider the
simplest matching structure between the oﬃcial and possible “customers”: each period the
oﬃcial is matched to play the game described above with a single customer. The customers
are drawn from a continuum of size N, so the same customer will only be drawn once. The
crucial parameters inﬂuencing what sorts of equilibria can arise in this random matching
game are the information sets of the players: the information set Λt,j of player j at time t is
106determined by which of the interactions that have taken place until time t−1 are known to
j, in terms of their actions/outcomes. A player who knows about (some of) the actions taken
until time t − 1 at time t can condition his or her actions on this knowledge. A player who
does not know cannot condition his or her action on this knowledge, so will be eﬀectively
playing the one-period game described above. This leads to modeling a simple information
structure among the citizens: the citizens are split in two groups: I for insiders, whose
information sets include at least the last meetings between the government oﬃcial and a
members of I (the more realistic situation in which they include all previous interactions
between insiders and the oﬃcial is identical in terms of equilibrium outcomes), and O for
outsiders, whose information sets include only their own participation to the game.
Formally, given the set of histories Ht, up to time t, the information set of player j at
time t is Λt,j. Denote by At,i the set of available actions for player j at time t, by at,j ∈ At,j
the action chosen by player j at time t, and by a(t−1)I,j or a(t−1)O,j the action of j at time the
previous time period in which an I player has been matched, and the corresponding notion
for O players respectively. If the history h is such that h ∈ Λt,j, then player j does not know
whether they are at history h or some other h0 ∈ Λt,j. The information sets of the two kinds
of players therefore are:
Λt,i = {ht|a(t−1)I,i ∈ ht,Aτ,o ∈ ht,a(t−1)I,g ∈ ht,A(τ)O,g ∈ ht,
∀τ ∈ 0,t, ∀i ∈ I, ∀o ∈ O} (44)
Λt,o = {ht|Aτ,i ∈ ht,Aτ,o ∈ ht,Aτ,g ∈ ht,∀τ ∈ 0,t,∀i ∈ I,∀o ∈ O} (45)
That is, insider players at time t know the actions taken by other insider players and the
government up to time in the latest period where they met, and outsider players do not
know what actions have been taken by anyone up to time t. Moreover, assume that these
information structures are common knowledge among all players.
The matching process is given by random draws from the mass of citizens, and the
107distribution of α parameters in the mass of citizens is given by a continuous random variable
with cumulative distribution function F:
α ∼ Fα(α) (46)
As shown above, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the one-period game is that
no corrupt transactions take place because there is no commitment power from the gov-
ernment to actually provide the goods that are the object of a potential transaction. The
repeated nature of the game opens up the possibility of cooperation sustained by commu-
nity enforcement.14 In the following, an equilibrium that fulﬁlls condition i) will be derived,
and shown to be the only one that satisﬁes it while also satisfying condition ii). The basic
intuition of community enforcement of “cooperative” equilibria is that the players that are
matched after a certain interaction has taken place use punishment strategies against players
who have deviated from the prescribed equilibrium behavior in that interaction. The match-
ing of I or O players is stochastic, with the simple law that the probability of an i match in
every stage is p and the probability of an o match is 1 − p. The parameter p is a measure
of the extent of secrecy that exists in society with respect to corrupt transactions: a higher
p means less secrecy, as more people are in the group of insiders. In the extreme case in
which p = 1, everyone has full information about corruption, meaning that the constraints
on revealing corrupt transactions are non-existent.
Some notation is useful: Denote by Mt,i the event “an insider player has been matched
with the government oﬃcial at stage t”, and by Mt,o the event “an outsider player has been
matched with the government oﬃcial at stage t”. Also denote by i0 all I players that are not
i. Given this set-up, the following statement can be shown to be true:
Proposition 1: Assume αi ≥
c(1−δ(1−p))
δp , ∀i. The follwing strategies generate a coop-
14For discussion and models of community enforcement in repeated, random matching games, see Ellison
(1994), Greif (1993), Kandori (1992), Milgrom, North, and Weingast (1990), Dixit, (2003), Ghosh and Ray
(1996), Karlan et al. (2009), Takahashi (2010). The basic idea in this literature is that cooperative equilibria
can be sustained even when players meet only once, if players condition their actions at time t on their and
other players’ behavior at times before t.
108erative subgame perfect equilibrium of the repeated game, in periods when the government
oﬃcial is matched with players from I:
∀τ < t:
σt,i =

   
   
Rt,i = c
1−δ(1−p)
δp if

R(t−1)I,i0 ≥ c
1−δ(1−p)
δp and G(t−1)I,i0 = 1

Rt,i = 0 if

R(t−1)I,i0 < c
1−δ(1−p)
δp or G(t−1)I,i0 6= G
 (47)
∀τ < t:
σt,g =

        
        
Gt,i = 1 if

Mt,i and

R(t−1)I,i0 ≥ c
1−δ(1−p)
δp and Rt,i ≥ c
1−δ(1−p)
δp and G(t−1)I,i0 = 1

Gt,i = 0 if

Mt,i and

R(t−1)I,i0 < c
1−δ(1−p)
δp or Rt,i < c
1−δ(1−p)
δp or G(t−1)I,i0 6= 1

Gt,o = 0 if Mt,o
(48)
∀τ < t σt,o = (Rt,o = 0) (49)
Proof: Write the value functions of the government in recursive form (the Bellman
equations) for the equilibrium path of the cooperative situation described by the strategies
above, as well as for the best one-stage deviation (OSD) by the government:
V
g
COOP(Mt,i) = Rt,i − c + δ [(1 − p)E [V
g
COOP(Mt+1,o)] + pE [V
g
COOP(Mt+1,i0)]] (50)
V
g
OSD(Mt,i) = Rt,i + δ [(1 − p)E [V
g
PUN(Mt+1,o)] + pE [V
g
PUN(Mt+1,i0)]] (51)
Here V
g
COOP(Mt,i) is the value function of the government on the equilibrium path in the
cooperative equilibrium described by the strategies above, in stages where the government
is matched with an insider player, V g(Mt,o) is the value function of the government when
matched with an outsider player, V
g
OSD(Mt,i) is the value of the best one-stage deviation
by the government, and V
g
PUN(Mt,i) is the value function of the government when play has
switched to the punishment prescribed by the strategies described above. The reason future
109instances of the value function are written in expectation is because these values might
depend on the α parameters drawn in future stages, and those parameters are random. The
subgame perfect equilibrium condition is that no proﬁtable one shot deviations exist for the
government:
∀t,∀i V
g
COOP(Mt,i) ≥ V
g
OSD(Mt,i) (52)
This condition will have to hold with equality, as there is no need for citizens to pay more
than enough rents to the government according to condition ii) (the remaining income is
incorporated in citizens’ utilities as the private good). To see what values of the rent param-
eter lead to the condition holding, compute V
g
COOP : First, take the expected value of both
Bellman equations in (50-51). Doing this will lead to equilibrium conditions involving the
expected value of the rent payment, E[Ri,t], so individual behavior by the citizens will have
to correspond to a probability law that leads to a certain expected value for the rent, If it
is further assumed that citizens use symmetric strategies, it is also possible to denote all i
players by a single subscript, rather than using i and i0. Using the fact that E[E[X]] = E[X]
and the linear property of the expected value, the Bellman equations now become:
E [V
g
COOP(Mt,i)] = E [Rt,i] − c + δ
h
(1 − p)E
h
V
G
COOP(Mt+1,o)
i
+ pE
h
V
G
COOP(Mt+1,i)
ii
E
h
V
G
OSD(Mt,i)
i
= E [Rt,i] + δ
h
(1 − p)E
h
V
G
PUNISH(Mt+1,o)
i
+ pE
h
V
G
PUNISH(Mt+1,i)
ii
Then from the ﬁrst equation:
E [V
g
COOP(Mt,i)](1 − δp) = E [Rt,i] − c + δ(1 − p)E
h
V
G
COOP(Mt+1,o)
i
(53)
The value function when being paired with an outsider player in the cooperative equilibrium
can be derived from its own set of two Bellman equations, again written in expectation, and
110again assuming symmetric strategies by O players:
E [V
g
COOP(Mt+1,o)] = E [Rt+1,o] − c +
+δ [(1 − p)E [V
g
COOP(Mt+2,o)] + pE [V
g
COOP(Mt+2,i)]] (54)
E [V
g
OSD(Mt+1,o)] = E [Rt+1,o] +
+δ [(1 − p)E [V
g(Mt+2,o)] + pE [V
g(Mt+2,i)]] (55)
The value functions following a deviation by the government here do not carry any subscript
regarding the strategy used by players who are matched in those periods, because once stage
t + 2 has been reached following a defection by the government, for the citizens this event
lies in the same information set as reaching stage t + 2 following cooperative behavior by
the government. Therefore, the citizens have to behave identically in the two histories, as
they do not know which one they are in. The government will have unique best responses to
whatever behaviors the citizens engage in, so it always has to be that E [V
g
COOP(Mt+2,o)] =
E [V g(Mt+2,o)] and E [V
g
COOP(Mt+2,i)] = E [V g(Mt+2,i)].
So the condition that V
g
COOP(Mt+1,o) ≥ V
g
OSD(Mt+1,o) leads to E [V
g
COOP(Mt+1,o)] ≥
E [V
g
OSD(Mt+1,o)], which then leads to:
E [Rt+1,o] − c ≥ E [Rt+1,o] (56)
which is never true as long as c > 0. Therefore cooperation cannot be sustained in stages
where the government meets outside players, so the value function of the government when
matched with an outside player is:
E [V
g
COOP(Mt+1,o)] =
δp
1 − δp
E [V
g
COOP(Mt+2,i)] (57)
111Putting this back in the value function for cooperating with an insider:
E[V
g
COOP(Mt,i)] =
1 − δ(1 − p)
1 − δ
(E [Rt,i] − c) (58)
The value function for the best one stage deviation is given by capturing the entire rent
payment now, which triggers the punishment future matches with insider players. Therefore
a stream of zero payments follows defection by the government, and
E [V
g
OSD(Mt,i)] = E [Rt,i] (59)
The no-deviation condition has to hold: E [V
g
COOP(Mt,i)] = E [V
g
OSD(Mt,i)], so it follows that:
E [Rt,i] =
1 − δ(1 − p)
1 − δ
(E [Rt,i] − c) (60)
=⇒ E[Rt,i] =
c(1 − δ(1 − p))
δp
(61)
Using symmetric strategies for all players, it follows that a constant rent payment by any
insider player keeps the government in the cooperative equilibrium, and that payment is:
Rt,i =
c(1 − δ(1 − p))
δp
(62)
For citizens, the value functions in the cooperative equilibrium are simpler:
V
i
COOP(Mt,i) = αiGi − Rt,i + w + δV
i(¬(Mt+1,i)) (63)
V
i
OSD(Mt,i) = w + δV
i(¬(Mt+1,i)) (64)
Future periods, in which i is not matched, have the value function Vi(¬(Mt+1,i)). So the
112cooperation condition V i
COOP ≥ V i
OSD reduces to:
αi ≥
c(1 − δ(1 − p))
δp
(65)
This condition states that the government good is worth enough that sacriﬁcing some
income to secure it is worth it for player i. The condition is mild, stating that the utility
of the citizen for the good is large enough when compared to the cost for the government
so that the citizen is willing to pay the price of the good. If this condition holds for any
αi, the cooperative equilibrium always exists and features the provision of the G good in
every matching with an insider player, the payment of a bribe Ri and the provision of no
G and the payment of no bribes when interacting with outsiders. The assumption of no
credit constraints means that αi and therefore the rent paid can be greater than w if needed
(or alternatively that αi ≤ w,∀i). Note that an equivalent equilibrium is generated in case
insider players observe all previous matches with insider players: similar to the equilibrium
presented above, they would condition on observing one defection from cooperative behavior
the start of the punishment phase.
The equilibrium derived above is Pareto optimal, as the maximal level of utility is gen-
erated each stage: The utilities in each period are w + αj − Rj for the citizen, and Rj − c
for the government, so total utility is w + αj − c, which is the maximal amount of utility
available in the game, as long as c < αj. Obviously, giving more of this utility to one player
means taking utility from another player, so the equilibrium is Pareto optimal. Among the
allocations that are Pareto optimal, the one generated by the equilibrium is the only one
that is also subgame perfect: the citizens would not give up more income each stage for
the government, as this would not be subgame perfect for them, and the government would
similarly not give up any of its utility, as this would violate subgame perfection.
113Multiple citizens per period
The model above omits an important feature of real-life corrupt transactions: the fact that
the G good might be rival at any given time t: that is, that more than one person would
derive utility from getting it from the oﬃcial. This situation will generate multiple equilibria,
so the question that arises is how to select among the multiple equilibria which are possible.
Applying condition i) will restrict the possible equilibria to a class of equilibria that share
most of the properties of the one for single matches, and further requirements will suggest a
natural candidate for a focal point among this class of equilibria.
Multiple interactions, diﬀerent citizens: equilibrium derivation
Consider a modiﬁed version of the selection process for customers for G at time t: now
instead of drawing one citizen, insider or outsider, from the distribution Fα(α), draw ni
insiders, and no outsiders from Fα(α). The parameters ni and no are themselves random:
ni ∼ FNi(ni)
no ∼ FNo(no) (66)
The random variable Fn is generic, but it is useful to impose the limitation that ni >
0 or no > 0 for simplicity of computation. That is, stages in which no customer is matched
are ignored, and in each stage, at least one potential customer exists. Also maintained is
the assumption that the customers are drawn from a continuum. So the government now
faces a “demand function” in each period made up of ni + no potential customers, ranked
by α, their valuation of the government good, and can distribute G to only one of them.
It is useful to denote by α
(r)
t,i ,r = 1,2,... the ranking of the α parameters of the insiders
drawn at time t, with α
(1)
t,i being the highest, and so on. It is also useful to denote by q
the probability that the draws from the two distributions generate a match with at least
one inside player: q = Pr(ni > 0). Further, denote by Ct,j the event “player j has been
114chosen by the government as partner at stage t”, and by Mt the set of all citizens that have
been matched at time t. Also denote by Mt,i the event “at least one insider player has been
matched at time t” (which has probability q) and by Mt,o the event “only outsider players
have been matched at time t” (probability 1-q).
Condition i) eliminates all equilibria in which the good G is not allocated to someone
who is part of the demand at each time t. Therefore, only consider equilibria in which
someone always is the recipient of the good, from among those who have been matched
at time t. The surviving equilibria are all similar to the one in section 2.1, in that the
government selects an insider citizen from among those forming the demand, oﬀers the G
good in exchange for a rent, and deviations from that behavior lead to a trigger punishment
strategy for all players. However, any choice of a partner to cooperate with from among the I
players matched each period fulﬁlls condition i), so it cannot help restrict the set of equilibria
further. One equilibrium however has a number of attractive properties which suggest it is
the most natural focal point: An equilibrium in which the government asks for bids from the
insider citizens who have been matched each period, and selects the one with the highest
ability to pay the rent, has four attractive properties: First, it is the most attractive for the
government among those that satisfy all the other conditions, as it generates the highest
level of the bribe. In as much as the government’s announced strategy can be a focal point,
this will be the outcome of the game. Second, it is strictly better in expectation than the
non-cooperative equilibrium, for every citizen, as every citizen has a positive probability of
being selected as partner, as everyone has a positive probability of ending up in a single
match with the government (though it is not the only equilibrium that has this property).
Third, it maximizes total welfare in the group made up of g and I, as the citizen who wins
the good is the one with the highest valuation for it. Fourth, it satisﬁes condition ii), which
requires that citizens do not overpay for G. The formal description of this equilibrium follows
here:
Proposition 2: Assume α
(2)
t,i ≥
c(1−δ(1−q))
δq ∀t,∀i. The follwing strategies generate a
115cooperative subgame perfect equilibrium whenever the government oﬃcial is matched with
players from I:
∀τ < t:
σt,i =

        
        
Rt,i =
c(1−δ(1−q))
δq if

R(t−1)I,i0 ≥
c(1−δ(1−q))
δq and G(t−1)I,i0 = G and Ct,i and nt,i = 1

Rt,i = α
(2)
t,i if

R(t−1)I,i0 ≥
c(1−δ(1−q))
δq and G(t−1)I,i0 = G and Ct,i and nt,i > 1

Rt,i = 0 if

R(t−1)I,i0 <
c(1−δ(1−q))
δq or G(t−1)I,i0 6= G or ¬Ct,i

(67)
∀τ < t
σt,g =

                      
                      
j s.t. Ct,j = argmaxj V
g
COOP(Ct,j), s.t. j ∈ Mt
Gt,i = G if nt,i > 0 and R(t−1)I,i0 ≥
c(1−δ(1−q))
δq
and Rt,i ≥
c(1−δ(1−q))
δq and G(t−1)I,i0 = G
Gt,i = 0 if nt,i > 0
and

R(t−1)I,i <
c(1−δ(1−q))
δq or Rt,i <
c(1−δ(1−q))
δq or G(t−1)I,i0 6= G

Gt,o = 0
(68)
∀τ < t σt,o = (Rt,o = 0) (69)
Proof: Write the value functions of the government on the equilibrium path and the
best one stage deviation for the government:
V
g
COOP(Mt,i) = Ri,t − c + δ
h
(1 − q)E
h
V
G
COOP(Mt+1,o)
i
+ qE
h
V
G
COOP(Mt+1,i)
ii
(70)
V
G
OSD(Mt,i) = Ri,t + δ
h
(1 − q)E
h
V
G
PUN(Mt+1,o)
i
+ qpE
h
V
G
PUN(Mt+1,i)
ii
(71)
The government’s conditions for maximizing income while being in this cooperative equi-
116librium are
(t,i) =

t,argmax
j V
g
COOP(Ct,j), s.t. j ∈ Mt

(72)
V
g
COOP(Mt,i) ≥ V
g
OSD(Mt,i) (73)
(The maximization problem is set up here only with respect to i players, as in equilibrium
an o player is never chosen, by the same logic as in the previous section.) The optimization
condition for the government is similar to that in case 1 but with the addition of the problem
of choosing among the citizens which have been matched, that is of choosing at each t the
one i (or o) for which the value function conditions have to hold. Since the forms of the two
relevant value functions are identical to those in case 1, except for replacing p with q, the
same derivation leads to the following cooperative equilibrium condition for the government:
E [Rt,i] ≥
c(1 − δ(1 − q))
δq
(74)
The condition is not yet reduced to equality, because there might be more than one insider
player willing to pay a bribe. To see which i player is chosen, write the value functions for
the citizens:
V
i
COOP(Ct,i) = αiGi − Rt,i + w + δV
i(¬(Mt+1,i)) (75)
V
i
OSD(Ct,i) = w + δV
i(¬(Mt+1,i)) (76)
V
i(¬Ct,i) = V
i
OSD(Ct,i) (77)
The set of relevant value functions now includes the last one, for the situation in which player
i is not chosen at time t. Then the cooperation condition for citizens (which is the same
as the condition for being willing to participate in a cooperative equilibrium altogether by
117being chosen as partner by the government) is:
αi ≥ Ri (78)
In case more than one citizen is matched, it is clear that the one with the highest αi
level will become the partner of the government oﬃcial, and will oﬀer a rent payment (just
slightly above) the maximum rent payment of the second-ranked drawn citizen.
With the given strategies, the government’s problem of choosing the player to cooperate
with in each period to maximize its value function for cooperation is reduced to choosing
the player who can pay the highest rent each period, as there is nothing to be gained by
choosing a player who can pay less.
The citizens in I then solve:
argmax
Ri
αi − Ri
subject to αi ≥ Ri and Ri ≥ Rj ∀j ∈ Mt (79)
This leads for the player who has α(1) at time t to set:
Rt,i = α
(2) (80)
This means that the player with the highest valuation for the G good at time t wins the
contest for G by paying (slightly more than) the maximum that the second player is willing
to pay. The assumption that this rent payment is enough to keep the government in the
cooperative equilibrium is similar to the one in section 2.1: α(2) ≥
c(1−δ(1−q))
δq . The major
diﬀerence between the equilibrium here and the one described in the previous case is that
the distribution of gains between the government and citizens is diﬀerent in the case of
multiple matches. The presence of competition between bribe payers leads to the government
capturing most of the rents from such interactions.
118The other equilibria which are allowed by condition i) are similar with the exception of
the criterion for choosing cooperative partners, and hence of the bribe that must be paid.
Virtually any rule for choosing among Mt,i, either deterministically or probabilistically can
generate a subgame perfect equilibrium with a given rent associated with it. Compared with
the equilibrium described above, these other equilibria have the following properties: First,
total utility will be lower, as the citizen receiving the good will not generally be the one with
the highest valuation. Second, the insider-outsider distinction is maintained, as punishment
strategies are still only eﬀective in the community of insiders. Third, the distributive eﬀects
of variation in players’ ability to impose externalities will not be as clear cut as they are in
the equilibrium presented above, as will be explained in section 2.3.2.
Spot transactions
One type of interaction not covered by the model above is that of a spot transaction, in which
there are no commitment problems on the part of the government. As has been argued, these
kinds of transactions are not likely to characterize corrupt interaction in most cases, but they
are included here for completeness. In the spot transaction case, the insider-outsider eﬀect
disappears, and the government awards the good to the citizen who pays the highest price
each stage: That is, the government’s problem is:
argmax
Gt,j
Rj − c
s. t. Gt,j ∈ {0,1}
cg = c if Gt,j = 1, cG = 0 if Gt,j = 0
Rt,j = Rt,j if Gt,j = 1,Ct,j;, Rt,j = 0 if Gt,j = 0,Ct,j
⇒ G
∗
t,j = 1 if Rt,j > c and Cj (81)
119together with
j = argmax
j Rj (82)
And the citizen solves:
argmax
R w + αjGj − Rj
s.t. Rt,j ≥ c, (G = G
∗ if Ct,j) and (G = 0 if ¬Ct,j)
⇒ R
∗
t,j = α
(2)
t,j if nt,i > 1,R
∗
t,j = c if nt,i = 1 (83)
Therefore, the insider or outsider who has the highest α gets the G good, and pays a rent
worth the maximal rent that the player with the second highest α would be willing to pay.
So the spot transaction case retains the result that the citizen with the highest private utility
wins the good, but does not retain the distinction between insiders and outsiders. However,
these kinds of transactions are likely to be rare, or altogether non-existent in practice.
Repeated interaction with the same player or same group
Another type of interaction that is omitted from the model above is one in which the same
players are matched with the government for multiple periods—a repeated game where the
government can meet the same player for many stages in a row. When there is only one such
player being matched with the government in each stage, the properties of this interaction
are the same as those of the spot transaction, in case the discount rate is high enough to
sustain a cooperative equilibrium, so the case is not further discussed. More relevant are
cases in which the good is desired by all (many) players in each stage: this is the case of
a generic good that genrates returns for the holders in each period, and so is potentially
desired by a large number of citizens over a long time horizon. Just as in the previous
cases, the repeated nature of the game leads to the existence of large numbers of possible
subgame perfect equilibria, by the logic of the folk theorems. Unlike in the previous cases,
120thought, there is no natural cooperative equilibrium that is to be sought by the players using
condition i). The strongest statements that can be made about this type of interaction are
those deriving from the results of the relevant folk theorem (Wen 2002). In addition, the
nature of a few possible equilibria can be discussed, as follows:
As stated before, the folk theorem of Wen (2002) states that any payoﬀ vector that
generates utilities per period weakly higher than 0 for the government, and weakly higher
than w for the citizens, but that sums up to less than w + αMAX
j − c in each period can
be sustained in a subgame perfect equilibrium for high enough δ. More precisely, any rule
for choosing the partner for cooperation at time t from among insiders can be sustained
in equilibrium. Condition i) does not restrict the set of equilibria beyond eliminating the
partially non-cooperative equilibria in which the good is sometimes not allocated. Condition
ii) does restrict the set of equilibria somewhat, for example by requiring that the highest-α
player is not paying a rent higher than the maximal rent that the government could extract
from other players, but the usefulness of this requirement is limited.
Therefore, there are many equilibria which can be produced by this interaction. An
obvious example is the analog of the equilibrium favored in section 2.2, which where would
be one in which the government solicits a bribe worth α
(2)
j from the citizen with the highest
α value in exchange for G, and any defection from this leads to all players switching to
the non-cooperative equilibrium with payoﬀs w for all citizens and 0 for the government
forever. For high enough values of δ these grim-trigger strategies will be subgame perfect.
(The distinction between I and O players does not matter anymore, as defections from the
cooperative strategy can be observed by all through the fact that a new match with the
government has become available.) However, here this equilibrium no longer fulﬁlls the
conditions which recommended it as a favorite in section 2.2: while it is the best equilibrium
for the government, and generates the most social utility, it violates requirement two, that it
be strictly better than the non-cooperative equilibrium for everyone: in this case, for every
citizen who is not the highest ranked citizen, the utility generated in this equilibrium is w,
121just like in the non-cooperative equilibrium, so one of the main reasons why this kind of
equilibrium was favored in section 2.2 is not present here.
There are many other possible equilibria, and no natural criterion by which to favor one
of them over the others. For example, an equilibrium where the government selects a random
citizen each stage, who oﬀers a rent payment worth c
δ (the minimal rent payment that keeps
the government oﬀering the good), is also sustained for high enough δ using grim trigger
strategies, and there is no reason to believe that either of the two proposed equilibria is more
natural than the other, as there is no Pareto optimality ordering between them. The reason
it is impossible to ﬁnd an equilibrium which fulﬁlls all four properties of the equilibrium from
section 2.2 is because now condition two, that of outcomes which are strictly better than the
non-cooperative equilibrium for everyone, is in direct contradiction with requirement one,
that the equilibrium be the best for the government, and with requirement three, that total
social welfare be maximized. Idiosyncratic (cultural) features of the society in which players
exist will determine which one of the many equilibria is a focal point (Myerson 2004), so
the analysis here cannot say more about the distributive eﬀects of interactions in which all
players participate in a typical repeated-game setup.
Equilibrium determination of α
So far the α indicating how useful the government good is for each of the citizens has been
kept exogenous. But there are many cases where agents react to knowing that the buying of
G is available by modifying their behavior in ways that maximize the usefulness of this fact.
An obvious example is that of a “get out of jail” card. The knowledge that this product
can be bought on the open market will make an agent commit the crime that is associated
with the get out of jail card, knowing that they can avoid the negative consequences of that
by buying the card. Assuming the equilibrium presented in 2.2.1, in case more than one
customer is matched with the government, the one with the highest ability to maximize α
will have an advantage to the others.
122To analyze the nature of this maximization, and the eﬀects it creates for utility distribu-
tion, consider the maximization problem in case the good G is not available for sale. Time
subscripts are not included, as they would be redundant here. In this non-corrupt case,
considering the same matching structure as above, the good G is distributed according to
social utility. There are various ways in which the social utility can diﬀer from the private
utility, depending on the precise social welfare function used. However, the major reason why
utilitarian social and private utility would diﬀer is the existence of externalities: citizen j
maximizing his or her utility might induce an externality e on other citizens. So the identity
that connects social and private utilities is assumed to be:
αj = α
B
j + ej (84)
The parameters αB
j and ej arise in equilibrium, once player j knows that he or she will
be the one to receive the good G. The externality ej is assumed to always be positive for
the citizen whose utility function it enters directly, and negative for all other citizens (e.g. it
is a negative externality). The parameter αB indicates the “baseline” utility of distributing
good G for citizen j, that is j’s private utility net of any externalities. For many of the goods
that are subject to corrupt transactions, this baseline utility is zero: there is no beneﬁt to
someone having a get-out-of-jail card, or a pass to extract rents from citizens, that is not also
a cost for someone else. In these cases, all of the gains for j are captured by the externality
term.
Whether citizen j is the one receiving the good is determined by the nature of the regime:
non-corrupt or corrupt. In the non-corrupt system the good is distributed to the citizen with
the highest baseline utility for the good, as long as he or she does not impose externalities.
That is, the j∗ who gets the good G is determined by:
∀j s.t. (ej = 0 and α
B
j > 0) j
∗ = argmax
j α
B
j (85)
123Implicit in this deﬁnition is that if the baseline utility of anyone receiving the good is not
strictly positive, then the good is not distributed at all, j∗ = ∅. This simple social welfare
function combines the two basic principles of utilitarian individual utility maximization and
Pareto optimality.
The citizen’s problem is therefore to set the optimal level of (potential) αB
j and ej,
knowing that they could be selected by the government for the allocation of G based on the
results of this optimization. The maximization problem of the citizen in the non corrupt
system is:
max
αj,ej
α
B
j + ej
s.t. e = 0 (86)
which yields the obvious solution

maxαB

j, ej = 0, where

maxαB

j stands for the highest
αB that citizen j can achieve. The externality ej is already set to 0 in the maximization
problem, since it is a given that any other level of ej will not maximize the citizen’s utility,
as he or she will not receive the G good.
In the corrupt system the G good is always distributed to the citizen with the highest αj,
that is the highest private utility for the good, by the arguments in the previous sections.
The citizen that gets the good is therefore:
i
∗ = argmax
i α
B
i + ei (87)
So the players who manage to make ei higher have an advantage to those who do not do
so. Also, if αB
i is zero, that is, there is no private utility for the good that is not also an
externality, all that matters is the citizen’s ability to impose externalities: the citizens who
are most skilled in this get the government good.
124Distributive eﬀects
This section proves formally what should intuitively emerge from the sections above: the
presence of corruption, when compared to the non-corrupt system in which goods are not
allocated based on willingness to pay and private utility, distributes income towards insiders,
towards those with high capability to impose externalities, and towards the government,
while reducing total output. The analysis concentrates on the cases in sections 2.1 and 2.2
(single matches and multiple matches in one stage), as the spot transaction and repeated
game situations in section 2.3 either are not very relevant (the former), or do not make
strong predictions (the latter). The equilibrium assumed for the case of multiple matches is
the one described in section 2.2.1.
Denote by ∆j(·) = UCORR
j (·)−UREF
j (·), the net gain from corruption when compared to
reform (REF). The relevant gains and losses are: ∆i(αi,ei), the gain for insiders given ﬁxed
α and e; ∆o(αo,eo), the gain for outsiders; ∆j(e), the gain as a function of an agent’s e; ∆g,
the gain for the government, and ∆
P
I,O,g U

, the total gain in utility for the society. It is
useful to denote by ¯ e the per capita level of the externality for players who are not the ones
imposing it. This term will enter their utilities with a negative sign.
The change in utility for outsiders from the corrupt system is given by:
∆o(α0,eo) =

   
   
−¯ e − αB
o if CREF
o
−¯ e − 0 if ¬CREF
o
(88)
In the corrupt system, outsider players are never chosen to receive the G good, but have
to suﬀer the expected value of the externality imposed by the winner. In the reformed
system, the outsiders can either be allocated the government good, which gives them the
baseline utility αB
o or not win it, while not having an externality be imposed upon them
either, and get 0. So whatever the case, outsider players lose from the corrupt system.
Denote by RMIN either
c(1−δ(1−p))
δp or
c(1−δ(1−q))
δq , depending on whether the analysis is
125performed on the model with single matches, or on the model with multiple matches. RMIN
is the minimal payment made to the government each stage when matched alone. The change
in utility for insider players is given by:
∆i(αi,ei) =

                      
                      

   
   
αi − α
(2)
i if ni,t > 1
αi − RMIN if ni,t = 1
and if (CCORR
i and ¬CREF
i )

   
   
αi − α
(2)
i − αB
i if ni,t > 1
αi − RMIN − αB
i if ni,t = 1
and if (CCORR
i and CREF)
−¯ ei − αB
i if (¬CCORR
i and CREF
i )
−¯ ei − 0 if (¬CCORR
i and ¬CREF
i )
(89)
The cases in which ni,t > 1 are obviously only relevant if allowing multiple matches.
Insider players gain from the corrupt system if they are chosen as recipients of G in this
system but not in the reformed system (ﬁrst case). In case they are chosen in both systems,
the eﬀect is ambiguous: On the one hand, they have to pay the bribe α
(2)
i or RMIN for
getting the good in the corrupt system, and no bribe in the reformed system. On the other
hand, the utility from the good in the corrupt system, αi, can be greater than the utility in
the reformed system αB
i because the former might include the externality ei. So the insider
player gains from the corrupt system in this subcase if:

   
   
αi − α
(2)
i − αB
i > 0 ⇐⇒ ei > α
(2)
i if ni,t > 1
αi − RMIN − αB
i > 0 ⇐⇒ ei > RMIN if ni,t = 1
(90)
That is, an insider player who is very skilled at imposing externalities can beneﬁt from
the corrupt system, even if he or she would have been awarded G in the bribe-free reformed
system, if the externality he or she can impose on other players is higher than the eﬀective
value of the bribe.
126The third subcase, when the insider player is not awarded G in the corrupt system,
but would be awarded G in the reformed system can arise when the insider player has a
high baseline utility for the good, but less of an ability to impose externalities than other I
players. In this case, this player loses from the corrupt system. In case the insider player
would not be awarded G in either the reformed or the corrupt system, he or she loses from
the corrupt system, because of the externality that is imposed in such a system.
The conclusion of the ﬁrst two analyses of changes in utilities is that outsider players
always lose from the corrupt system, while insider players can often gain from it. In any
given stage, the insider player who wins the G good under corruption either clearly gains
from the corrupt system (if they would have not received G in the reformed system), or
gains conditional on having a large ei (or low RMIN or low α
(2)
i ). As diﬀerent I players
will be drawn in diﬀerent stages, all of them have some chance at getting the beneﬁts from
corruption at some point. Also notable would be a realistic case where the externalities ¯ e are
imposed on a large mass of citizens who are either outside the I group, or outside the I and
O group altogether. In this case the ¯ e terms would be very small for an individual I player,
so over time their negative eﬀect in stages where that I player is not chosen to receive G
would be small, while in the stages where he or she is chosen to receive G, the gains would
be large. In the case of an equilibrium where the citizen who gets G pays something else
than α(2) (in the multiple-matches case), then the intuition of the results, is not changed:
insider players can often beneﬁt from corruption, while outsider players never beneﬁt.
The eﬀect of corruption given ej is that those with high capacity to impose externalities
have to gain from corruption if they are also insiders, as they are both more likely to win the
G good and to beneﬁt from it once they have gained it. (In the case of multiple matches,
this assumes the equilibrium presented in section 2.2). The change in utility from corruption
is given in the following expression, where the underset notation indicates whether e has a
127positive (+), negative (-) or neutral (0) eﬀect on the given quantity:
∆i(e) = E[C
CORR
i |ei]
(+/0)
U
CORR(ei)
(+)
− E[C
REF
i ]
(0)
U
REF(e)
(0)
− E[¬C
CORR
i |ei]
(−/0)
(¯ ei)
(0)
(91)
This quantity is aﬀected by ei in the follwing way: The second term is not aﬀected by
e at all. In the ﬁrst term, the expectation of winning the G good is increased by e (when
competing against other I players), as well as the utility of winning it (always). In the third
term, the loss from externalities from others is not aﬀected by i’s own ei, but the probability
of not being chosen is negatively aﬀected by ei. So overall, ei has a positive eﬀect on an
insider player’s utility from corruption, that is the corrupt system favors those with higher
ability to generate externalities. For an outsider player, eo has no eﬀect on their gain or loss
form corruption, as they either do not the good (in corruption), or get it in an environment
where eo does not matter (in the reformed system). In case the rule for choosing partners in
the case of multiple matches is diﬀerent, then, while U(CORR)(ei) is still positively aﬀected by
e, it may be that E[CCORR
i |ei] has no natural connection with ei in case the rule for choosing
partners is not based on choosing the one with the highest α.
For the government, the eﬀect of corruption is either neutral or positive in each period:
∆g =

        
        
RMIN − c − 0 if ni = 1
α
(2)
i − c − 0 if ni > 1
0 − 0 if ni = 0
(92)
In the ﬁrst two cases, the eﬀect is positive, as RMIN > c from its formula, and α
(2)
i ≥
RMIN =⇒ α
(2)
i ≥ c by assumption. So the overall eﬀect of the corrupt system on the
government is positive. The eﬀect is positive even if the rent that emerges in the case of
multiple matches is not α
(2)
i , as the rent paid has to always be large enough to cover the cost
c for the government.
To compute the overall eﬀect on total utility among the three kinds of agents, ﬁrst note
128that externalities and rent payments can be eliminated from the calculation, as they are just
transfers from one group to another. Also notable is the fact that in the corrupt system,
many transactions do not happen at all: in cases in which the only match is one or more
outsider players, the good G is not allocated at all, and it does not generate utility for
anyone even if it would have positive social utility if it were allocated. Another reason why
corruption reduces total utility is that in corruption, even when G is allocated, it is less
likely to be allocated to the individual with the highest baseline utility for it: In the corrupt
system, each stage, a citizen with baseline utility αB∗
i gets the good. In the reformed system,
each stage a citizen with baseline utility αB∗
j gets the good. There are two reasons why αB∗
i
might be lower than αB∗
j , and no case in which it is higher. First as j can be either i or o,
the pool from which the highest-αB j player is drawn is larger than the pool from which the
highest-α i player is drawn. Second, as distribution in the corrupt system is based on αi,
not αB
i , so in general, the insider player with the highest αB
i will not be chosen. That is,
under corruption, there are social losses because the government goods are awarded only to
insider players and are awarded based on private utility, not social utility:
∆i,o,g =

   
   
−αB
j∗ if Mt,o
αB
i∗ − c − αB
j∗ if Mt,i
(93)
where i∗ = {i|αi ≥ αi0∀i0 ∈ I \ {i}}
j∗ = {j|α
B
j ≥ α
B
j ∀j0 ∈ (I + O) \ {i}} (94)
In periods when only an outsider player is matched, the net social eﬀect is negative or
zero: no transaction takes place under corruption, whereas G would be allocated to the
citizen with the highest baseline valuation in the non-corrupt system. In case some insider
players have been matched, the net eﬀect is given by the diﬀerence between the baseline
utility of the citizen receiving the good under corruption (minus the cost of providing the
129good), and the baseline utility of the person receiving the good under the non-corrupt system.
For reasonable parameter values, this will be highly negative in the case of goods that have
any social utility in the ﬁrst place: The major component of the diﬀerence is αB
i∗ − αB
j∗ and
αB
i∗ will generally be smaller than αB
j∗. In case the winner of the good in the multiple matches
case is not the one with the highest α, then the eﬀect can only be more negative, as the
utility of whoever gets the good can only be lower.
A corollary to expression (93) is that the amount of secrecy regarding corruption (which
is given by the size of the I group, parameterized as the probability p) aﬀects total social
welfare: Keeping everything else constant, societies in which secrecy is greater suﬀer a greater
loss, as more agents are part of the outside group with which transactions cannot be made.
The magnitude of the net social eﬀect under reasonable parameter values, and in case
there is some social utility associated to the good is worth exploring: The nature of the
distribution Fα primarily determines it, and a realistic model for α will lead to high social
losses from corruption. Fα is the distribution of baseline utilities for the G good in the
population. G goods that generate any kind of social utility, such as permits to engage in
regular economic activity, will generally require very speciﬁc complementarities between the
good and the consumer, for the good to provide the optimal utility. For example, there
are very few agents in a given country (maybe even in the world) who are really competent
at building roads, at operating retail operations, at providing military equipment, and so
on. That is, the distribution Fα is likely to be severely skewed towards zero, and very long-
tailed. The ﬁrst source of ineﬃciency is that limiting draws from this distribution to only
insider players is likely to miss the few high-αB players. Moreover, even after taking the
draws only from the insider group, the one insider who gets chosen is not the one with the
highest baseline utility, but the one with the highest value of the sum of baseline value and
externality. Since imposing externalities is itself a skill, it can also be modeled as being
distributed as a long-tailed distribution, which is either independent, or positively correlated
with the baseline αB distribution. A Monte-Carlo simulation is useful for illustrating this
130Table 2: The net social eﬀect of corruption—simulations
µαB σ2
αB µe σ2
αe ni no ∆i,o,g
Default 2 .5 1 .125 5 5 -7.71
Small I group 2 .5 1 .125 5 15 -10.50
Low externalities 2 .5 .5 .125 5 5 -7.68
High var. in skill 2 1 1 .125 5 5 -16.46
logic. Take the case in which there are multiple matches of insider players and model the
distribution of αB and e as log-Normal:
α
B ∼ lnN(µαB,σ
2
αB)
e ∼ lnN(µe,σ
2
e) (95)
Set ni and no to be the expected value of their distributions, which are generic:
ni ≡ Efni
no ≡ Efno (96)
Also set c = 5. For the simulation, take N = 100,000 repeated draws from the distribution
above, at diﬀerent values of the relevant parameters, and compute the expected value of
the social loss E
h
αB
i∗ − c − αB
j∗
i
. Results are presented in table 2. The social gain is always
negative. A small I group relative to the O group, indicating greater secrecy, means a larger
loss. The size of the externalities here does not matter, as they are not correlated with αB.
High variation in the skill αB induces a larger loss, because getting the diﬀerence between the
right agent for the job and the one chosen through the government’s optimization problem
will increase as the diﬀerences in skill in the population increase.
131Discussion
There are a few non-obvious points that emerge from the models above. The ﬁrst point
is that, while corruption is good for the government oﬃcial, as she is able to maximize
her income, the nature of corrupt transactions means that the oﬃcial is not able to fully
use her power and get the best deals from citizens. The primary reason is the inability to
engage outsider players in the random matching models. This might be why real life corrupt
interactions, such as the awarding of a business permit, seem to often take the form of
ineﬃcient transactions between the government oﬃcial and their proverbial “cousin”, rather
than of transactions with the most eﬃcient agent, which in the case of the business permit
would be the most eﬃcient international corporation in that ﬁeld. While the oﬃcial would
like to be able to extract a much higher bribe from the corporation, their lack of commitment
power in that transaction means it will not take place.
An immediate corollary of this is that the value of corrupt transactions will often be
“unnaturally” low. The fact that bribes paid to oﬃcials are often shown to be very low
is emphasized in Buchannan (1980) as one of the major puzzles of empirical studies of
corruption. One reason for this might be that the “demand” for the corrupt good is artiﬁcially
lowered by the inability of the oﬃcial to include in it all the potential customers from the
outsider group.
The insider-outsider distinction suggests why corrupt societies are often best understood
through the lens of cliques, connections, patronage, and family relations, rather than as
extreme examples of free markets, where “everything is for sale”. Everything might be for
sale, but the customers who are willing to engage in the transactions might very well be
only a very small subset of society, thus greatly departing from the ideal of the free market.
The most relevant distinction between corrupt and non-corrupt interactions is that corrupt
markets are often markets which are not supposed to exist, not simply versions of legitimate
markets in which the government oﬃcial is free to optimize how she provides the good in
order to maximize income.
132Another interesting conclusion is that corruption also facilitates the existence of crime
in general. If goods such as get-out-of-jail cards are available for sale under corruption, but
not under the non-corrupt system, then the equilibrium response of citizens in the corrupt
system will be to maximize the usefulness of this fact by committing the crime associated
with the card.
The fact that corrupt interactions cannot be made public implicitly assumes that there is
some cost for the government in making them public: either the cost of being sanctioned by
a higher-level oﬃcial, or electoral costs. An interesting variation of the model removes this
requirement, by making p = 1. This would mean that there is no reason for the transaction
to be kept secret, as there is no higher-level oﬃcial to punish, and/or electoral constraints
are not binding. In this case, corruption would be more eﬃcient, and the government would
gain more, by making it able for outsider players to engage in transactions. An example of
such a situation might be the case of some oil-rich absolute monarchies in the contemporary
world, where transactions with the royal family are quite public, and seem to be engaged in
by all agents who desire so, including high-eﬃciency international corporations. However, it
also seems that these types of interactions should be called something else than corruption,
as the phenomenon is quite diﬀerent. The word “feudalism” might be more appropriate in
this case.
The most interesting conclusion of the analysis, though, is that the complex distributive
eﬀects of corruption mean that a large number of citizens are in favor of corruption. The
usual view of corruption, as a transfer from citizens to the government, must be amended
with the fact that this system also has important distributive eﬀects among citizens. Citizens
who are part of some oﬃcial’s connections, as well as citizens who are very skilled in imposing
externalities will beneﬁt from corruption, and will vote for the continuation of the system
if given the opportunity. This might be why electoral mechanisms often seem unable to
eliminate corruption even in the case of vigorous political competition.
133Appendix A - List of Divisions
For each of the thirty divisions, the date on which it occurred, and the code in Ginter is given.
The “votes for” and “against” entries are the oﬃcial totals recorded from the division. The
“recorded for” and “against” are the number of expressed votes which are left in the surviving
lists. When the voting intention of an MP was known, but he could not express it, Ginter
notes this as “absent yes/no” or “implicit yes/no”. These kinds of votes are counted in the
“nonvote” category, along with “absent” votes, and they are also counted as regular yes/no
votes, as they too reﬂect the MP’s preferences. The “balanced” entry indicates whether the
division is a part of the sample for the models are denoted “balanced sample” in the text.
The government vote entry is listed by Ginter as how the most important ministers voted
in the division. For the bills in which an anti-corruption preference is given by a “no” vote,
this fact is noted.
Whenever possible, information on the motion that the division was taken on, and its
context from the Hansard is given, as this is the most accurate source for information on the
debates. When this is not possible, or for additional details, the Journals of the House of
Commons (JC) are another source of information. The Journals describe the business of the
House in more detail but do not record the speeches given by the MPs. The description of
the division from the History of Parliament is also given when available, and for one division,
the description comes from the Gentlemen’s Magazine—a monthly magazine from that era.
12 Feb 1779 - Contractors Bill (779010)
Votes for: 160. Votes against: 145.
“Nonvote” for: 81. “Nonvote” against: 173.
Recorded for: 160. Recorded against: 142.
Balanced: Yes.
Government vote: No.
Description: “Division on the bill to prohibit Government contractors from sitting in the
134House.” (HP). The bill stated that any government contractor should not be allowed to be a
member of the House of Commons, unless the contract has been awarded through competi-
tive bidding. The mover, P.J. Clerke criticized the the government’s inﬂuence in the house
given by the awarding of such contracts, and also criticized a fraudulent contract oﬀered by
the Treasury in connection to the American war eﬀort. Lord North argued that the contract
given as example had actually been awarded fairly. (Hansard)
21 Feb 1780 - Pensions Granted by the Crown (780010 1)
“No” vote is pro-reforms.
Votes for: 190. Votes against: 188.
“Nonvote” for: 35. “Nonvote” against: 29.
Recorded for: 191. Recorded against: 189.
Balanced: Yes.
Government vote: Yes.
Description: A bill was moved by George Savile on Feb 15 for an account of all pen-
sions granted by the crown, so that the Commons could judge their usefulness. The motion
was argued against by Lord North and others, who said such an account would embarrass
many individuals, such as widows of aristocrats, who were paid such pensions because they
had no other sources of income in spite of their high social standings. On Feb 21, Lord
North moved an amendment on that bill so that it would only refer to pensions paid by the
Exchequer, that is not to those paid by the Crown directly. Opponents argued this makes
the bill ineﬀective, because its main object are the pensions that are paid secretly by the
crown. A very long debate followed and the house divided on North’s amendment. (Hansard)
2 Mar 1780 - Civil Establishment Bill (780101 2)
Votes for: 197. Votes against: 232.
“Nonvote” for: 12. “Nonvote” against: 0.
135Recorded for: 32. Recorded against: 53.
Balanced: Yes.
Government vote: No.
Description: A bill moved by Edmund Burke for “the better Regulation of his Majesty’s
Civil Establishments and of certain public oﬃces for the limitation of pensions and the sup-
pression of sundry useless expensive and inconvenient places and for applying the monies
saved thereby to the public service.” Speakers in favor argued that the increase in government
business during the American War has increased the opportunities for corruption. Speakers
against argued the bill is too general and there needs to be more time before it goes to a
committee. The vote was on whether to send the bill to a committee the next day or to
delay it. (Hansard)
8 Mar 1780 - Civil Establishment Bill (Third Secretary of State) (780020)
Votes for: 202. Votes against: 209.
Recorded for: 203. Recorded against: 209.
Balanced: Yes.
Government vote: No.
Description: “Division in the committee on Burke’s economical reform bill on the clause
to abolish the oﬃce of secretary of state for the colonies.” (HP) This was the ﬁrst clause
of the Establishment Bill mentioned above. A speaker against argued that the bill both
limits the executive’s constitutional right to spend money on salaries as it sees ﬁt, as well as
referring to a post which is not useless. The debate on these matters went on until 3 a.m.,
and then a vote was taken. (Hansard)
13 Mar 1780 - Civil Establishment Bill (Board of Trade) (780030)
Votes for: 208. Votes against: 200.
Recorded for: 210. Recorded against: 206.
136Balanced: Yes.
Government vote: No.
Description: “Division in the committee on Burke’s economical reform bill on the clause
to abolish the Board of Trade.” (HP) Another part of Burke’s bill. Debates similar to those
presented above on abolishing this particular governmental institution. (Hansard)
28 Mar 1794 - Private Benevolances to Government (794090)
Votes for: 36. Votes against: 206.
Recorded for: 36. Recorded against: 2.
Balanced: No.
Government vote: No.
Description: A motion stating “that it is a dangerous and unconstitutional measure for
the executive government to solicit money from the people as a private aid, loan, benevolence
or subscription, for public purposes, without the consent of Parliament” (JC)
8 April 1794 - Reduction of Sinecures and Pensions (794100)
Votes for: 50. Votes against: 119.
“Nonvote” for: 0. “Nonvote” against: 2.
Recorded for: 51. Recorded against: 2.
Balanced: No.
Government vote: No.
Description: “a Bill for the purpose of appropriating a certain part of the emoluments
arising from certain pensions and sinecure places, for the service of the public, during the
continuance of the war, at the disposal of Parliament; and also for the purpose of appropri-
ating a part of the emoluments arising from certain eﬃcient places, amounting to more than
a speciﬁed sum, to be applied to the same purpose.” (JC)
13713 Mar 1797 - Reduction of Sinecures (797060)
Votes for: 79. Votes against: 171.
“Nonvote” for: 2. “Nonvote” against: 2.
Recorded for: 19. Recorded against: 4.
Balanced: No.
Government vote: No.
Description: “the extent of supplies voted to Government since the commencement of
the present war, having caused so heavy an increase in taxes, it is the duty of this House to
enquire whether some relief to the burdens of the people, or provision for future experience,
may not be obtained by the reduction of useless places, sinecure oﬃces, exorbitant fees in
oﬃces, and other modes of retrenchment in the expenditure of the public money.” (JC) The
mover argued that in the face of increasing public debt, waste on sinecures must be curbed.
William Pitt argues against the motion on the grounds that it does not make it clear how
such reductions in expenditures would be achieved, and that it is all to easy to criticize the
system from outside. (Hansard)
8 Apr 1805 - Censure of Lord Melville (805080)
Votes for: 219. Votes against: 218.
“Nonvote” for: 1. “Nonvote” against: 0.
Recorded for: 219. Recorded against: 216.
Balanced: Yes.
Government vote: No.
Description: Corruption charges against former War Secretary, Lord Melville: “Violation
of the act of Parliament; connivance at the private proﬁts illegally made by Mr. Trotter
out of the public money; and participation in those proﬁts” (JC). Lord Melville, (Henry
Dundas), was a key member of Pitt’s cabinet and a friend of the prime minister. He was
acquitted in the end, in the impeachment trial in the House of Lords, but did not return to
138public oﬃce. (Hansard)
15 Mar 1809 - Conduct of Duke of York (809020)
Votes for: 125. Votes against: 366.
“Nonvote” for: 3. “Nonvote” against: 1.
Recorded for: 129. Recorded against: 3.
Balanced: No.
Government vote: No.
Description: The Duke of York was the commander in chief of the British Army at the
time. He was forced to step down as a result of suspicions that he allowed his mistress to sell
army commissions, which they proﬁted from. (Harling, 1996a) This division is for or against
the original address put forward by Gwyllym Wardle in which he reveals the corruption
accusations. (Hansard)
17 Mar 1809 - Conduct of Duke of York (Perceval Motion) (809040)
“No” vote is pro-reforms.
Votes for: 280. Votes against: 198.
“Nonvote” for: 2. “Nonvote” against: 6.
Recorded for: 3. Recorded against: 201.
Balanced: No.
Government vote: Yes.
Description: The motion is an amendment to relieve the Duke of York of personal re-
sponsibility for the corrupt transactions: that the House “ﬁnds it expedient to pronounce a
distinct opinion upon the truth or falsehood of these imputations; and is therefore of opinion
that there is no foundation for imputing personal corruption or criminal connivance to his
royal highness." (Hansard)
13917 Mar 1809 - Conduct of Duke of York (Turton Motion) (809030)
“No” vote is pro-reforms.
Votes for: 336. Votes against: 137.
“Nonvote” for: 2. “Nonvote” against: 6.
Recorded for: 2. Recorded against: 139.
Balanced: No.
Government vote: Yes.
Description: Similar to the Perceval motion above, but wants to relieve the Duke of any
“knowledge” of corruption, rather than “connivance”. (Hansard)
17 Apr 1809 - Conduct of Duke of York (Committee on Abuses) (809050)
Votes for: 32. Votes against: 180.
Recorded for: 35. Recorded against: 8.
Balanced: No.
Government vote: No.
Description: This is a wide-ranging proposal to appoint a committee to inquire into all
possible abuses relating to the sale of military oﬃces: the motion is "That a Committee be
appointed to enquire into the existence of any corrupt practices with regard to the disposal
of Oﬃces in any department of the state, or any agreement, negotiation, or bargain, direct
or indirect, for the sale thereof; and of any corrupt practices relative to the purchase and
sale of Commissions in the Army; and also, to examine into the terms on which Letters of
Service have been granted for raising men for the Army by way of Levies, and the manner
in which the said Levies have been conducted; and to report the same, as it shall appear to
them, to the house, together with their observations thereupon; and that the said Commit-
tee have power to report the Minutes of Evidence taken before them, and their proceedings,
from time to time, to the house." The prime minister replied that the Duke of York’s al-
leged corruption is no reason to have such a wide-ranging inquiry into the military. (Hansard)
14025 Apr 1809 - Conduct of Castlereagh (809060)
Votes for: 169. Votes against: 218.
“Nonvote” for: 0. “Nonvote” against: 1.
Recorded for: 169. Recorded against: 4.
Balanced: No.
Government vote: No.
Description: A scandal involving Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh, who was ac-
cused of awarding some oﬃces in the East India Company for electoral gain as a member
of the board of control. The resolution was "That it appears to this house, from the Evi-
dence on the table, that lord viscount Castlereagh in the year 1805, he having just quitted
the oﬃce of President of the Board of Controul, and being then a Privy Counsellor and
Secretary of State, did place at the disposal of lord Clancarty, a member of the said Board,
the nomination of a Writership to India, for the purpose of thereby procuring the said lord
Clancarty a Seat in this honourable house. 2nd. That it was owing to a disagreement
among other subordinate parties to the transaction, that this corrupt negotiation did not
take eﬀect.—3rd. That lord viscount Castlereagh has been by the said conduct guilty of a
violation of his duty, of an abuse of his inﬂuence and authority as President of the Board
of Controul, and also of an attack upon the purity and constitution of this house." (Hansard)
1 May 1809 - Dutch Commissioners (809070)
Votes for: 79. Votes against: 104.
“Nonvote” for: 0. “Nonvote” against: 1.
Recorded for: 79. Recorded against: 2.
Balanced: No.
Government vote: No.
Description: This is an inquiry into the behavior of public oﬃcials that were supposed,
141in 1795, to dispose of the captured Dutch ships and goods by selling them. Corruption by
these oﬃcials was alleged. The motion being voted on was: “1.That it appears to this house,
that to commit pecuniary trusts to any persons whatsoever, without providing any check on
their proceedings, without calling for any regular or periodical accounts, and without set-
tling, during a long course of years, the mode or amount of their remuneration, is a neglect
which must inevitably lead to the most prejudicial consequences, and is a violation of the
obvious duty of government. 2. That such neglect and deviation have been proved to exist,
and might have been attended with material loss to the public. 3. That the Commissioners
upon Dutch Property have been guilty of gross misconduct, in violating the act under which
they were appointed, and appropriating to their own use without authority, sums for which
they ought to have accounted to the public. 4. That the Accounts of the Commissioners be
referred to the Auditors of Public Accounts to be examined. 5. That all consideration of the
remuneration to be allowed to the Commissioners ought to be deferred till their accounts are
ﬁnally settled.” (Hansard)
11 May 1809 - Conduct of Perceval and Castlereagh (809090)
Votes for: 87. Votes against: 312.
“Nonvote” for: 0. “Nonvote” against: 1.
Recorded for: 87. Recorded against: 4.
Balanced: No.
Government vote: No.
Description: A motion put forward by William Maddocks that that House inquire into
the conduct of Prime Minister Perceval and the Viscount Castlereagh for alleged electoral
corruption. (Hansard)
17 May 1810 - Abolition and Regulation of Sinecures (810110)
Votes for: 94. Votes against: 100.
142“Nonvote” for: 1. “Nonvote” against: 1.
Recorded for: 96. Recorded against: 95.
Balanced: Yes.
Government vote: No.
Description: A motion by Henry Bankes to abolish sinecure oﬃces and replace them with
a fund for the rewarding of those who served in public oﬃce for a long time. (Gentlemen’s
Magazine)
7 Feb 1812 - Oﬃces in Reversion Bill (812060)
Votes for: 56. Votes against: 58.
“Nonvote” for: 0. “Nonvote” against: 1.
Recorded for: 56. Recorded against: 57.
Balanced: Yes.
Government vote: No.
Description: Henry Bankes proposed a bill that stated “that no oﬃce, place, employment
or salary, ought hereafter to be granted in reversion.” (JC) The prime minister argued that
no economy would arise from such a bill, and that “the objects to be attained by it were of
so little importance, that more injury might be expected to result from a discordance in the
legislature, than from its adoption.” (Hansard)
4 May 1812 - Sinecure Oﬃces Bill (812230)
Votes for: 136. Votes against: 125.
“Nonvote” for: 10. “Nonvote” against: 2.
Recorded for: 139. Recorded against: 123.
Balanced: Yes.
Government vote: No.
Description: “To take into further consideration the report on the sinecure oﬃces bill.”
143(JC) Opponents of the bill argued that it was unconstitutional in Scotland. (Hansard)
29 Mar 1813 - Sinecure Oﬃces Bill (813050)
Votes for: 96 Votes against: 86.
Recorded for: 96. Recorded against: 2.
Balanced: No.
Government vote: Neutral.
Description: Whether to further consider the Sinecure Oﬃces Bill. (JC)
27 May 1813 - Committee on Civil List (813100)
Votes for: 31. Votes against: 110.
Recorded for: 31. Recorded against: 2.
Balanced: No.
Government vote: No.
Description: A motion that a House Committee to inquire into the Civil List expendi-
tures and “that the committee have power to send for persons and records” (Hansard)
14 Apr 1815 - Committee on Civil List (815140)
Votes for: 96. Votes against: 129.
“Nonvote” for: 1. “Nonvote” against: 1.
Recorded for: 97. Recorded against: 123.
Balanced: Yes.
Government vote: No.
Description: George Tierney sought to establish a committee for “inquiry into the causes
of the excesses of the Civil List”. A long debate on the merits of such a committee followed.
(Hansard)
1448 May 1815 - Select Committee on Civil List (815230)
Votes for: 121. Votes against: 177.
“Nonvote” for: 12. “Nonvote” against: 1.
Recorded for: 121. Recorded against: 175.
Balanced: Yes.
Government vote: No.
Description: George Tierney, who had put forward other motions on the civil list, com-
plained that all committees that had been set up do not have suﬃcient power to achieve
anything meaningful. Now he proposes that the committee “have power to send for Mr. T.
B. Mash, of the Lord Chamberlain’s oﬃce." (Hansard)
6 May 1816 - Select Committee on Civil List (816200)
Votes for: 124. Votes against: 215.
Recorded for: 124. Recorded against: 215.
Balanced: Yes.
Government vote: No.
Description: Again a motion that a Select Committee on the Civil list have power to
send for persons, papers, and records. (JC)
24 May 1816 - Civil List Bill (816280)
Votes for: 118. Votes against: 232.
Recorded for: 119. Recorded against: 227.
Balanced: Yes.
Government vote: No.
Description: A vote on the progress of a bill to regulate the Civil List. (JC)
14 Jun 1816 - Public Revenues Consolidation Bill (816360)
145“No” vote is pro-reforms.
Votes for: 109. Votes against: 67.
“Nonvote” for: 2. “Nonvote” against: 2.
Recorded for: 108. Recorded against: 68.
Balanced: Yes.
Government vote: Yes.
Description: As a part of the Public Revenues Consolidation Bill, this is a vote on
whether to allow a Vice-Treasurer position in Ireland to be created, which opponents argued
was a sinecure worth £3,500 per year, as well as a deputy for that position, worth £1,000
a year. The prime minister said the position was necessary, and the only concern was the
remuneration. Opponents insisted this was a sinecure, and a long debate followed. (Hansard)
17 Jun 1816 - Public Revenues Consolidation Bill (816370)
“No” vote is pro-reforms.
Votes for: 100. Votes against: 102.
“Nonvote” for: 14. “Nonvote” against: 18.
Recorded for: 101. Recorded against: 102.
Balanced: Yes.
Government vote: Yes.
Description: This is a vote speciﬁcally on the salary of the oﬃce in Ireland to be created.
The vote is on whether the salary to be £3,500 a year, which opponents argued was exces-
sive. (Hansard)
20 Jun 1816 - Public Revenues Consolidation Bill (816380)
Votes for: 113. Votes against: 151.
“Nonvote” for: 16. “Nonvote” against: 15.
Recorded for: 103. Recorded against: 150.
146Balanced: Yes.
Government vote: No.
Description: This is an amendment proposed by Henry Bankes, to make the deputy of
the newly-created Vice-Treasurer of Ireland not receive money directly from the budged, but
rather that his salary be deducted from the salary of the Vice-Treasurer. (Hansard)
17 Feb 1817 - Salaries of Secretaries of Admiralty (817040)
Votes for: 116. Votes against: 171.
Recorded for: 116. Recorded against: 172.
Balanced: Yes.
Government vote: No.
Description: Charles Wentworth-Fitzwilliam, Lord Milton, proposed a motion "That the
issue of the war salaries to the secretaries to the admiralty, and certain other persons con-
nected with the navy and dock-yards, in consideration of the expedition to Algiers, which
terminated in hostilities with that government, is uncalled for by the order in council of
January 15th, 1800, and therefore an improper application of the public money." The issue
was that the secretaries of the Admiralty had a higher salary in time of war, and they had
claimed that higher salary during a Navy expedition to Algiers in a manner which opponents
said was not legal. (Hansard)
25 Feb 1817 - Reduction in the Number of Lords of the Admiralty (817070)
Votes for: 154. Votes against: 210.
“Nonvote” for: 1. “Nonvote” against: 0.
Recorded for: 152. Recorded against: 207.
Balanced: Yes.
Government vote: No.
Description: Matthew Ridley puts forward a motion that the number of oﬃcials in the
147Board of Admiralty be reduced from its current six. He argued this number was too high
for a time of peace. (Hansard)
19 May 1817 - Civil Services Compensation Bill (817220)
Votes for: 107. Votes against: 47.
Recorded for: 2. Recorded against: 47.
Balanced: No.
Government vote: Yes.
Description: A vote on the progress of the Civil Services Compensation Bill, which in-
stituted pensions for public oﬃcials, as a substitute for the practice of granting sinecures
for elderly government workers. Reformers such as Henry Bankes spoke in favor of the bill.
(Hansard)
10 Jun 1817 - Civil Services Compensation Bill (817260)
Votes for: 29. Votes against: 66.
Recorded for: 29. Recorded against: 2.
Balanced: No.
Government vote: No.
Description: A vote on a clause in the Civil Services Compensation Bill that anyone
receiving a pension under the provisions of the law cannot be a member of Parliament at
the same time. (Hansard)
10 Jun 1817 - Civil Services Compensation Bill (817270)
Votes for: 77. Votes against: 22.
Recorded for: 2. Recorded against: 22.
Balanced: No.
Government vote: Yes.
148Description: A vote on whether to continue taking into consideration the Civil Services
Compensation Bill. (Hansard)
18 Mar 1819 - Reduction of Admiralty Board (Two Lay Lords) (819080)
Votes for: 166. Votes against: 247.
“Nonvote” for: 2. “Nonvote” against: 1.
Recorded for: 167. Recorded against: 3.
Balanced: No.
Government vote: No.
Description: Matthew Ridley proposes a reduction in the number of the Lords of the
Admiralty as he had done in 1817. (Hansard)
29 Mar 1819 - Electoral Bribery by Windham Quinn (819100 1)
Votes for: 75. Votes against: 164.
Recorded for: 75. Recorded against: 158.
Balanced: Yes.
Government vote: Neutral.
Description: An MP, Windham Quinn, was accused of bribing an inﬂuential individual in
his constituency, by oﬀering him the position of justice of the peace. The vote is on whether
to take the matter into further consideration. (Hansard)
17 May 1819 - Barnstaple Bribery Bill (819220)
Votes for: 112. Votes against: 14.
Recorded for: 2. Recorded against: 14.
Balanced: No.
Government vote: Neutral.
Description: Sir Manassah Lopez was imprisoned for his open bribery at Barnstaple, and
149this bill was on whether to change to franchise in that constituency so that it would not be
concentrated among a few venal electors, but rather be extended to 800 freemen. The bill
was defeated in the Lords in the end, in spite of strong support in the Commons. (Hansard)
22 Jun 1819 - Penryn Bribery Bill (819360)
Votes for: 46. Votes against: 26.
Recorded for: 46. Recorded against: 25.
Balanced: Yes.
Government vote: Neutral.
Description: A vote to proceed considering the Penryin Bribery Bill, which aimed to
remove the franchise from the venal borough of Penryn, where corruption had been proven.
(Hansard)
150Appendix B - Data
Data collection
The sources for the independent variables are the History of Parliament and Judd (1972).
Each MP for whom there is a vote recorded in the 30 bills which are analyzed is assigned a
unique code in Ginter (1995). This code is also used by Judd. Lists from Judd were also used
for the variables merchant, India (where the categories “East India interest” and “Nabobs”
from Judd are conﬂated), banker (split into those associated with the Bank of England and
others), manufacturer, and physician.
For the other independent variables, the source is the History of Parliament. We processed
a digital version of the relevant volumes (1754-1790 and 1790-1820) from the HP to allow the
extraction of the relevant information using the Python programming language. The text
was put in ASCII format, therefore stripping much of the formatting. From each volume only
the parts which contained biographies of MPs are kept, removing the introductory chapters
and the parts where the individual constituencies are presented.
We then used the Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK) (Loper and Bird, 2002) package in
Python to spilt the raw string into “tokens”, that is units of analysis for the algorithms to
be applied on the text. The ﬁrst relevant level of tokenization for this analysis is the word.
We used the function word_tokenizer from NLTK to split the text at this ﬁrst level. This
function applies the Treebank Word Tokenizer algorithm to the text (Marcus et al., 1993),
which ensures that words are deﬁned in a natural manner.
The second level of aggregation of the data is the MP level. To establish the beginning of
the entry for an MP, we search for the word patterns which are characteristic of this: one or
more last names written in all capital letters (possibly with apostrophes, as for “A’Court”),
of length at least three characters, and followed shortly by a comma (to separate them from
the ﬁrst name). We removed the few words which might have produced this pattern but were
not last names, such as “USA”, by inspecting every last name produced by this criterion.
151The entry for an MP, as can be seen in the example in the second part of this appendix, is
split in two: a “header” which gives the basic biographical information in a pre-set order,
and a body which presents less structured information.
A very large number of MPs were known by more than one name throughout their lives.
Changes of last name were common, when one acceded to an aristocratic title, or when one
individual inherited a fortune from someone other than his father. In the latter case, the
last name of the person whose wealth was being inherited was often added to the last name
of the heir. Other sources of multiple names are diﬀerent spellings of Huguenot names, and
multiple spellings of regular English names. When this is the case, the HP uses the oﬃcial
name of the MP when he ﬁrst got elected, and for the other names it has entries of the form
“New Name, see Old Name”. Such entries have been removed from the text, as they add no
information.
Also removed are any “c.” (circa) or “bef.” (before) words before years to leave year
entries as simply four (or two) ﬁgures.
Some MPs have more than one entry because they had a signiﬁcant political role both in
the 1754-1790 and in the 1790-1820 periods. When this is the case, the two texts are joined,
based on the criterion of identical names and dates of birth and death.
Each entry for an MP is tagged with the code used by Ginter and Judd. When a name
matched exactly and uniquely the one in Judd’s book, we assigned that code to the entry
for that MP. When there was no perfect match, or multiple matches, we assigned the code
manually, going by the dates of birth and death as a criterion for identifying which MP
should be matched with what code.
Once this basic processing of the text had taken place, we used simple algorithms for
extracting information from each MP’s entry. The variables used in the paper, which are
not code from Judd, have been extracted as follows:
Lawyer. The criterion for extracting the list of lawyers is that the MP should be either
“called to the Bar” or mentioned in the text as a a solicitor or advocate (for a small number
152of cases) and that he should not be established by Ginter as exercising another profession.
We settled on this criterion because the number of lawyers obtained in this case (about
11% of the House) matches the estimates made by the authors of the HP. Using just legal
education produces too many positive results, as a degree in law was very usual for those
with university education. Looking at just those mentioned in the body as lawyers produces
too few positive results, when compared to the HP.
The pattern (regular expression) we looked for in the header of the text (using “1780” as a
placeholder for any year) was of the form “called 1780” or “called to the English Bar 1780”, or
“called [I] 1780” (for Ireland), or “Solicitor in”, or “adv.”, or “articled”. All these expressions
allow for diﬀerent capitalization. From the list of MPs obtained using this criterion, we
eliminated those identiﬁed explicitly by Judd as ending up in other professions, as an early
career in law was often a natural stepping stone towards business and trade.
Military. As explained, we try to only capture career military men rather than everyone
who did some military service in their youth. Those who ended up as Colonels or Rear-
Admirals or higher, can safely be considered career military men. We search for the patterns
indicating such positions for every MP (“col.”, “gen.”, “r-adm.”, “f.m.”, etc.).
Government oﬃcial. To get at oﬃcial positions for an MP, we ﬁrst removed the part of
the text which referred to his parents. This is because entries often contain in their header
information of the form “s. of John Doe, Secretary of the Navy 1750-1755”, sometimes
with other pieces of information about the parents. Also included is sometimes information
about the MP’s wife’s parents (“m. to Jane Doe, da. of John Smith, Master of the Mint
1740-1750”, etc.) We removed the parts of the text that begin with “s. of” and until a
pattern that indicates the MP’s own children, of the form (“x s., y d.” or “s.p.” for sine
prole). This ensures that whatever information is extracted refers to the MP, not to his
parents or to his wife’s parents. The HP presents a list of all oﬃcial positions held by the
MP, along with their date of beginning and end, as the last entry of the header. We used a
combination of automated extraction and manual checking to get at the “government oﬃcial”
153variable. We ﬁrst recorded any pattern that indicates a date range in the last portion of the
header, along with the text right before it, which should be the name of the position. Then
we manually checked the resulting entries, to ensure they really refer to positions the MP
has held. While in general the HP lists only political/administrative positions, sometimes
private-sector or non-proﬁt positions are also listed. We eliminate any such position, for
example those relating to various clubs for agricultural improvement, or other non-proﬁts.
We also eliminate local-level positions, often symbolic, such as sheriﬀ, because these often
came about as a natural consequence of the inﬂuence of the MP in the community. We
do however keep the position of governor or lord-lieutenant of an administrative division, as
these individuals were the monarch’s representatives in that division. We then check whether
in the 14 years in which votes occur any such position is recorded for each MP.
Public School. Judd lists the public schools that MPs could attend: Charterhouse, Eton,
Harrow, Rugby, Shrewsbury, Westminster, and Winchester. We record whether these names
occur after the “educ.” marker.
University. Similarly, we record whether the words Oxf., Camb., Aberdeen, Edinburgh,
Glasgow, Andrews, Dublin, Leyden or simply Univ. occur after the “educ.” marker. Over-
whelmingly, the MPs who went to university did so at Oxford and Cambridge.
Grand Tour. We record whether “Grand Tour” is encountered in the header for the MP.
First son. We search for patterns like “1st s. of” or “o.s. of” or “1st surv. s. of” in the
header of the entry.
Aristocrat. We search for “Duke”, “Mq.”, “Marquess”, “Earl”, “Visct.”, “Viscount”,
“Baron”, “Bt.” or “suc. fa. as” (for “succeeded father as”), or “cr.” for “created” in
the header of the text.
Whig Club / Brooks’ Club. We search for a mention of the names of the clubs in the
entire text of the entry. Members that did join one of these clubs always have an entry of
the form “He joined the Whig Club in...”.
For the constituency-level data, we ﬁrst needed to extract the name of the constituency
154that the MP served in in each one of the 14 years in which votes occurred. We did this
by searching for the speciﬁc patterns that identify the constituency names in the header
of the entry for each MP. The constituencies are written in capital letters and followed
immediately by the years between which the MP served there. For each MP we recorded
the name of the constituency and the years associated with it. Then we recorded the name
of the constituency for each of the relevant years (e.g. 1779, 1780, etc).
The information for each constituency in these years is taken from the parts of the HP
which deal with the districts. Both the 1754-1790 and the 1790-1820 volumes present tables
of the constituencies, with their size (small, medium or large), franchise type, and whether
there were contested elections in oﬃcial election years, or in by-elections. We matched these
pieces of information to each constituency-year. The size and franchise type do not change
over the years. The contested election variable is coded as yes if a contested election is
recorded at the last general election or the last by-election before or during the year the vote
is recorded.
The dependent variable is coded from the records provided by Ginter. The votes in which
the MP is listed as “absent yes” or “implicit yes”, and “no” respectively, are coded as “yes”
or “no”, as they too reveal the MPs’ preference. These votes are matched with the records
for the independent variables using the unique code which characterizes each entry. At the
end of this process, each expressed vote has been matched with an entry from the HP and
Judd, and therefore with the needed independent variables.
155Sample entry from the History of Parliament (ﬁrst paragraphs
only)
156Summary statistics
Full sample Balanced sample
Variable Obs. Mean S.d. Obs. Mean S.d.
Dependent var.
Yes Vote 7141 0.536 0.499 5776 0.449 0.497
Occupational cat.
Merchant 7141 0.058 0.233 5776 0.051 0.220
Physician 7141 0.004 0.067 5776 0.003 0.059
Manufacturer 7141 0.008 0.091 5776 0.009 0.094
Military 7141 0.321 0.467 5776 0.321 0.467
Government Oﬃcial 7141 0.222 0.415 5776 0.249 0.433
Bank of England 7141 0.006 0.078 5776 0.006 0.078
Banker 7141 0.051 0.220 5776 0.047 0.212
India Bourgeoisie 7141 0.071 0.258 5776 0.071 0.257
W. Indies Bourgeoisie 7141 0.043 0.204 5776 0.046 0.209
Landowner-only 7141 0.314 0.464 5776 0.311 0.463
Lawyer 7141 0.071 0.256 5776 0.067 0.250
Group A 7141 0.456 0.498 5776 0.471 0.499
Group B 7141 0.110 0.313 5776 0.112 0.315
Group C 7141 0.550 0.498 5776 0.534 0.499
Bourgeoisie 7141 0.330 0.470 5776 0.321 0.467
Personal char.
Public School 7141 0.448 0.497 5776 0.442 0.497
University 7141 0.565 0.496 5776 0.566 0.496
Grand Tour 7141 0.045 0.207 5776 0.046 0.209
First Son 6977 0.490 0.500 5640 0.486 0.500
Aristocrat 7141 0.343 0.475 5776 0.348 0.476
Whig Club 7141 0.120 0.325 5776 0.094 0.292
Brooks’ Club 7141 0.215 0.411 5776 0.170 0.376
Constituency size
Large const. 7141 0.338 0.473 5776 0.324 0.468
Medium const. 7141 0.115 0.319 5776 0.110 0.313
Small const. 7141 0.517 0.500 5776 0.533 0.499
Unknown size const. 7141 0.030 0.172 5776 0.032 0.176
Franchise type
157County 7141 0.240 0.427 5776 0.241 0.428
Burgage Franchise 7141 0.096 0.294 5776 0.101 0.301
Scottish Borough 7141 0.018 0.133 5776 0.019 0.137
Corporation Borough 7141 0.091 0.288 5776 0.092 0.289
Freeholder Franchise 7141 0.027 0.162 5776 0.027 0.163
Freeman Borough 7141 0.356 0.479 5776 0.350 0.477
Householder Franchise 7141 0.045 0.208 5776 0.044 0.206
Other (Univ.) Franchise 7141 0.012 0.110 5776 0.013 0.112
Scot-and-Lot Franchise 7141 0.114 0.317 5776 0.113 0.316
Election
Contested Election 7141 0.299 0.546 5776 0.290 0.453
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Figure 11: Government income and expenditure, nominal pounds. Data from Mitchell
(1988).
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Figure 12: Real interest rate computed as nominal interest rate on long-term debt minus
rate of inﬂation. Data from Mitchell (1988) and Oﬃcer (2001)
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Figure 13: Share of electoral districts contested at each election. Data from the History of
Parliament.
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Controls: none.
Logit model, standard errors clustered by MP.
X axis indicates probability of pro−reform vote with 95% conf. intervals.
Balanced sample. N = 5776.
Figure 14: Voting behavior by occupational group, no controls.
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Controls: electoral characteristics. Controls set at modal value.
Logit model, standard errors clustered by MP.
X axis indicates probability of pro−reform vote with 95% conf. intervals.
Balanced sample. N = 5776.
Figure 15: Voting behavior by occupational group, controls for electoral characteristics.
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Controls: electoral characteristics, personal characteristics. Controls set at modal value.
Logit model, standard errors clustered by MP.
X axis indicates probability of pro−reform vote with 95% conf. intervals.
Balanced sample. N = 5640.
Figure 16: Voting behavior by occupational group, controls for electoral and personal char-
acteristics.
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Figure 17: Voting behavior by occupational group, controls for electoral characteristics,
personal characteristics, and Whig aﬃliation.
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Figure 18: Voting behavior of groups A, B, and C, no controls.
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Controls: electoral characteristics. Controls set at modal value.
Logit model, standard errors clustered by MP.
X axis indicates probability of pro−reform vote with 95% conf. intervals.
Balanced sample. N = 5776.
Figure 19: Voting behavior of groups A, B, and C, controls for electoral characteristics.
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Figure 20: Voting behavior of groups A, B, and C, controls for electoral and personal
characteristics.
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Figure 21: Voting behavior of groups A, B, and C, controls for electoral characteristics,
personal characteristics, and Whig aﬃliation.
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Controls: electoral characteristics, personal characteristics.
Logit model, standard errors clustered by MP.
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Figure 22: Voting behavior of groups A, B, and C, controls for electoral characteristics and
personal characteristics. Only large constituencies.
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Figure 23: Voting behavior of groups A, B, and C, controls for electoral characteristics and
personal characteristics. Only competitive elections.
169Appendix D - Mathematical derivations
The maximization problem in (8). The problem is:
argmax
Go
To − Go + αu(G) s.t. Go ∈ [0,To] (97)
The necessary ﬁrst order condition for an interior solution to the oﬃcial’s utility maximiza-
tion problem is
∂
∂Go
(To − Go + αu(G)) = 0 (98)
⇐⇒ 0 − 1 +
∂
∂Go
αu(G) = 0 (99)
For large values of nE, the term ∂
∂Gαu(G) will be very small, and it can be approximated by
zero by Assumption 1. Doing this in (3) above leads to −1 = 0, which is a contradiction,
which implies no interior solutions exist. To ﬁnd the argmax, it then suﬃces to compare the
value of the oﬃcial’s utility function at the two extremes of the constraint set while assuming
all other oﬃcials optimize in the same manner. At the point Go = To the utility maximizer
reaches utility:
To − To + αu
  nO X
o=1
(To)
!
= αu
  nO X
o=1
(To)
!
(100)
and at the point G = 0 the utility maximizer reaches utility
To − 0 + αu
  nO X
o=1
(To) − To
!
(101)
170Therefore G = 0 is the argmax if:
To + αu
  nO X
o=1
(To) − To
!
> αu
  nO X
o=1
(To)
!
(102)
To > αu
  nO X
o=1
(To)
!
− αu
  nO X
o=1
(To) − To
!
(103)
By Assumption 1, the right hand side term can be approximated by zero, so for any positive
values of To, the condition holds, and the solution to the oﬃcial’s utility maximization
problem is G = 0. Now assuming all other oﬃcials choose the solution G = 0, at the point
G = To , the utility maximizer reaches utility
To − To + αu(To) (104)
At the point G = 0, the utility maximizer reaches utility
To − 0 = To (105)
So in this case G = 0 is the argmax if
To > αu(To) (106)
⇐⇒ To > αu(0 + To) − αu(0) (107)
Again, by Assumption 1, the term on the right hand side can be approximated by zero, so
G = 0 is the argmax in this case as well. This means the unique solution to the maximization
problem faced by the individual oﬃcial who takes into consideration that all other oﬃcials
are maximizing in a similar fashion is G = 0. Of course, the result that T and G are zero
is an approximation, as the small positive marginal utility at low levels of production of G
would induce each oﬃcial to produce some small quantity, but that eﬀect can be ignored for
simplicity of exposition. In case the small levels of production generated by the oﬃcials are
171not approximated by zero, Assumption 2 has to be modiﬁed slightly to argue that reform is
preferable in the one-shot interaction to the very small level of public good production.
The results in (15)-(16). To keep the government oﬃcial’s participation constraint holding
with equality, set
V
∗
o = V
OSD
o (108)
⇐⇒
1
1 − δO
(R
∗
o + αu(G
∗)) = T
∗
o + αu(G
∗) + δO
 
0 + αu(G∗)
1 − δO
!
(109)
⇐⇒
1
1 − δO
R
∗
o +
1
1 − δO
αu(G
∗) = T
∗
o + αu(G
∗) +
1
1 − δO
δOαu(G
∗) (110)
Multiply everything by (1 − δO):
R
∗
o + αu(G
∗) = (1 − δO)T
∗
o + (1 − δO)αu(G
∗) + δOαu(G
∗) (111)
Canceling the u(G∗) terms leads to:
R
∗
o = (1 − δO)T
∗
o (112)
which is condition (15) in the paper. The rest of the tax payment is returned as government
goods, so
G
∗
o = T
∗
o − (1 − δO)T
∗
o = δOT
∗
o (113)
which is condition (16) from the paper.
172Condition (19) follows immediately from V ∗
c ≥ V OSD
c :
1
1 − δE
(w − T
∗ + αu(G
∗)) ≥
1
1 − δE
(w − T
∗∗ − c + αu(G
∗∗)) (114)
⇐⇒ −T
∗ + αu(G
∗) ≥ −T
∗∗ − c + αu(G
∗∗) (115)
(αu(G
∗) − T
∗) − (αu(G
∗∗) − T
∗∗) + c ≥ 0 (116)
Proposition 2. To show that as α goes over some αRC, the condition for C tolerating
corruption will always be violated, a suﬃcient condition is that the partial derivative with
respect to α of the expression E1 = (αu(G∗) − T ∗) − (αu(G∗∗) − T ∗∗) is always negative,
and that the growth of the expression is unbounded. Before writing this partial derivative,
note that the parameters T ∗, G∗, T ∗∗, and G∗∗ which are endogenous with respect to α are
implicitly deﬁned by their optimality conditions:
∂
∂(G)
u(G
∗) =
1
δOneα
(117)
∂
∂(G)
u(G
∗∗) =
1
neα
(118)
Note that the expression E1 is in fact the loss in consumer surplus from the corrupt system
when compared to the reformed system. (An illustration is provided in ﬁgure 14). The loss
in consumer surplus (Y+Z in the ﬁgure) in reform versus corruption is given by
E2 = −nE
" 1
δO
− 1

G
∗ +
 G∗∗
G∗
α
∂
∂G
u(G)dG − (G
∗∗ − G
∗)
#
(119)
= −nE
 1
δO
G
∗ − G
∗∗ + αu(G
∗∗) − αu(G
∗)

(120)
= nEE1 (121)
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Figure 24: Consumer surplus in corruption = X; Consumer surplus in reform = X+Y+Z;
Rents paid = Y; Total payment in corruption = Y+W; Total payment in reform = W+K;
Loss in consumer surplus from corruption = Y+Z; Extra loss in consumer surplus with dα
= L
174The suﬃcient condition for E2 to become more negative is that for all α:
∂
∂α
G
∗ > 0 and
∂
∂α
G
∗∗ ≥ 0 (122)
This is because any additional unit of G∗ could have been obtained for the lower price of 1
instead of 1
δ under reform, so it can only add to the loss in surplus from corruption. So to
establish that E1 decreases with α it suﬃces to show that condition (26) holds. To do so,
the implicit function theorem can be applied to the two expressions that implicitly deﬁne
G∗and G∗∗. Taking the ﬁrst expression in (122):
∂G∗
∂α
= −
∂
h
nEα ∂
∂Gu(G∗) − 1
δO
i
∂α


∂
h
nEα ∂
∂Gu(G∗) − 1
δO
i
∂G


−1
= −nE
∂
∂G
u(G
∗)
 
nEα
∂
∂G
∂
∂G
u(G
∗)
!−1
= −
∂
∂G
u(G
∗)
 
α
∂2
∂G2u(G
∗)
!−1
It is known that ∂
∂Gu(G∗) > 0 and ∂2
∂G2u(G∗) < 0 so the expression on the right hand
side is strictly positive, which leads to ∂
∂αG∗ > 0. A similar derivation using the optimality
condition for G∗∗ will lead to:
∂G∗∗
∂α
= −
∂
∂G
u(G
∗∗)
 
α
∂2
∂G2u(G
∗∗)
!−1
This again shows that ∂
∂αG∗∗ > 0 , which leads to to ∂
∂αE1 < 0. This shows that the
loss in consumer surplus from corruption is strictly increasing in α. To be sure that as
α increases the condition for tolerating corruption fails, it has to be checked that, while
increasing, the loss is not bounded. Looking at E1 as a loss in consumer surplus, this is
equivalent to checking that the increase in consumption of G is not bounded as α increases.
This can be checked by taking the limit as α increases in the implicit deﬁnitions of G∗ and
G∗∗. This will lead to ∂
∂Gu(G∗) → 0 which implies G∗ → ∞ and similarly G∗∗ → ∞. This
175means the loss in consumer surplus is not bounded, so there always exists an αRC such that
for all α ≥ αRC condition (19) in the paper does not hold.
Proposition 3. To show that as α increases, A players become less likely to desire
reforms, note that the right hand side of equation (22) in the paper, E4 = αu(G∗∗)−αu(G∗)
is again a diﬀerence in consumer surpluses for a consumer who pays a price of zero for the
public good (e.g. the oﬃcial). From the implicit deﬁnition of G∗and G∗∗ it follows that
limα→∞(G∗∗ − G∗) = 0 , so limα→∞ (αu(G∗∗) − αu(G∗)) = 0. The left hand side is the rent
received by the o player, which is linearly dependent on the rent lost by all e players under
corruption. Since the total rent lost by e players is always

1
δO − 1

G∗, and it has been
shown that ∂
∂GG∗ > 0 and the increase in consumption is unbounded, it follows that the
rent lost by e players increases with α and is not bounded, so the rent received by each o
player, which is a linear function of that, also increases with α and is not bounded. Therefore
increases in α make the right hand side of the inequality lower and the left hand side higher,
so higher α make A player be less in favor of reforms.
Equilibrium conditions. The fact threats to remove the tax payment of an individual
O player who deviated are credible is derived from the fact that V ∗
C and V ∗1
c are equal as
long as no ≥ 2. This follows from the fact that no does not appear in the equilibrium
conditions of either e or o players. So as long as the corrupt equilibrium is desirable, it is
also the case that the threat of removing payments from one o player is credible. Another
question is then whether it is not possible to generate corrupt equilibria that more resilient
than the ones generated by the use of the individual punishments. In such an alternative
equilibrium, the other credible punishment, that of having all players revert to the one-shot
equilibrium in which reform is enacted, should be used. These strategies are clearly not able
to generate equilibria that the individual punishment strategy cannot generate, as writing
176the participation constraint for o players in case they are threatened with reform leads to:
V
∗(REF)
c ≥ V
OSD
c
1
1 − δO

R
∗(REF)
o + αu

G
∗(REF)

≥ T
∗(REF)
o + αu

G
∗(REF)

+ δO
 
0 + αu(G∗∗)
1 − δO
!
R
∗(REF) ≥ (1 − δO)T
∗
o + δOα

u(G
∗∗) − u(G
∗(REF))

Therefore the rents required for equilibria sustained by the threat of reform are greater
than the rents required for equilibria sustained by the threat of individual punishment,
R∗(REF)
o > R∗
o, so it cannot be that the value for c players of equilibria sustained by the
threat of reform is greater than the value of equilibria sustained by the threat of individual
punishments. If C players do not want to participate in a corrupt equilibrium sustained by
individual punishments, they are sure to not want to participate in a corrupt equilibrium
sustained by the weaker punishment of overall reform. This allows the analysis to concentrate
on equilibria sustained by individual punishments.
The result in (24) is given by replacing w with (w−S+wS) or w−S in the value functions
of B players. For players in B, the value function for the cooperative equilibrium path is
similar to that for C players, with the replacement of w by (w−S + wS):
V
∗
b =
1
1 − δE

w
−S + w
S − T
∗ + αu(G
∗)

(123)
However, the value function for reform has to take account of the loss of wS:
V
REF
b =
1
1 − δE

w
−S − T
∗∗ − c + αu(G
∗∗)

(124)
Setting V ∗
b ≥ V REF
b leads to
w
−S + w
S − T
∗ + αu(G
∗) ≥ w
−S − T
∗∗ − c + αu(G
∗∗) (125)
(αu(G
∗) − T
∗) − (αu(G
∗∗) − T
∗∗) + c + w
S ≥ 0 (126)
177Proposition 4. The fact that αRB > αRC is given by the fact that the pivotal B player’s
problem is identical to that of the C players, except the expression E1 = (αu(G∗) − T ∗) −
(αu(G∗∗) − T ∗∗) needs to be even lower than in the case of a C player for reforms to be
preferred (this is assuming O players have a reason to try to prevent B players from voting
for reform). This is because now this expression needs to become lower than (−c − wS),
whereas in the case of the C players, it needed to be lower than just (−c) for reform to be
desirable. It has been established that E1 is monotonically decreasing in α and unbounded,
so it is known that above a certain αRB it will become lower than the threshold (−c − wS),
but as the threshold is lower than the one for C players, it is also the case that αRB > αRC.
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